G. E. MOORE, Litt.D.
Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrews), F.B.A.
Lecturer in Moral Science in the University of Cambridge
Author of "Principia Ethica"
ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LTD
BROADWAY HOUSE: 68-74 CARTER LANE, E.C.4
||THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM
||THE NATURE AND REALITY OF OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION
||WILLIAM JAMES' "PRAGMATISM"
||THE STATUS OF SENSE-DATA
||THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY
||SOME JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION
||THE CONCEPTION OF INTRINSIC VALUE
||EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS
||THE NATURE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY
Those of the papers in this volume, which have been previously published, originally appeared as follows:—
I. "The Refutation of Idealism" in Mind, N.S. Vol. xii, 1903.
II. "The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1905-6.
III. "Professor James' 'Pragmatism'" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1907-8.
IV. "Hume's Philosophy" in The New Quarterly, November, 1909.
V. "The Status of Sense-Data" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1913-14.
VI. "The Conception of Reality" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1917-18.
VII. "Some Judgments of Perception" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1918-19.
IX. "External and Internal Relations" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1919-20.
All the papers contained in this volume, except the two ethical ones (VIII and X), have been previously published; and of those which have been previously published all, except that on "External and Internal Relations" (IX), are here re-printed without change. They were written at various dates between 1903 and 1921, and all are here printed in the order in which they were written, except that VIII on "The Conception of Intrinsic Value," which was written earlier than VI and VII, has been moved out of its proper place in order to bring it nearer to IX and X, to both of which it is closely related in subject.
All, except IV and X, were primarily intended for an audience familiar with the writings of philosophers; but I hope that they may nevertheless prove intelligible even to those who have read little or no philosophy, since I make little use of technical terms, and, where I have done so, have done my best to explain in ordinary language exactly what I mean by them. The tone of X is somewhat different from that of the rest, because it was written as a lecture for the Leicester Philosophical Society, with regard to which I was informed that I must not assume any previous acquaintance with philosophy in most of the audience. It accordingly bears marks throughout of the kind of audience for which it was intended.
An attentive reader will easily discover that some of the views expressed in some of the papers are inconsistent with views expressed in others. The fact is that some of the views expressed in some of the earlier ones are views with which I no longer agree; and I feel that some apology is needed for nevertheless republishing them exactly as they stood. In all cases, except one, my excuse is that the mistaken views in question are so embedded in the form and substance of the papers in which they occur, that it would have been impossible to correct them without practically substituting new papers for the old ones; and that, in spite of these mistakes, the old papers, as they stand, still seem to me, on the whole, to say things which are worth saying in a form which, however defective it may be, I doubt my own ability to improve upon. The only case in which I doubt whether this excuse applies is that of the first paper—"The Refutation of Idealism." This paper now appears to me to be very confused, as well as to embody a good many down-right mistakes; so I am doubtful whether I ought to have included it. But in this case I have another excuse: namely that it is a paper to which a good many allusions have been made by contemporary writers on philosophy; and I was told that, for some readers at all events, it would be a convenience that it should be re-printed along with the rest, if only for the sake of reference.
I said above that the only one of the previously published papers, in which changes have been made, is IX on "External and Internal Relations." In this case the changes are not due to any change in my views, but to the fact that, in that part of the paper in which symbols are used, I tried, when it was first published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, to use the symbols adopted by Whitehead and Russell in Principia Mathematica, and used them also without giving an explanation of their meaning which would be sufficient for readers not acquainted with that work. The symbols in question are symbols which it is difficult for printers to reproduce; and I have, therefore, thought it better, on this occasion, to use another set of symbols, which seem to me to be adequate for the