The Great War
and
How it arose
1915
Parliamentary Recruiting Committee
12, Downing Street, London, S.W.
CONTENTS.
THE GREAT WAR.
SERBIA'S POSITION.
On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand and the Archduchess were assassinated on Austrian territory at Serajevo by two Austrian subjects, both Bosniaks. On a former occasion one of these assassins had been in Serbia and the "Serbian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities, found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual."[1] After a "magisterial" investigation, the Austro-Hungarian Government formally fixed upon the Serbians the guilt both of assisting the assassins and of continually conspiring against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and on July 23, 1914, sent an ultimatum to Serbia of which the following were the chief terms[2]:—
"The Royal Serbian Government shall publish on the front page of their 'Official Journal' of the 13-26 July the following declaration:—
"'The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—i.e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.
"'The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda...."
"The Royal Serbian Government further undertake:
"To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity; ...
"To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
"To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;
"To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;
"To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto."
In effect Austria wished to force Serbia (a) to admit a guilt which was not hers; (b) to condemn officers in her army without trial at Austria's direction[3]; (c) to allow Austrian delegates to dispense such justice in Serbian Courts as they might think fit. In other words, Serbia was to lose her independence as a Sovereign State. And to all these claims Austria demanded an acceptance within 48 hours—until 6 p.m. on July 25, 1914. Yet, in spite of this, Serbia, within the specified time, sent her reply[4], which amounted to an acceptance of Austria's demands, subject, on certain points, to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise
An outline of the Serbian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin contented itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards that Serbia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.
As Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador on one occasion "the Serbian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian Note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept."[5]
During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended in order to give the requisite time to negotiate an amicable settlement. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain asked Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna.
Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and Petrograd in favour of conciliation. Italy assented, France assented, Russia declared herself ready, Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia became threatening."
Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet Austria.
But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had expired.
The British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople discovered the true object in view when he telegraphed on July 29:—
"I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Serbian territory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian Army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Serbian rule."[6]
So Austria contemplated no less than the break-up of the whole Balkan settlement to which she and Germany had been parties so recently as 1913. She was to take advantage of the weakened condition of the Balkan peoples (as a result of the Wars of 1912-13) to wage a war of conquest right down to the Ægean Sea.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 30.
[2] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 4.
[3] This demand was pointedly summed up by Mr. Lloyd George at the Queen's Hall, London, September 19, 1914, when he said:—
"Serbia ... must dismiss from her army the officers whom Austria should subsequently name. Those officers had just emerged from a war where they had added lustre to the Serbian arms; they were gallant, brave and efficient. I wonder whether it was their guilt or their efficiency that prompted Austria's action! But, mark you, the officers were not named; Serbia was to undertake in advance to dismiss them from the army, the names to be sent in subsequently. Can you name a country in the world that would have stood that? Supposing Austria or Germany had issued an ultimatum of that kind to this country, saying 'You must dismiss from your Army—and from your Navy—all those officers whom we shall subsequently name.' Well, I think I could name them now. Lord Kitchener would go; Sir John French would be sent away; General Smith-Dorrien would go, and I am sure that Sir John Jellicoe would have to go. And there is another gallant old warrior who would go—Lord Roberts. It was a difficult situation for a small country. Here was a demand made upon her by a great military power that could have put half-a-dozen men in the field for every one of Serbia's men, and that Power was supported by the greatest military Power (Germany) in the world."
[4] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 39.
[5] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 46.
[6] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 82.
RUSSIA'S POSITION.
Russia's interest in the Balkans was well-known. As late as May 23, 1914, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans" and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European power would be regarded as a menace to that policy. The Russians are a Slav people like the Serbians. Serbian independence was one of the results of the Great War which Russia waged against Turkey in 1877. If Serbia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on July 29, "regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Serbia was to be humiliated, then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at Petrograd, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development. It was known to the Austrians and to every foreign secretary in Europe, that if the Tsar's
GERMANY'S POSITION.
Since the outbreak of war Germany has issued an Official White Book which states concisely and with almost brutal frankness the German case prior to the outbreak of hostilities,[7] in the following terms:—
"The Imperial and Royal Government (Austria-Hungary) ... asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able to ... assure him (Austria) that any action considered necessary ... would meet with our approval. We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duties as allies. We could not ... advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic Race in Central Europe.
"A morally weakened Austria ... would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our Easterly and Westerly neighbours.
"We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia."
Farther on in the German Official White Book (page 7) it is stated that the German Government instructed its Ambassador at Petrograd to make the following declaration to the Russian Government, with reference to Russian military measures which concerned Austria alone[8]:—
"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army.
"But mobilisation means war.
"As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France...."
Here, then, we have the plain admission:—
That the steps subsequently taken were directed against Russia and France.
That from the first Austria was given a free hand even to the calculated extent of starting a great European war.
That a morally weakened Austria was not an ally on whom Germany "could count" or "have confidence" though no reference is made to Italy in this Official document.
FOOTNOTES:
[7] The German White Book (only authorised translation). Druck und Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin, pages 4 and 5. (Price, 40 pf.)
[8] Cd. 7717, No. 109. In a despatch from Berlin, July 30, 1914, Mons. Jules Cambon (French Ambassador) says:—
"Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation compromised the success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisation, and this might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and consequently that of Germany.
"I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, and that this was not being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for the German army, and 'that the words of which I reminded him did not constitute a firm engagement on his part.'"
ITALY'S POSITION.
Italy's position on the eve of the Great War, and while the above machinations were in progress, is quite clear for the reason that she had been approached twelve months before to take part in a similar enterprise and had peremptorily refused. On August 9, 1913, the Italian Premier, Signor Giolitti, received a telegram from the Marquis di San Guiliano (Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs), acquainting him with the fact that Austria had just confided to Italy that, with the approval of Germany, she was about to deliver an ultimatum to Serbia, in essence identical with that actually sent on July 23, 1914, whereby the present Great War was kindled. Austria then asked Italy to consider this move to be a casus foederis under the Triple Alliance—which is purely a treaty of defence—involving Italy's military assistance on the side of Austria and Germany.[9] To this the Italian Premier (Signor Giolitti) replied[10]:—
"If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a casus foederis cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure."
Italy, having on this occasion made her position clear, maintained her neutrality last July (1914) when Germany and Austria decided to proceed with the plans arranged over twelve months before. Italy remained neutral because she held that Germany and Austria were the aggressors—not Russia and France.[11] By not consulting Italy on the subject of action against Serbia, Austria-Hungary violated one of the fundamental clauses of the Triple Alliance, and eventually this led Italy to denounce the Treaty on May 4th, 1915, and finally, on May 24th, 1915, to declare war on Austria-Hungary.
FOOTNOTES:
[10] Cd. 7860.
[11] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 152.
GERMANY'S SELECTED MOMENT.
The past history of Germany shows that she has always made her wars at her own "selected moment," when she thought her victim was isolated or unprepared. As General von Bernhardi says in his book, Germany and the Next Great War: "English attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of success." On July 23, 1914, when Austria launched her ultimatum to Serbia, the Chancelleries of Europe were taken by surprise. Germany and Austria chose their moment well.
(1) The British representatives were away from both Berlin and Belgrade.
(2) M. Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, and the other Ministers were away electioneering.
(3) The Russian Ambassadors were absent from Vienna, Berlin and Paris, and the Russian Minister was absent from Belgrade. Indeed the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had left "for the country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the (Austro-Hungarian) Ministry for Foreign Affairs."[12]
(4) The President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister were out of France at Reval, on board the French Battleship "La France."
(5) The Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had left the Capital and his presence at Ischl was constantly used by the Germans and Austrians as an excuse for not being able to get things done in time.
The known facts of the crisis out of which the Great War arose and the messages of our Ambassadors suggest that Germany chose this particular time:—
(1) Calculating that Russia, if she did not fight, would be humiliated, whilst Austria—Germany's ally—would be strengthened by the conquest of Serbia; and
(2) Believing that if Russia chose to fight, even if she fought with France as her ally, still it was a favourable moment.
The deepening of the Kiel Canal to permit German battleships to pass from the Baltic to the North Sea was just completed. Germany had at her disposal the larger part of a huge war tax of £50,000,000, and had added enormously to her land forces. The murder of the Archduke created a pretext which roused enthusiasm for war in Austria, and there can be little doubt that Germany was ready to use this wave of popular feeling for her own ends. Germany appears to have instilled into Austria-Hungary the belief that there was small danger in coercing Serbia.[13]
On the other hand, Germany aimed at thoroughly humiliating Russia and France, and appears to have calculated that if the worst came to the worst, she and Austria-Hungary would be in a position to beat them both. The German view of the European situation may be briefly set forth as follows:—
Russia.—Russia was passing through serious industrial troubles, which it was thought might end in revolution.
France.—France was passing through a period of political chaos, no Government being able to hold together for more than a few weeks. And on July 13 the French had appointed a Committee to inquire and report immediately on alleged deficiencies in various defensive preparations.
Belgium.—Belgium was beginning a re-organisation of her Army which would have gradually increased it to almost double its present strength.
Britain.—Germany thought the Irish and general political position in Britain made it impossible for her to show a united front in foreign affairs, and that therefore she would be unable to fight. The Germans seem to have assumed that Britain would be glad incidentally to seize the chance of making money through neutrality and would repudiate her treaty obligations to Belgium and her friendship for France, and be content to see Germany ruthlessly crushing the smaller Powers of Europe. Sir Edward Grey, on July 27, 1914, telegraphed to the British Ambassador at Petrograd:—"I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside."[14]
Our Ambassadors at Petrograd, (July 24, 1914), Rome, (July 29, 1914) and Paris (July 30, 1914), each stated that the Foreign Offices of Russia, Italy and France respectively thought that Germany was counting on our neutrality, while the German Foreign Minister, after war was actually declared, seemed totally unable to understand how we could go to war for what he called "a Scrap of Paper." The "Scrap of Paper" happened to be a treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and signed by both Great Britain and Germany![15] The whole case is put in a nutshell in the despatch from the British Ambassador at Vienna, dated August 1, 1914, in which he says:—
"I agree ... that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.... Nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany."[16]
FOOTNOTES:
[12] Cd. 7717, No. 18.
[13] See Appendix "B."
[14]
[15] Great Britain and the European Crisis, Nos. 80, 99 and 160.
[16] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 141.
PEACE THWARTED BY GERMANY.
The attitude taken up by Germany and Austria-Hungary throughout the whole crisis can only lead to one conclusion—that both countries were determined to force their point, even at the risk of a European war. As showing the endeavours to devise means of averting a general conflict, they should be considered seriatim, together with the persistency with which they were blocked in Berlin:—
(I.)—Attempt to Extend Time-Limit of Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia.
On July 25, in reply to the Anglo-Russian efforts, to extend the forty-eight hour "time-limit" of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna telegraphed that he had been officially informed that "the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse our proposal to extend the time-limit of the Note."[17] How Austria-Hungary was aided and abetted by Germany in this refusal is made plain in the despatch from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin on the same day:—
"The (German) Minister for Foreign Affairs ... tells me that the British Government have likewise urged him to advise Vienna to extend the time limit of the ultimatum, ... but he fears that in the absence of Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs) "who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time, his telegrams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance of Serbia."[18]
(II.)—The Question of Delay of Hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
When the extension of the time-limit of the Ultimatum to Serbia was refused by Austria, Sir Edward Grey thought the question of preventing or delaying hostilities might serve as a basis for discussion. The Austrian Ambassador explained that:—
"the Austrian Note should not be regarded as an Ultimatum; it should be regarded as a step which, in the event of no reply, or in the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations, and the immediate departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister from Belgrade, without, however, entailing the immediate opening of hostilities."[19]
As Sir Edward Grey said in his Despatch to the British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, July 24, 1914:—
"The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State."[20]
The following day (July 25, 1914), Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin:—
"The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed."[21]
But here again Germany was lukewarm, to say the least of it, as will be seen in the Despatch from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 26, 1914:—
"Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Serbian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.
"Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this."[22]
(III.)—Suggested Mediation by the Four Powers.
On July 24, 1914, Sir Edward Grey suggested to the German Ambassador that the only chance he could see of a mediating or moderating influence being effective was:—
"that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France and ourselves should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening."[23]
Finding that Russia consented to this idea, Sir Edward telegraphed to our representatives at Paris, Berlin and Rome on July 26, 1914, to the following effect:—
"Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself, to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference."[24]
The Powers, with the exception
"(German) Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration, and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable."[25]
Again, on July 29, 1914, the British Ambassador at Berlin reported:—
"I was sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Serbian reply might form the basis of discussion."[26]
(IV.)—Germany asked to State any Form which Mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary might take.
How Germany endeavoured to shuffle out of the suggested mediation by the four Powers on the plea that the "form" was not one which Austria-Hungary could accept, is set forth in a Telegram from Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador in Berlin, dated July 29, 1914:—
"The German Government ... seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations à quatre in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would 'press the button' in the interests of peace."[27]
Here again Germany evaded the point, as is shown in the Telegram from the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 30, 1914:—
"The Chancellor told me last night that he was 'pressing the button' as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise."[28]
Sir Edward Grey's telegram was sent off about 4 p.m. on July 29. His appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About midnight a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.[29] The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would be taken from her.
Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come.
(V.)—Russia Suggests Direct Negotiations with Austria-Hungary.
Another excuse given by Germany for refusing mediation by the four Powers was the possibility of direct negotiations between Russia and Austria-Hungary. The British Ambassador in Berlin on July 27, in recording Germany's excuses, said that the German Secretary of State—
"added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof" (Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs) "to exchange views with Count Berchtold" (Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs). "He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best before doing anything else to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments."[30]
It is worth noting that, in reply to this Despatch from the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Grey wrote on July 29:—
"I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Serbian conflict."[31]
Russia had done her best to open these negotiations, and endeavoured to get the German Government to advise Austria to continue negotiations thus opened. How the proposal was received by Germany is found in the following Despatch from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, dated July 27, 1914:—
"I begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal in Vienna that Szapary" (Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Russia) "should be authorised to draw up, by means of a private exchange of views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow" (German Foreign Secretary of State) "answered that he was aware of this proposal and that he agreed with Pourtalès" (German Ambassador in Russia) "that as Szapary had begun this conversation, he might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that he could not advise Austria to give way."
The result of Germany's hostile attitude to the plan was at once made apparent the next day in Vienna, where the Russian Ambassador reported on July 28, 1914:—
"Count Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs) "replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note."[33]
(VI.)—Russia's Final Attempt at Peace.
Finally, on July 30, 1914, another attempt at peace by Russia is indicated in the Despatch from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome, in the following terms:—
"The German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might give—that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of Serbia—and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action: 'If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian question has become a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum such points as violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop her military preparations.'
"Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question, for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military preparations."[34]
And subsequently this was amended according to the following Despatch from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassadors abroad, dated July 31, 1914, Petrograd:—
"Please refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July. The British Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications in the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Ambassador. I replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send you the text of the modified formula, which is as follows:—
"'If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Serbian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Serbia has become a question of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and decide what satisfaction Serbia could afford to the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."[35]
The possibility of peace was not thought hopeless by Sir Edward Grey, for, in a despatch to the British Ambassador at Berlin, dated August 1, he says:—
"I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.
"The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.
"Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters."[36]
That Austria was at last taking a more reasonable attitude is shown by the despatch from the Russian Ambassador in Paris, dated August 1, 1914:—
"The Austrian Ambassador yesterday visited Viviani" (French Minister for Foreign Affairs), "and declared to him that Austria, far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Serbia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Servia with the other powers. The French Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the French frontier for they are convinced that under the guise of 'Kriegszustand,' mobilisation is, in reality, being carried out."[37]
Unfortunately at this point, when the Austro-Hungarian Government appeared ready to debate amicably with Russia, Germany stopped all efforts at peace by issuing an Ultimatum to Russia. News of this is given in a telegram to the Russian representatives abroad on August 1, in the following terms:—
"At midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, on the instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by midnight on Saturday, we had not begun to demobilise, not only against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it."[38]
As Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, tersely put it in his despatch, dated from London, September 1, 1914, to Sir Edward Grey:—
"Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history."[39]