Antioch.—
Gregory of Nyssa and Basil the Great.—Deceit in Interests of
Harmony.—Chrysostom's Deception of Basil.—Chrysostom's Defense
of Deceit.—Augustine's Firmness of Position.—Condemnation of
Lying.—Examination of Excuses.—Jerome's Weakness and Error.—Final
Agreement with Augustine.—Repetition of Arguments of Augustine and
Chrysostom.—Representative Disputants.—Thomas Aquinas.—Masterly
Discussion.—Errors of Duns Scotus.—John Calvin.—Martin Luther.—
Ignatius Loyola.—Position of Jesuits.—Protestants Defending Lying.
—Jeremy Taylor.—Errors and Inconsistencies.—Wrong Definitions.—
Misapplication of Scripture.—Richard Rothe.—Character, Ability,
and Influence. in Definition of Lie.—Failure to Recognize.—Error
Love to God as Only Basis of Love to Man.—Exceptions in Favor of
Lying.—Nitzsch's Claim of Wiser and Nobler Methods than Lying in
Love.—Rothe's Claim of Responsibility of Loving Guardianship—No
Countenance of Deception in Example of Jesus.—Prime Error of Rothe.
—Opinions of Contemporary Critics.—Isaac Augustus Dorner.—
Character and Principles.—Keen Definitions.—High Standards.—
Clearness and Consistency.—Hans Lassen Martensen.—Logic Swayed by
Feeling.—Right Premises and Wavering Reasonings.—Lofty Ideals.—
Story of Jeanie Deans.—Correct Conclusions.—Influence of Personal
Peculiarities on Ethical Convictions.—Contrast of Charles Hodge and
James H. Thornwell.—Dr. Hodge's Correct Premises and Amiable
Inconsistencies.—Truth the Substratum of Deity.—Misconceptions of
Bible Teachings.—Suggestion of Deception by Jesus Christ.—Error as
to General Opinion of Christians.—Dr. Hodge's Conclusions Crushed
by his Premises.—Dr. Thornwell's Thorough Treatment of Subject.—
Right Basis.—Sound Argument.—Correct Definitions.—Firmness for
Truth.—Newman Smyth's Manual.—Good Beginning and Bad Ending.—
Confusion of Terms.—Inconsistencies in Argument.—Loose Reasoning.
—Dangerous Teachings.—James Martineau.—Fine Moral Sense.—Conflict
between Feeling and Conviction.—Safe Instincts.—Thomas Fowler.—
Higher Expediency of Veracity.—Importance to General Good.—Leslie
Stephen.—Duty of Veracity Result of Moral Progress.—Kant and
Fichte.—Jacobi Misrepresented.—False Assumptions by Advocates of Lie
of Necessity.—Enemies in Warfare not Justified in Lying.—Testimony
of Cicero.—Macaulay on Lord Clive's Treachery.—Woolsey on
International Law.—No Place for Lying in Medical Ethics.—Opinions
and Experiences of Physicians.—Pliny's Story of Roman Matron.—Victor
Hugo's Sister Simplice.—Words of Abbé Sicard.—Tact and
Principle.—Legal Ethics.—Whewell's View.—Opinion of Chief-Justice
Sharswood.—Mistakes of Dr. Hodge.—Lord Brougham's Claim.—False
Charge against Charles Phillips.—Chancellor Kent on Moral
Obligations in Law and in Equity.—Clerical Profession Chiefly
Involved.—Clergymen for and against Lying.—Temptation to Lies of
Love.—Supreme Importance of Sound Principle.—Duty of Veracity to
Lower Animals.—Dr. Dabney's View.—Views of Dr. Newman Smyth.—Duty
of Truthfulness an Obligation toward God.—Lower Animals not Exempt
from Principle of Universal Application.—Fishing.—Hunting.—Catching
Horse.—Professor Bowne's Psychological View.—No Place for Lying
in God's Universe.—Small Improvement on Chrysostom's Argument for
Lying.—Limits of Consistency in Logical Plea.—God, or Satan.

VII.

THE GIST OF THE MATTER.

One All-Dividing Line.—Primal and Eternal Difference.—Lie Inevitably
Hostile to God.—Lying Separates from God.—Sin per se.—Perjury
Justifiable if Lying be Justifiable.—Lying—Lying Defiles Liar,
apart from Questions of Gain in Lying.—Social Evils Resultant from
Lying.—Confidence Essential to Society.—Lying Destructive of
Confidence.—Lie Never Harmless.

INDEXES.

TOPICAL INDEX. SCRIPTURAL INDEX.

I.

A QUESTION OF THE AGES.

Whether a lie is ever justifiable, is a question that has been in discussion, not only in all the Christian centuries, but ever since questions concerning human conduct were first a possibility. On the one hand, it has been claimed that a lie is by its very nature irreconcilable with the eternal principles of justice and right; and, on the other hand, it has been asserted that great emergencies may necessitate a departure from all ordinary rules of human conduct, and that therefore there may be, in an emergency, such a thing as the "lie of necessity."

It is not so easy to consider fairly a question like this in the hour when vital personal interests pivot on the decision, as it is in a season of rest and safety; yet, if in a time of extremest peril the unvarying duty of truthfulness shines clearly through an atmosphere of sore temptation, that light may be accepted as diviner because of its very power to penetrate clouds and to dispel darkness. Being forced to consider, in an emergency, the possible justification of the so-called "lie of necessity," I was brought to a settlement of that question in my own mind, and have since been led to an honest endeavor to bring others to a like settlement of it. Hence this monograph.

In the summer of 1863 I was a prisoner of war in Columbia, South Carolina. The Federal prisoners were confined in the common jail, under military guard, and with no parole binding them not to attempt an escape. They were subject to the ordinary laws of war. Their captors were responsible for their detention in imprisonment, and it was their duty to escape from captivity, and to return to the army of the government to which they owed allegiance, if they could do so by any right means. No obligations were on them toward their captors, save those which are binding at all times, even when a state of war suspends such social duties as are merely conventional.

Only he who has been a prisoner of war in a Southern prison in midsummer, or in a Northern prison in the dead of winter, in time of active hostilities outside, can fully realize the heart-longings of a soldier prisoner to find release from his sufferings in confinement, and to be again at his post of duty at the front, or can understand how gladly such a man would find a way, consistent with the right, to escape, at any involved risk. But all can believe that plans of escape were in frequent discussion among the restless Federal prisoners in Columbia, of whom I was one.

A plan proposed to me by a fellow-officer seemed to offer peculiar chances of success, and I gladly joined in it. But as its fuller details were considered, I found that a probable contingency would involve the telling of a lie to an enemy, or a failure of the whole plan. At this my moral sense recoiled; and I expressed my unwillingness to tell a lie, even to regain my personal liberty or to advantage my government by a return to its army. This opened an earnest discussion of the question whether there is such a thing as a "lie of necessity," or a justifiable lie. My friend was a pure-minded man of principle, ready to die for his convictions; and he looked at this question with a sincere desire to know the right, and to conform to it. He argued that a condition of war suspended ordinary social relations between the combatants, and that the obligation of truth-speaking was one of the duties thus suspended. I, on the other hand, felt that a lie was necessarily a sin against God, and therefore was