he ranked among the foremost in the senate and it seemed likely that through his agency the rest might reach a harmonious decision; it was Gabinius's hope, likewise, that he would join in approving the general desire from the fact that he saw the tribunes in bad straits. Accordingly Catulus received permission to speak, since all respected and honored him as one who at all times spoke and acted for their advantage, and delivered an address about as follows:

[-31-] "That I have been exceedingly zealous, Quirites, in behalf of your body, all of you, doubtless, clearly understand. This being so, it is requisite for me to set forth in simple fashion and quite frankly what I know to be for the good of the State; and it is only fair for you to listen to it calmly and afterward to deliberate. For, if you raise an uproar, you will fail of obtaining some perhaps very useful suggestion which you might have heard, but if you pay attention to what is said you will be sure to discover definitely something to your advantage. I for my part assert in the first place most emphatically that it is not proper to confide to any one man so many positions of command, one after another. This has been forbidden by law, and by test has been found to be most perilous. What made Marius such a monster was practically nothing else than being entrusted with so many wars in the briefest space of time and being made consul six times as rapidly as possible: and similarly the cause of Sulla's frenzy was that he held command of the armies so many years in succession, and later was appointed dictator, then consul. It does not lie in man's nature for a person, not necessarily young but mature quite as often, after exercise in authority for a considerable period to be willing to abide by ancestral customs.[-32-] I do not say this in any spirit of condemnation of Pompey, but because it does not appear at all advantageous to you on general grounds, and further it is not permitted according to the laws. For if an enterprise brings honor to those deemed worthy of it, all whom that enterprise concerns ought to obtain honor; this is the principle of democracy: and if it brings labor, all ought to share that labor proportionately; this is mere equity.

"Again, in such an affair it is to your advantage for many individuals to have practice in exploits, so that as a result of trial your choice may be an easy one from among those who can be trusted for any urgent business; but if you take that other course it is quite inevitable that the scarcity should be great of those who will practice what they should, and to whom interests can be trusted. This is the chief reason why you were at a loss for a general in the war with Sertorius; previous to that time you were accustomed to employ the same men for a long period. Consequently, even if in all other respects Pompey deserves to be elected against the pirates, still, inasmuch as he would be chosen contrary to the injunction of the laws and to the principles laid down by experience, it behooves both you and him most strongly that it be not done.

[-33-] "This is the first and most important point I have to mention. Second arises the consideration, that when consuls and praetors and those serving in their place can take offices and leaderships in a way prescribed by the laws it is neither decent nor advantageous for you to overlook them and introduce some new office. To what end do you elect the annual officials, if you are going to make no use of them for such businesses? Not, presumably, that they may stalk about in purple-bordered togas, nor that endued with the name alone of the office they may be deprived of its duties. How can you fail to alienate these and all the rest who have a purpose to enter politics at all, if you break down the ancient offices, and entrust nothing to those elected by law, but assign a strange and previously non-existent position of command to a private individual? [-34-] If there should be any necessity of choosing, in addition to the annual officials, still another, there is for this, too, an ancient precedent,—I mean the dictator. However, because he held such power, our fathers did not appoint him on all occasions nor for a longer period than six months. Accordingly, if you need any such person, you may, without transgressing the laws or making light of the common welfare, designate either Pompey or any one else dictator,—on condition that he shall sway for not more than the time ordained, nor outside of Italy. You doubtless are not ignorant that this latter limitation, too, our fathers guarded scrupulously, and no instance would be found of a dictator chosen for any other country, except one sent to Sicily, and that without accomplishing anything. But if Italy needs no such person and you would no longer endure, apart from the functions of dictator, even the name (this is clear from your anger against Sulla), how would it be right for a new position of command to be created, and that, too, for three years and embracing practically all interests both in Italy and without? What disasters come to cities from such a course, and how many men on account of lawless lust for rule have often disturbed our populace and done themselves countless evils, you all alike understand.

[-35-] "About this, then, I shall say no more. Who can fail to know that on general principles it is neither decent nor advantageous to commit matters to any one man, or for any one man to be put in charge of all the blessings we own, even if he be the best man conceivable? Great honors and excessive powers excite and ruin even such persons. I ask you, however, to consider my next assertion,—that it is not possible for one man to preside over the entire sea and to manage the entire war properly. You must, if you shall in the least do what is needful, make war on them everywhere at once, so that they may neither unite, nor by finding a refuge among those not attacked, become hard to capture. Any one man who might be in command could by no manner of means accomplish this. For how on about the same days could he fight in Italy and in Cilicia, Egypt and Syria, Greece and Spain, in the Ionian Sea and the islands? Consequently you need many soldiers and generals both, to take matters in hand, if they are going to be of any use to you. [-36-] In case any one declares that even if you confide the entire war to some one person he will most certainly have plenty of admirals and lieutenants, my reply would be: 'Would it not be much juster and more advantageous for these men destined to serve under him to be chosen by you beforehand for the very purpose and to receive an independent command from you? What prevents such a course?' By this plan they will pay more heed to the war, since each of them is entrusted with his own particular share and cannot lay upon any one else the responsibility for neglect of it, and there will be keener rivalry among them because they are independent and will themselves get the glory for whatever they effect. By the other plan what man do you think, subordinate to some one else, will with equal readiness perform any duty, when the credit for his victory will belong not to himself but to another?

"Accordingly, that one man could not at one time carry on so great a war has been admitted on the part of Gabinius himself, in that he asks for many helpers to be given to whomever is elected. Our final consideration is whether actual commanders or assistants should be sent, and whether they should be despatched by the entire populace, or by the commandant alone for his assistance. Every one of you would agree that my proposition is more law-abiding in all respects, and not merely in reference to the case of the freebooters. Aside from that, notice how it looks for all our offices to be overthrown on the pretext of 'pirates' and for no one of them either in Italy or in subject territory during this time …" [8]

[-37-] … and of Italy in place of consul for three years, they assigned to him fifteen