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THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA
A DICTIONARY OF ARTS, SCIENCES, LITERATURE AND GENERAL INFORMATION
ELEVENTH EDITION
VOLUME V SLICE VIII
Chariot to Chatelaine
Articles in This Slice
CHARIOT CHARLES MARTEL CHARISIUS, FLAVIUS SOSIPATER CHARLESTON (Illinois, U.S.A) CHARITON CHARLESTON (South Carolina, U.S.A.) CHARITY AND CHARITIES CHARLESTON (West Virginia, U.S.A.) CHARIVARI CHARLESTOWN CHARKHARI CHARLET, NICOLAS TOUSSAINT CHARLATAN CHARLEVILLE CHARLEMAGNE CHARLEVOIX, PIERRE FRANÇOIS XAVIER DE CHARLEMAGNE, JEAN ARMAND CHARLEVOIX CHARLEMONT, JAMES CAULFEILD CHARLOTTE CHARLEROI (town in Belgium) CHARLOTTENBURG CHARLEROI (borough of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.) CHARLOTTESVILLE CHARLES CHARLOTTETOWN CHARLES II. (Roman emperor) CHARM CHARLES III. (Roman emperor) CHARNAY, (CLAUDE JOSEPH) DÉSIRÉ CHARLES IV. (Roman emperor) CHARNEL HOUSE CHARLES V. (Roman emperor) CHARNOCK, JOB CHARLES VI. (Roman emperor)CHARIOT (derived from an O. Fr. word, formed from char, a car), in antiquity, a conveyance (Gr. ἅρμα, Lat. currus) used in battle, for the chase, in public processions and in games. The Greek chariot had two wheels, and was made to be drawn by two horses; if a third or, more commonly, two reserve horses were added, they were attached on each side of the main pair by a single trace fastened to the front of the chariot, as may be seen on two prize vases in the British Museum from the Panathenaic games at Athens. On the monuments there is no other sign of traces, from the want of which wheeling round must have been difficult. Immediately on the axle (ἄξων, axis), without springs of any kind, rested the basket or body (δίφρος) of the chariot, which consisted of a floor to stand on, and a semicircular guard round the front about half the height of the driver. It was entirely open at the back, so that the combatant might readily leap to the ground and up again as was necessary. There was no seat, and generally only room for the combatant and his charioteer to stand in. The pole (ῥυμός, temo) was probably attached to the middle of the axle, though it appears to spring from the front of the basket; at the end of the pole was the yoke (ζυγὸν, jugum), which consisted of two small saddles fitting the necks of the horses, and fastened by broad bands round the chest. Besides this the harness of each horse consisted of a bridle and a pair of reins, mostly the same as in use now, made of leather and ornamented with studs of ivory or metal. The reins were passed through rings attached to the collar bands or yoke, and were long enough to be tied round the waist of the charioteer in case of his having to defend himself. The wheels and body of the chariot were usually of wood, strengthened in places with bronze or iron; the wheels had from four to eight spokes and tires of bronze or iron. This description applies generally to the chariots of all the nations of antiquity; the differences consisted chiefly in the mountings. The chariots of the Egyptians and Assyrians, with whom the bow was the principal arm of attack, were richly mounted with quivers full of arrows, while those of the Greeks, whose characteristic weapon was the spear, were plain except as regards mere decoration. Among the Persians, again, and more remarkably among the ancient Britons, there was a class of chariot having the wheels mounted with sharp, sickle-shaped blades, which cut to pieces whatever came in their way. This was probably an invention of the Persians; Cyrus the younger employed these chariots in large numbers. Among the Greeks and Romans, on the other hand, the chariot had passed out of use in war before historical times, and was retained only for races in the public games, or for processions, without undergoing any alteration apparently, its form continuing to correspond with the description of Homer, though it was lighter in build, having to carry only the charioteer. On two Panathenaic prize vases in the British Museum are figures of racing bigae, in which, contrary to the description given above, the driver is seated with his feet resting on a board hanging down in front close to the legs of his horses. The biga itself consists of a seat resting on the axle, with a rail at each side to protect the driver from the wheels. The chariot was unsuited to the uneven soil of Greece and Italy, and it is not improbable that these nations had brought it with them as part of their original habits from their former seats in the East. In the remains of Egyptian and Assyrian art there are numerous representations of chariots, from which it may be seen with what richness they were sometimes ornamented. The “iron” chariots in use among the Jews appear to have been chariots strengthened or plated with metal, and no doubt were of the form above described, which prevailed generally among the other ancient nations. (See also Carriage.)
The chief authorities are J.C. Ginzrot, Die Wagen and Fahrwerke der Griechen und Römer (1817); C.F. Grashof, Über das Fuhrwerk bei Homer und Hesiod (1846); W. Leaf in Journal of Hellenic Studies, v.; E. Buchholz, Die homerischen Realien (1871-1885); W. Helbig, Das homerische Epos aus den Denkmälern erläutert (1884), and the article “Currus” in Daremberg and Saglio, Dictionnaire des Antiquités.
CHARISIUS, FLAVIUS SOSIPATER, Latin grammarian, flourished about the middle of the 4th century A.D. He was probably an African by
The best edition is by H. Keil, Grammatici Latini, i. (1857); see also article by G. Götz in Pauly-Wissowa’s Realencyclopädie, iii. 2 (1899); Teuffel-Schwabe, Hist. of Roman Literature (Eng. trans.), § 419, I. 2; Fröhde, in Jahr. f. Philol., 18 Suppl. (1892), 567-672.
CHARITON, of Aphrodisias in Caria, the author of a Greek romance entitled The Loves of Chaereas and Callirrhoë, probably flourished in the 4th century A.D. The action of the story, which is to a certain extent historical, takes place during the time of the Peloponnesian War. Opinions differ as to the merits of the romance, which is an imitation of Xenophon of Ephesus and Heliodorus.
Editions by J.P. D’Orville (1783), G.A. Hirschig (1856) and R. Hercher (1859); there is an (anonymous) English translation (1764); see also E. Rohde, Der griechische Roman (1900).
CHARITY AND CHARITIES. The word “charity,” or love, represents the principle of the good life. It stands for a mood or habit of mind and an endeavour. From it, as a habit of mind, springs the social and personal endeavour which in the widest sense we may call charity. The two correspond. Where the habit of mind has not been gained, the endeavour fluctuates and is relatively purposeless. In so far as it has been gained, the endeavour is founded on an intelligent scrutiny of social conditions and guided by a definite purpose. In the one case it is realized that some social theory must be found by us, if our action is to be right and consistent; in the other case no need of such a theory is felt. This article is based on the assumption that there are principles in charity or charitable work, and that these can be ascertained by a study of the development of social conditions, and their relation to prevalent social aims and religious or philosophic conceptions. It is assumed also that the charity of the religious life, if rightly understood, cannot be inconsistent with that of the social life.
Perhaps some closer definition of charity is necessary. The words that signify goodwill towards the community and its members are primarily words expressive of the affections of family life in the relations existing between parents, and between parent and child. As will be seen, the analogies underlying such phrases as “God the Father,” “children of God,” “brethren,” have played a great part in the development of charitable thought in pre-Christian as well as in Christian days. The germ, if we may say so, of the words φιλία, ἀγάπη, amor, love; amicitia, friendship, is the sexual or the parental relation. With the realization of the larger life in man the meaning of the word expands. Caritas, or charity, strikes another note—high price, and thus dearness. It is charity, indeed, expressed in mercantile metaphor; and it would seem that it was associated in thought with the word χάρις, which has also a commercial meaning, but signifies as well favour, gratitude, grace, kindness. Partly thus, perhaps, it assumed and suggested a nobler conception; and sometimes, as, for instance, in English ecclesiastical documents, it was spelt charitas. Άγάπη, which in the Authorized Version of the Bible is translated charity, was used by St Paul as a translation of the Hebrew word hēsēd, which in the Old Testament is in the same version translated “mercy”—as in Hosea vi. 6, “I desired mercy, and not sacrifice.” This word represents the charity of kindness and goodness, as distinguished from almsgiving. Almsgiving, şedāqāh, is translated by the word ἐλεημούνη in the Septuagint, and in the Authorized Version by the word “righteousness.” It represents the deed or the gift which is due—done or made, not spontaneously, but under a sense of religious obligation. In the earlier Christian period the word almsgiving has this meaning, and was in that sense applied to a wide range of actions and contracts, from a gift to a beggar at a church door to a grant and a tenure of land. It also, in the word almoner, represented the fulfilment of the religious obligation with the aid of an agent or delegate. The words charity or love (caritas or ἀγάπη), on the other hand, without losing the tone with which the thought of parental or family love inspires them, assume a higher meaning. In religious thought they imply an ideal life, as represented by such expressions as “love (agape) of God.” This on the one side; and on the other an ideal social relation, in such words as “love of man.” Thus in the word “charity” religious and social associations meet; and thus regarded the word means a disciplined and habitual mood in which the mind is considerate of the welfare of others individually and generally, and devises what is for their real good, and in which the intelligence and the will strive to fulfil the mind’s purpose. Charity thus has no necessary relation to relief or alms. To give a lecture, or to nurse a sick man who is not in want or “poor,” may be equally a deed of charity; though in fact charity concerns itself largely with the classes usually called “the poor,” and with problems of distress and relief. Relief, however, is not an essential part of charity or charitable work. It is one of many means at its disposal. If the world were so poor that no one could make a gift, or so wealthy that no one needed it, charity—the charity of life and of deeds—would remain.
The history of charity is a history of many social and religious theories, influences and endeavours, that have left their mark alike upon the popular and the cultivated thought of the present day. The inconsistencies of charitable effort and argument may thus in part be accounted for. To understand the problem of charity we have therefore (1) to consider the stages of charitable thought—the primitive, pagan, Greek and Roman, Jewish and Christian elements, that make up the modern consciousness in regard to charity, and also the growth of the habit of “charity” as representing a gradually educated social instinct. (2) We have also to consider in their relation to charity the results of recent investigations of the conditions of social life. (3) At each stage we have to note the corresponding stage of practical administration in public relief and private effort—for the division between public or “poor-law” relief and charity which prevails in England is, comparatively speaking, a novelty, and, generally speaking, the work of charity can hardly be appreciated or understood if it be considered without reference to public relief. (4) As to the present day, we have to consider practical suggestions in regard to such subjects as charity and economic thought, charity organization, friendly visiting and almonership, co-operation with the poor-law, charity and thrift, parochial management, hospitals and medical relief, exceptional distress and the “unemployed,” the utilization of endowments and their
First in the series come the charities of the family and of hospitality; then the wider charities of religion, the charities of the community, and of individual donors and of mutual help. These gradually assumed importance in communities which consisted originally of self-supporting classes, within which widows and orphans, for instance, would be rather provided for, in accordance with recognized class obligations, than relieved. Then come habitual almsgiving, the charitable endowment, and the modern charitable institution and association. But throughout the test of progress or decadence appears to be the condition of the family. The family is the source, the home and the hearthstone of charity. It has been created but slowly, and there is naturally a constant tendency to break away from its obligations and to ignore and depreciate its utility. Yet the family, as we now have it, is itself the outcome of infinite thought working through social instinct, and has at each stage of its development indicated a general advance. To it, therefore, constant reference must be made.
Part I.—primitive Charity
The study of early communities has brought to light the history of the development of the family. “Marriage in its lowest phases is by no means a matter of affection or companionship”; and only very slowly has the position of both parents been recognized as implying different but correlative responsibilities towards their child. Only very slowly, also, has the morality necessary to the making of the family been won. Charity at earlier stages is hardly recognized as a virtue, nor infanticide as an evil. Hospitality—the beginning of a larger social life—is non-existent. The self-support of the community is secured by marriage, and when relations fail marriage becomes a provision against poverty. Then by the tribal system is created another safeguard against want. But apart also from these methods of maintenance, at a very early stage there is charitable relief. The festivals of the solstices and equinoxes, and of the seasons, are the occasions for sacrifice and relief; and, as Christmas customs prove, the instinct to give help or alms at such festival periods still remains. Charity is concerned primarily with certain elemental forces of social life: the relation between these primitive instincts and impulses that still influence charity should not, therefore, be overlooked. The basis of social life is also the basis of charitable thought and action.
The savage is the civilized man in the rough. “The lowest races have,” Lord Avebury writes, “no institution of marriage.” Many have no word for “dear” or “beloved.” The child belongs to the tribe rather than to the parent. In these circumstances a problem of charity such as the following may arise:—“Am I to starve, while my sister has children whom she can sell?” a question asked of Burton by a negro. From the point of view of the tribe, an able-bodied man would be more valuable than dependent children, and the relationship of the larger family of brothers and sisters would be a truer claim to help than that of mother and child. Subsequently the child is recognized as related, not to the father, but to the mother, and there is “a kind of bond which lasts for life between mother and child, although the father is a stranger to it.” Slowly only is the relative position of both parents, with different but correlative responsibilities, recognized. The first two steps of charity have then been made: the social value of the bond between the mother, and then between the father, and the child has been recognized. Until this point is reached the morality necessary to the making of the family is wanting, and for a long time afterwards it is hardly won. The virtue of chastity—the condition precedent to the higher family life—is unrecognized. Indeed, the set of such religious thought as there may be is against it. Abstract conceptions, even in the nobler races, are lacking. The religion of life is vaguely struggling with its animality, and that which it at last learns to rule it at first worships. In these circumstances there is little charity for the child and little for the stranger. “There is,” Dr Schweinfurth wrote in his Heart of Africa, “an utter want of wholesome intercourse between race and race. For any member of a tribe that speaks one dialect to cross the borders of a tribe that speaks another is to make a venture at the hazard of his life.” The religious obligations that fostered and sanctified family life among the Greeks and Romans and Jews are unknown. Much later in development comes charity for the child, with the abhorrence of infanticide—against which the Jewish-Christian charity of 2000 years ago uttered its most vigorous protests. If the child belonged primarily to the tribe or state, its maintenance or destruction was a common concern. This motive influenced the Greeks, who are historically nearer the earlier forms of social life than ourselves. For the common good they exposed the deformed child; but also “where there were too many, for in our state population has a limit,” as Aristotle says, “the babe or unborn child was destroyed.” And so, to lighten their own responsibilities, parents were wont to do in the slow years of the degradation of the Roman empire, though the interest of the state then required a contrary policy. The transition to our present feeling of responsibility for child-life has been very gradual and uncertain, through the middle ages and even till the 18th century. Strictly it may be said that all penitentiaries and other similar institutions are concrete protests on behalf of a better family life. The movement for the care of children in the 18th century naturally and instinctively allied itself with the penitentiary movement. The want of regard for child-life, when the rearing of children becomes a source of economic pressure, suggests why in earlier stages of civilization all that charitable apparatus which we now think necessary for the assistance of children is wanting, even if the need, so far as it does arise, is not adequately met by the recognized obligations of the clan-family or brotherhood.
In the case of barbarous races charity and self-support may be considered from some other points of view. Self-support is secured in two ways—by marriage and by slavery. “For a man or woman to be unmarried after the age of thirty is unheard of” (T.H. Lewin, Wild Races of South-East India). On the other hand, if any one is without a father, mother or other relative, and destitute of the necessaries of life, he may sell himself and become a slave. Thus slavery becomes a provision for poverty when relations fail. The clan-family may serve the same purpose. David Livingstone describes the formation of the clan-family among the Bakuena. “Each man, by virtue of paternity, is chief of his own children. They build huts round his.... Near the centre of each circle of huts is a spot called a ‘kotla,’ with a fireplace; here they work, eat, &c. A poor man attaches himself to the ‘kotla’ of a rich one, and is considered a child of the latter.” Thus the clan-family is also a poor-relief association.
Studies in folklore bring to light many relations between the charity of the old world and that of our own day.
In regard to the charity of the early community, we may take the 8th century B.C. as the point of departure. The Odyssey (about 800 B.C.) and Hesiod (about 700 B.C.) are roughly parallel with Amos (816-775), and represent The early community. two streams
Under the same patronage of Zeus and the same laws of hospitality were vagrants and beggars. The vagrant and loafer are sketched in the Odyssey—the vagrant who lies glibly that he may get entertainment, and the loafer who prefers begging to work on a farm. These and the winter idlers, whom Hesiod pictures—a group known to modern life—prefer at that season to spend their time in the warmth of the village smithy, or at a house of common resort (λέσχη)—a common lodging-house, we might say—where they would pass the night. Apparently, as in modern times, the vagrants had organized their own system of entertainment, and, supported by the public, were a class for whom it was worth while to cater. The local or public beggars formed a still more definite class. Their begging was a recognized means of maintenance; it was a part of the method of poor relief. Thus of Penelope it was said that, if Odysseus’ tale were true, she would give him better clothes, and then he might beg his bread throughout the country-side. Feasts, too, and almsgiving were nearly allied, and feasts have always been one resource for the relief of the poor. Thus naturally the beggars frequented feasts, and were apparently a recognized and yet inevitable nuisance. They wore, as part of their dress, scrips or wallets in which they carried away the food they received, as later Roman clients carried away portions of food in baskets (sportula) from their patron’s dinner. Odysseus, when he dresses up as a beggar, puts on a wallet as part of his costume. Thus we find a system of voluntary relief in force based on a recognition of the duty of almsgiving as complete and peremptory as that which we shall notice later among the Jews and the early Christians. We are concerned with country districts, and not with towns, and, as social conditions that are similar produce similar methods of administration, so we find here a general plan of relief similar to that which was in vogue in Scotland till the Scottish Poor Law Act of 1845.
In Hesiod the fundamental conceptions of charity are more clearly expressed. He has, if not his ten, at least his four commandments, for disobedience to which Zeus will punish the offender. They are: Thou shalt do no evil to suppliant or guest; thou shalt not dishonour any woman of the family; thou shalt not sin against the orphan; thou shalt not be unkind to aged parents.