reſpectable perſons, and even ſtate-creditors, to enliſt under the ſtandard of COCHON, (the Police Miniſter,) becauſe ſuch is the honourable conduct of our ſovereigns, that they pay their ſpies in ſpecie—and their ſoldiers, and the creditors of the ſtate, in paper.—Such is the morality, ſuch the juſtice, ſuch are the republican virtues, ſo loudly vaunted by our good and deareſt friends, our penſionerſ—the Gazetteers of England and Germany!"

There is not a ſingle abuſe, which the modern reformers reprobated ſo loudly under the ancient ſyſtem, that is not magnified, in an infinite degree, under the preſent eſtabliſhment. For one Lettre de Cachet iſſued during the mild reign of LOUIS the Sixteenth, a thouſand Mandats d'Arret have been granted by the tyrannical demagogues of the revolution; for one Baſtile which exiſted under the Monarchy, a thouſand Maiſons de Detention have been eſtabliſhed by the Republic. In ſhort, crimes of every denomination, and acts of tyranny and injuſtice, of every kind, have multiplied, ſince the abolition of royalty, in a proportion which ſetſ all the powers of calculation at defiance.

It is ſcarcely poſſible to notice the preſent ſituation of France, without adverting to the circumſtances of the WAR, and to the attempt now making, through the medium of negotiation, to bring it to a ſpeedy concluſion. Since the publication of my Letter to a Noble Earl, now deſtined to chew the cud of diſappointment in the vale of obſcurity, I have been aſtoniſhed to hear the ſame aſſertions advance, by the memberſ and advocates of that party whoſe merit is ſaid to conſiſt in the violence of their oppoſition to the meaſures of government, on the origin of the war, which had experienced the moſt ample confutation, without the aſſiſtance of any additional reaſon, and without the ſmalleſt attempt to expoſe the invalidity of thoſe proofs which, in my conception, amounted nearly to mathematical demonſtration, and which I had dared them, in terms the moſt pointed, to invalidate. The queſtion of aggreſſion before ſtood on ſuch high ground, that I had not the preſumption to ſuppoſe it could derive an acceſſion of ſtrength from any arguments which I could ſupply; but I was confident, that the authentic documents which I offered to the public would remove every intervening object that tended to obſtruct the fight of inattentive obſervers, and reflect on it ſuch an additional light as would flaſh inſtant conviction on the minds of all. It ſeems, I have been deceived; but I muſt be permitted to ſuggeſt, that men who perſiſt in the renewal of aſſertions, without a ſingle effort to controvert the proofs which have been adduced to demonſtrate their fallacy, cannot have for their object the eſtabliſhment of truth—which ought, excluſively, to influence the conduct of public characters, whether writers or orators.

With regard to the negotiation, I can derive not the ſmalleſt hopes of ſucceſs from a contemplation of the paſt conduct, or of the preſent principles, of the government of France. When I compare the projects of aggrandizement openly avowed by the French rulers, previous to the declaration of war againſt this country, with the exorbitant pretenſionſ advanced in the arrogant reply of the Executive Directory to the note preſented by the Britiſh Envoy at Baſil in the month of February, 1796, and with the more recent obſervations contained in their official note of the 19th of September laſt, I cannot think it probable that they will accede to any terms of peace that are compatible with the intereſt and ſafety of the Allies. Their object is not ſo much the eſtabliſhment aſ the extenſion of their republic.

As to the danger to be incurred by a treaty of peace with the republic of France, though it has been conſiderably diminiſhed by the events of the war, it is ſtill unqueſtionably great. This danger principally ariſeſ from a pertinacious adherence, on the part of the Directory, to thoſe very principles which were adopted by the original promoters of the abolition of Monarchy in France. No greater proof of ſuch adherence need be required than their refuſal to repeal thoſe obnoxious decrees (paſſed in the months of November and December, 1792,) which created ſo general and ſo juſt an alarm throughout Europe, and which excited the reprobation even of that party in England, which was willing to admit the equivocal interpretation given to them by the Executive Council of the day. I proved, in the Letter to a Noble Earl before alluded to, from the very teſtimony of the members of that Council themſelves, as exhibited in their official inſtructions to one of their confidential agents, that the interpretation which they had aſſigned to thoſe decrees, in their communications with the Britiſh Miniſtry, was a baſe interpretation, and that they really intended to enforce the decrees, to the utmoſt extent of their poſſible operation, and, by a literal conſtruction thereof, to encourage rebellion in every ſtate, within the reach of their arms or their principles. Nor have the preſent government merely forborne to repeal thoſe deſtructive lawſ—they have imitated the conduct of their predeceſſors, have actually put them in execution wherever they had the ability to do ſo, and have, in all reſpects, as far as related to thoſe decrees, adopted the preciſe ſpirit and principles of the faction which declared war againſt England. Let any man read the inſtructions of the Executive Council to PUBLICOLA CHAUSSARD, their Commiſſary in the Netherlands, in 1792 and 1793, and an account of the proceedings in the Low Countries conſequent thereon, and then examine the conduct of the republican General, BOUNAPARTE, in Italy—who muſt neceſſarily act from the inſtructions of the Executive Directory——and he will be compelled to acknowledge the juſtice of my remark, and to admit that the latter actuated by the ſame pernicious deſire to overturn the ſettled order of ſociety, which invariably marked the conduct of the former.

"It is an acknowledged fact, that every revolution requires a proviſional power to regulate its diſorganizing movements, and to direct the methodical demolition of every part of the ancient ſocial conſtitution.— Such ought to be the revolutionary power.

"To whom can ſuch power belong, but to the French, in thoſe countrieſ into which they may carry their arms? Can they with ſafety ſuffer it to be exerciſed by any other perſons? It becomes the French republic, then, to aſſume this kind of guardianſhip over the people whom ſhe awakens to Liberty!*"

* Conſiderations Generales fur l'Eſprit et les Principes du Decret du 15 Decembre.

Such were the Lacedaemonian principles avowed by the French government in 1792, and ſuch is the Lacedaimonian policy* purſued by the French government in 1796! It cannot then, I conceive, be contended, that a treaty with a government ſtill profeſſing principles which have been repeatedly proved to be ſubverſive of all ſocial order, which have been acknowledged by their parents to have for their object the methodical demolition of exiſting conſtitutions, can be concluded without danger or riſk. That danger, I admit, is greatly diminiſhed, becauſe the power which was deſtined to carry into execution thoſe gigantic projects which conſtituted its object, has, by the operations of the war, been conſiderably curtailed. They well may exiſt in equal force, but the ability is no longer the ſame.

MACHIAVEL juſtly obſerves, that it was the narrow policy of the Lacedaemonians always to deſtroy the ancient conſtitution, and eſtabliſh their own form of government, in the counties and cities which they ſubdued.

But though I maintain the exiſtence of danger in a Treaty with the Republic of France, unleſs ſhe previouſly repeal the decrees to which I have adverted, and abrogate the acts to which