HISTORY
OF THE
EXPEDITION TO RUSSIA,
UNDERTAKEN BY THE
EMPEROR NAPOLEON,
IN THE YEAR 1812.
BY GENERAL, COUNT PHILIP DE SEGUR.
SECOND EDITION, CAREFULLY REVISED AND CORRECTED.
IN TWO VOLUMES,
Volume One
Volume Two
WITH A MAP AND SEVEN ENGRAVINGS.
VOL. I.
LONDON:
TREUTTEL AND WURTZ, TREUTTEL, jun. AND RICHTER,
30, SOHO-SQUARE.
1825.
Portrait of Napoleon
TO THE
VETERANS OF THE GRAND ARMY.
COMRADES,
I have undertaken the task of tracing the History of the Grand Army and its Leader during the year 1812. I address it to such of you as the ices of the North have disarmed, and who can no longer serve their country, but by the recollections of their misfortunes and their glory. Stopped short in your noble career, your existence is much more in the past than in the present; but when the recollections are so great, it is allowable to live solely on them. I am not afraid, therefore, of troubling that repose which you have so dearly purchased, by placing before you the most fatal of your deeds of arms. Who is there of us but knows, that from the depth of his obscurity the looks of the fallen man are involuntarily directed towards the splendor of his past existence—even when its light illuminates the shoal on which the bark of his fortune struck, and when it displays the fragments of the greatest of shipwrecks?
For myself, I will own, that an irresistible feeling carries me back incessantly to that disastrous epoch of our public and private calamities. My memory feels a sort of melancholy pleasure in contemplating and renewing the painful traces which so many horrors have left in it. Is the soul, also, proud of her deep and numerous wounds? Does she delight in displaying them? Are they a property of which she has reason to be proud? Is it rather, that after the desire of knowing them, her first wish is to impart her sensations? To feel, and to excite feeling, are not these the most powerful springs of our soul?
But in short, whatever may be the cause of the sentiment which actuates me, I have yielded to the desire of retracing the various sensations which I experienced during that fatal war. I have employed my leisure hours in separating, arranging, and combining with method my scattered and confused recollections. Comrades! I also invoke yours! Suffer not such great remembrances, which have been so dearly purchased, to be lost; for us they are the only property which the past leaves to the future. Single, against so many enemies, ye fell with greater glory than they rose. Learn, then, that there was no shame in being vanquished! Raise once more those noble fronts, which have been furrowed with all the thunders of Europe! Cast not down those eyes, which have seen so many subject capitals, so many vanquished kings! Fortune, doubtless, owed you a more glorious repose; but, such as it is, it depends on yourselves to make a noble use of it. Let history inscribe your recollections. The solitude and silence of misfortune are propitious to her labours; and let truth, which is always present in the long nights of adversity, at last enlighten labours that may not prove unproductive.
As for me, I will avail myself of the privilege, sometimes painful, sometimes glorious, of telling what I have seen, and of retracing, perhaps with too scrupulous attention, its most minute details; feeling that nothing was too minute in that prodigious Genius and those gigantic feats, without which we should never have known the extent to which human strength, glory, and misfortune, may be carried.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
VOLUME FIRST.
BOOK I.
Chap.
- —Political relations of France and Russia since 1807
- —Prussia.—Frederick William
- —Turkey.—Sultans Selim—Mustapha—Mahmoud
- —Sweden.—Bernadotte
BOOK II.
Chap.
- —Feelings of Napoleon's grandees at the approaching contest—their objections, with Napoleon's replies—real motives which urged him to the struggle
- —Arguments against the war by the Dukes of Frioul and Vicenza and the Count de Segur.—Napoleon's replies
- —His manner of gaining proselytes to his opinions—his avowals to his own family—his discussions with Cardinal Fesch—his declaration to Prince Kourakin
- —Circumstances inclining him to delay the contest—his proposals to England and to Russia—Russian ultimatum
- —Preparations for commencement—Talleyrand—opinions of the military—of Napoleon's ministers and generals—fresh obstacles to his departure
BOOK III.
Chap.
- —Napoleon's departure from
BOOK IV.
Chap.
- —Addresses of Napoleon and Alexander to their respective armies—Position of the Russian forces—Napoleon's plans in consequence—Sketch of the operations of his left and right wings during the campaign
- —Passage of the Niemen—Dreadful storm and its fatal effects—Melancholy catastrophe—Napoleon's arrival at Wilna—Political arrangements
- —Feelings of the Lithuanians—Napoleon's answer to the address of the Polish confederation—Coolness of the Lithuanians, and discussion of its causes
- —Distress of the army and its excesses—Manner in which Napoleon was affected by them
- —Arrival of Balachoff from Alexander—Quarrel between Napoleon and Caulaincourt—Progress of the invading army to the 10th of July
- —Operations of the King of Westphalia's and of Davoust's divisions—Perilous situation and narrow escape of Bagration
- —Napoleon's departure from Wilna—Retreat of the Russian army from Drissa to Witepsk—Arrival of the different French corps at Beszenkowiczi—Different partial actions near Witepsk
- —General engagement before Witepsk—French attack ordered to cease in expectation of a decisive battle on the following day—Retreat of the Russians—Napoleon's disappointment—Position of his different corps
BOOK V.
Chap.
- —Napoleon's first plans for halting at Witepsk—afterwards abandoned, and his determination to proceed to Smolensk
- —Discussions with the officers of his household—their reasons for dissuading him from advancing further, and his replies—Feelings of the army in general
- —Operations of Oudinot's corps against that of Wittgenstein—partial successes on both sides—Napoleon determines to change his line of operation
BOOK VI.
Chap.
- —Manner in which this manœuvre was effected—The army crosses the Boristhenes—Character of the Jewish and native population
- —Surprise of Newerowskoi's corps beyond Krasnoë—Bold retreat of that officer
- .—Movements of the main Russian army—Plans of Barclay—his dissension with Bagration—hastens to the relief of Smolensk—about to be surprised by Napoleon—Unsuccessful attack of the French on Smolensk
- —Retreat of the Russian army, and fresh disappointment of Napoleon—Ineffectual attempts of Murat to dissuade his farther advance—Capture of Smolensk
- —Napoleon's reflections on the conduct of the Russians—Intelligence of Regnier's victory over Tormasof—Opinions of the Emperor's principal officers as to the impolicy of proceeding farther
- —State of the allied army—its immense losses from various causes, independent of the enemy—Napoleon's professed intention to stop, but real determination to proceed
- —Final evacuation of Smolensk by the Russians after setting it on fire—their army overtaken by Murat and Ney—Death of General Gudin—Battle of Valoutina—Narrow escape of the Russians in consequence of Junot's irresolution
- —Results of the battle—Recompenses and rewards conferred by Napoleon—Enthusiasm of the army—Melancholy state of the wounded—Animosity of the Russian population
- —Napoleon's plans of moving the Russian peasantry to insurrection—Conduct of their nobles to ward off the danger—Napoleon's hesitation as to the plan he should pursue
- —Saint Cyr's victory over Wittgenstein on the 18th of August—Dissension between Murat and
BOOK VII.
Chap.
- —Manner in which the allied army was supplied on its march—Details of the organization of Davoust's corps
- —Napoleon's bulletin and decrees at Slawkowo—Fresh quarrels between Murat and Davoust—Description of the Russian mode of retreat and of Murat's method of pursuit
- —Advance to Wiazma and to Gjatz—Refusal of Davoust to obey Murat—Full development of the Russian plan of destroying their cities and towns
- —Clamours of the Russians against Barclay—Kutusof sent to supersede him—Great merit of Barclay's plan of retreat
- —Near prospect of a battle—Character of Kutusof—Sanguinary and partial action on the 4th of September—Anecdote of Murat—Napoleon's survey of the ground
- —Disposition of the Russian army on the field of Borodino—Napoleon's plan of battle
- —Plan proposed by Davoust rejected by Napoleon—Feelings of the French army—Proclamation of Napoleon
- —Preparations of the Russians—Feelings of their soldiery—Napoleon's anxiety—his indisposition on the night before the battle
- —Battle of Borodino on the 7th of September
- —Battle of Borodino on the 7th of September (Cont.)
- —Battle of Borodino on the 7th of September (Cont.)
- —Results of the battle—immense loss on both sides—faults committed by Napoleon—how accounted for—incompleteness of his victory
- —Advance to, and skirmish before Mojaisk—Gallantry of fifty voltigeurs of the 33d—Surprising order in the Russian retreat—Napoleon's distress
VOLUME SECOND.
BOOK VIII.
Chap.
- —The Emperor Alexander's arrival at Moscow after his retreat from Drissa—Description of that city—Sacrifices voted by the nobility and the merchants to meet the threatened danger
- —Alarm in consequence of the advance of the French army—Determination of the Governor, Count Rostopchin, and his preparations for destroying the capital—Evacuation of Moscow by the principal part of the inhabitants on the 3d of September
- —State of that city just before and after the battle of Borodino—The Governor's departure
- IV.—Napoleon advances to Moscow on the 14th of September—Feelings of the army on approaching it—Disappointment at finding it deserted
- —Murat's entrance into the city
- —Napoleon's entrance into the Kremlin—Discovery of the conflagration of the city
- —Danger which he ran in escaping through the flames to Petrowsky—Hesitation as to his future plans
- .—His return to the Kremlin—Description of the camps outside the city—System of general plunder—Reproaches made to the army, and vindication of it
- —Conduct of Kutusof after abandoning Moscow—Rostopchin sets fire to his seat at Woronowo—Partial actions at Czerikowo and Vinkowo—Anxiety and uneasiness of Napoleon—consultation with his chief officers—Sends Lauriston to the Emperor
- —Conference of Lauriston with Kutusof—Artful conduct of the latter—Armistice—Infatuation of Murat—Distress of the French army—Warnings of the impending danger—Napoleon's obstinacy in remaining
- —Illusions by which he kept up his own and his army's hopes—Count Daru's advice—Rupture of the armistice—Incapacity of Berthier—Disastrous engagement at Vinkowo—Napoleon determines to leave Moscow
BOOK IX.
Chap.
- —Departure from Moscow—Composition of the army
BOOK X.
Chap.
- —Wittgenstein's attack upon Saint Cyr at Polotsk—Retreat of the latter—Want of concert in the movements of the Russian generals
- —Junction of the corps of Saint Cyr and Victor at Smoliantzy on the 31st October—Opportunity lost by the latter of defeating the enemy—General view of the state of the army—Errors committed by Napoleon and his commanders
- —Napoleon's departure from Smolensk—Dispositions of the Russian army to interrupt his farther retreat—Bravery of Excelmans—Arrival at Krasnoë
- —March of Eugene from Smolensk to Krasnoë with the remains of his corps—his narrow escape
- —Successful nocturnal attack by Roguet on the Russian camp at Chickowa—Desperate situation of Napoleon—Wilson's fruitless efforts to induce Kutusof to surround and destroy him—Battle of Krasnoë—Bravery of the guard under Mortier
- —Napoleon's arrival at Dombrowna—Nocturnal false alarm—General disorganization of the army—Davoust's ineffectual efforts to check it
- —Council held at Orcha to determine the farther course of retreat—Opinion of Jomini—Napoleon decides on Borizof—Quits Orcha on the 20th of November without hearing any thing of Ney—Re-appearance of that Marshal after his departure
- —Details of Ney's retreat from Smolensk until his arrival at Orcha
- —Details of Ney's retreat from Smolensk until his arrival at Orcha (cont.)
BOOK XI.
Chap.
- —Capture of Minsk by the Russians—Different opinions in the army as to the causes of their disasters—Rumoured treachery of Schwartzenberg—Napoleon's reproaches to him and Schwartzenberg's reply
- —Details of the loss of Minsk—Movements of Dombrowski, Oudinot, and Victor—Distress and malady of Napoleon—Remarkable conversation with Count Daru
- —Passage through the Forest of Minsk—Junction of the remains of the grand army with Victor and Oudinot's corps—State of the former
- —Preparations for crossing the Berezina
BOOK XII.
Chap.
- —Napoleon's journey from Smorgony to Paris—Impression produced in the army by his departure—Dreadful effects of the increased cold
- —Picture of the sufferings of the army from the cold and the climate
- —Arrival at Wilna—Consternation of the inhabitants—Fatal effects of not distributing the provisions collected among the troops—State of the wounded in the hospitals—Arrival of the Russians—Flight of Murat—Evacuation of Wilna—Immense losses which that occasioned—Disaster at Ponari
- —Details of Ney's mode of retreat—Losses occasioned to the Russians by the severity of the winter—Arrival at Kowno—Ney's defence and evacuation of that place
- —First symptoms of Murat's defection—Arrival at Königsberg
- —Marshal Macdonald's retreat from Riga—Details of the defection of the Prussian Army under Yorck
- —Marshal Macdonald's retreat from Riga—Details of the defection of the Prussian Army under Yorck (Cont.)
- —Marshal Macdonald's retreat from Riga—Details of the defection of the Prussian Army under Yorck (Cont.)
- —Marshal Macdonald's retreat from Riga—Details of the defection of the Prussian Army under Yorck (Cont.)
- —Conduct of Schwartzenberg and defection of the Austrians—Atrocities committed on the French prisoners at Wilna and Königsberg
- —Defection of Murat
- —Conclusion
DIRECTIONS FOR PLACING THE PLATES.
- Portrait of Napoleon
- Map of the countries between Paris and Moscow
- Passage of the Niemen
- Portrait of Murat, King of Naples
- Portrait of the Emperor Alexander
- Conflagration of Moscow
- Portrait of Marshal Ney
- Passage of the Berezina
Map of the countries between Paris and Moscow
(To see this map assembled, click here.)
HISTORY
OF
NAPOLEON'S EXPEDITION
TO
BOOK I.
CHAP. I.
Ever since 1807, when the space between the Rhine and the Niemen had been overrun, the two great empires of which these rivers were the boundaries had become rivals. By his concessions at Tilsit, at the expense of Prussia, Sweden, and Turkey, Napoleon had only satisfied Alexander. That treaty was the result of the defeat of Russia, and the date of her submission to the continental system. Among the Russians, it was regarded by some as attacking their honour; and by all it was felt to be ruinous to their interests.
By the continental system Napoleon had declared eternal war against the English; to that system he attached his honour, his political existence, and that of the nation under his sway. That system banished from the Continent all merchandise which was English, or had paid duty in any shape to England. He could not succeed in establishing it but by the unanimous consent of the continental nations, and that consent could not be hoped for but under a single and universal dominion.
France had besides alienated the nations of Europe from her by her conquests, and the monarchs by her revolution and her new dynasty. Henceforward she could no longer look forward to have either friends or rivals, but merely subjects; for the first would have been false, and the second implacable: it followed that all must be subject to her, or she to all.
With feelings of this kind, her leader, influenced by his position, and urged on by his enterprising character, filled his imagination with the vast project of becoming the sole master of Europe, by overwhelming Russia, and wresting Poland from her dominion. He had so much difficulty in concealing this project, that hints of it began to escape him in all directions. The immense preparations which so distant an enterprise required, the enormous quantities of provisions and ammunition collecting, the noise of arms, of carriages, and the march of such numbers of soldiers—the universal movement the majestic and terrible course of all the forces of the West against the East—every thing announced to Europe that her two colossuses were about to measure their strength with each other.
But, to get within reach of Russia, it was necessary to go beyond Austria, to cross Prussia, and to march between Sweden and Turkey; an offensive alliance with these four powers was therefore indispensable. Austria was as much subject to the influence of Napoleon as Prussia was to his arms: to them he had only to declare his intentions; Austria voluntarily and eagerly entered into his plans, and Prussia he easily prevailed on to join him.
Austria, however, did not act blindly. Situated between the two great colossuses of the North and the West, she was not displeased to see them at war: she looked to their mutually weakening each other, and to the increase of her own strength by their exhaustion. On the 14th of March, 1812, she promised France 30,000 men; but she prepared prudent secret instructions for them. She obtained a vague promise of an increase of territory, as an indemnity for her share of the expenses of the war, and the possession of Gallicia was guaranteed to her. She admitted, however, the future possibility of a cession of part of that province to the kingdom of Poland; but in exchange for that she would have received the Illyrian provinces. The sixth article of the secret treaty establishes that fact.
The success of the war, therefore, in no degree depended on the cession of Gallicia, or the difficulties arising from the Austrian jealousy of that possession. Napoleon, consequently, might on his entrance into Wilna, have publicly proclaimed the liberation of the whole of Poland, instead of betraying the expectations of her people, astonishing and rendering them indifferent by expressions of wavering import.
This, however, was one of those prominent points, which in politics as well as in war are decisive, with which every thing is connected, and from which nothing ought to have made him swerve. But whether it was that Napoleon reckoned too much on the ascendancy of his genius, or the strength of his army, and the weakness of Alexander; or that, considering what he left behind him, he felt it too dangerous to carry on so distant a war slowly and methodically; or whether, as we shall presently be told by himself, he had doubts of the success of his undertaking; certain it is, that he either neglected, or could not yet determine to proclaim the liberation of that country whose freedom he had come to restore.
And yet he had sent an ambassador to her Diet. When this inconsistency was remarked to him, he replied, that "that nomination was an act of war, which only bound him during the war, while by his words he would be bound both in war and peace." Thus it was, that he made no other reply to the enthusiasm of the Lithuanians than evasive expressions, at the very time he was following up his attack on Alexander to the very capital of his empire.
He even neglected to clear the southern Polish provinces of the feeble hostile armies which kept the patriotism of their inhabitants in check, and to secure, by strongly organizing their insurrection, a solid basis of operation. Accustomed to short methods, and to rapid attacks, he wished to imitate himself, in spite of the difference of places and circumstances; for such is the weakness of man, that he is always led by imitation, either of others, or of himself, which in the latter case, that of great men, is habit; for habit is nothing more than the imitation of one's self. So true it is, that by their strongest side these extraordinary men are undone!
The one in question committed himself to the fortune of battles. Having prepared an army of six hundred and fifty thousand men, he fancied that that was doing sufficient to secure victory, from which he expected every thing. Instead of sacrificing every thing to obtain victory, it was by that he looked to obtain every thing; he made use of it as a means, when it ought to have been his end. In this manner he made it too necessary; it was already rather too much so. But he confided so much of futurity to it, he overloaded it with so much responsibility, that it became urgent and indispensable to him. Hence his precipitation to get within reach of it, in order to extricate himself from so critical a position.
But we must not be too hasty in condemning a genius so great and universal; we shall shortly hear from himself by what urgent necessity he was hurried on; and even admitting that the rapidity of his expedition was only equalled by its rashness, success would have probably crowned it, if the premature decline of his health had left the physical constitution of this great man all the vigour which his mind still retained.
CHAP. II.
As to Prussia, of which Napoleon was completely master, it is not known whether it was from his uncertainty as to the fate which he reserved for her, or as to the period at which he should commence the war, that he refused, in 1811, to contract the alliance which she herself proposed to him, and of which he dictated the conditions, in 1812.
His aversion to Frederick William was remarkable. Napoleon had been frequently heard to speak reproachfully of the cabinet of Prussia for its treaties with the French republic. He said, "It was a desertion of the cause of kings; that the negotiations of the court of Berlin with the Directory displayed a timid, selfish, and ignoble policy, which sacrificed its dignity, and the general cause of monarchs, to petty aggrandizements." Whenever he followed with his finger the traces of the Prussian frontiers upon the map, he seemed to be angry at seeing them still so extensive, and exclaimed, "Is it possible that I have left this man so large a territory?"
This dislike to a mild and pacific monarch was surprising. As there is
At the beginning of 1805, however, Russia, Austria, and England, made ineffectual attempts to engage Frederick in their third coalition against France. The court of Berlin, the queen, the princes, the minister Hardenberg, and all the young Prussian military, excited by the ardour of displaying the inheritance of glory which had been left them by the great Frederick, or by the wish of blotting out the disgrace of the campaign of 1792, entered heartily into the views of the allied powers; but the pacific policy of the king, and of his minister Haugwitz, resisted them, until the violation of the Prussian territory, near Anspach, by the march of a corps of French troops, exasperated the passions of the Prussians to such a degree, that their cry for immediate war prevailed.
Alexander was then in Poland; he was invited to Potsdam, and repaired thither immediately; and on the 3d of November, 1805, he engaged Frederick in the third coalition. The Prussian array was immediately withdrawn from the Russian frontiers, and M. de Haugwitz repaired to Brünn to threaten Napoleon with it. But the battle of Austerlitz shut his mouth; and within a fortnight after, the wily minister, having quickly turned round to the side of the conqueror, signed with him the participation of the fruits of victory.
Napoleon, however, dissembled his displeasure; for he had his army to re-organize, to give the grand duchy of Berg to Murat, his brother-in-law, Neufchatel to Berthier, to conquer Naples for his brother Joseph, to mediatize Switzerland, to dissolve the Germanic body, and to create the Rhenish confederation, of which he declared himself protector; to change the republic of Holland into a kingdom, and to give it to his brother Louis. These were the reasons which induced him, on the 15th of December, to cede Hanover to Prussia, in exchange for Anspach, Cleves, and Neufchatel.
The possession of Hanover at first tempted Frederick, but when the treaty was to be signed, he appeared to feel ashamed, and to hesitate; he wished only to accept it by halves, and to retain it merely as a deposit. Napoleon had no idea of such timid policy. "What!" said he, "does this monarch dare neither to make peace nor war? Does he prefer the English to me? Is there another coalition preparing? Does he despise my alliance?" Indignant at the idea, by a fresh treaty, on the 8th of March, 1806, he compelled Frederick to declare war against England, to take possession of Hanover, and to admit French garrisons into Wesel and Hameln.
The king of Prussia alone submitted; his court and his subjects were exasperated; they reproached him with allowing himself to be vanquished without attempting to fight; and elevating themselves on the remembrance of their past glory, they fancied that for them alone was reserved the honour of triumphing over the conqueror of Europe. In their impatience they insulted the minister of Napoleon; they sharpened their swords on the threshold of his gate. Napoleon himself they loaded with abuse. Even the queen, so distinguished by her graces and attractions, put on a warlike attitude. Their princes, one of them particularly (whose carriage and features, spirit and intrepidity, seemed to promise them a hero), offered to be their leaders. A chivalrous ardour and fury animated the minds of all.
It is asserted, that at the same time there were persons, either treacherous or deceived, who persuaded Frederick that Napoleon was obliged to show himself pacific, that that warrior was averse to war; they added, that he was perfidiously treating for peace with England, on the terms of restoring Hanover, which he was to take back from Prussia. Drawn in at last by the general feeling, the king allowed all these passions to burst forth. His army advanced, and threatened Napoleon; fifteen days afterwards he had neither army nor kingdom; he fled alone; and Napoleon dated from Berlin his decrees against England.
Humbled and conquered as Prussia thus was, it was impossible for Napoleon to abandon his hold of her; she would have immediately rallied, under the cannon of the Russians. Finding it impossible to gain her to his interests, like Saxony, by a great act of generosity, the next plan was to divide her; and yet, either from compassion, or the effect of Alexander's presence, he could not resolve to dismember her. This was a mistaken policy, like most of those where we stop half-way; and Napoleon was not long before he became sensible of it. When he exclaimed, therefore, "Is it possible that I have left this man so large a territory?" it is probable that he did not forgive Prussia the protection of Alexander; he hated her, because he felt that she hated him.
In fact, the sparks of a jealous and impatient hatred escaped from the youth of Prussia, whose ideas were exalted by a system of education, national, liberal, and mystical. It was among them that a formidable power arose in opposition to that of Napoleon. It included all whom his victories had humbled or offended; it had all the strength of the weak and the oppressed, the law of nature, mystery, fanaticism, and revenge! Wanting support on earth, it looked up for aid to Heaven, and its moral forces were wholly out of the reach of the material power of Napoleon. Animated by the devoted and indefatigable spirit of an ardent sect, it watched the slightest movements and weakest points of its enemy, insinuated itself into all the interstices of his power, and holding itself ready to strike at every opportunity, it waited quietly with the patience and phlegm which are the peculiar characteristics of the Germans, which were the causes of their defeat, and against which our victory wore itself out.
This vast conspiracy was that of the Tugendbund[1], or Friends of Virtue. Its head, in other words, the person who first gave a precise and definite direction to its views, was Stein. Napoleon perhaps might have gained him over to his interests, but preferred punishing him. His plan happened to be discovered by one of those chances to which the police owes the best part of its miracles; but when conspiracies enter into the interests, passions, and even the consciences of men, it is impossible to seize their ramifications: every one understands without communicating; or rather, all is communication—a general and simultaneous sympathy.