doing so, how to make Men really, and in earnest Christians.

To see what light we receive from Nature to direct our Actions, and how far we are Naturally able to obey that Light; Men must be consider'd purely as in the state of Nature, viz. as having no extrinsick Law to direct them, but indu'd only with a faculty of comparing their distant Ideas by intermediate Ones, and Thence of deducing, or infering one thing from another; whereby our Knowledge immediately received from Sense, or Reflection, is inlarg'd to a view of Truths remote, or future, in an Application of which Faculty of the mind to a consideration of our own Existence and Nature, together with the beauty and order of the Universe, so far as it falls under our view, we may come to the knowledge of a First Cause; and that this must be an Intelligent Being, Wise and Powerful, beyond what we are able to conceive. And as we delight in our selves, and receive pleasure from the objects which surround us, sufficient to indear to us the possession and injoyment of Life, we cannot from thence but infer, that this Wise and Powerful Being is also most Good, since he has made us out of nothing to give us a Being wherein we find such Happiness, as makes us very unwilling to part therewith.

And thus, by a consideration of the Attributes of God, visible in the Works of the Creation, we come to a knowledge of his Existence, who is an Invisible Being: For since Power, Wisdom and Goodness, which we manifestly discern in the production and conservation of our selves, and the Universe, could not subsist independently on some substance for them to inhere in, we are assur'd that there is a substance where unto they do belong, or of which they are the Attributes.

Which Attributes of God would not be discoverable by us, did we not discern a difference in Things; as between Power and Weakness, Benevolence and no Benevolence, or its contrary; and betwixt directing means to an End, and acting at hap-hazard without any design, or choice: A knowledge, which, by whatever steps convey'd into the mind, is no other than a seeing things to be what they are, and that they cannot but be what they are.

From which diversity and immutability in the Nature of things, there necessarily arises a diversity of respects and relations between them, as unchangeable as the things themselves: wherein the Will of the Creator in reference hereunto is reveal'd to every intelligent Agent, so far as he is made capable of discerning these relations, dependencies and consequences; and whatsoever with respect to his own Actions, such a Being finds resulting from any of these as most conformable to the design of his Creator in making him such a part as he is of the whole, he cannot but consider as the Will of God, thereby dictated to him; since otherwise, God would act contradictiously to his Wisdom in making him what he is.

We being then indu'd, as we are, with a capacity of perceiving and distinguishing these differences of Things; and also with a liberty of acting, or not, suitably and agreeably hereunto; whence we can according to the preference of our own minds, act either in conformity to, or disconformity with, the Will of the Creator (manifested in his Works no less than the Will of any Humane Architect is in his) it follows, That to act answerably to the nature of such Beings as we are, requires that we attentively examine, and consider the several natures of Things, so far as they have any relation to our own actions.

Which attentive consideration of the Works of God objected to our view, implies an exercise thereupon of that Faculty in us by which we deduce, or infer, one thing from another: Whence (as has been said) our knowledge immediately deriv'd to us from sensation, or reflection, is inlarg'd by the perception of remote, or distant Truths. The more obviously eminent advantages accruing to us from which faculty of reason, plainly make known the Superiority of its Nature; and that its suggestions, ought to be hearken'd to by us preferably to those of Sense; where these (as it too often happens) do not concur. For did we know nothing by Inference and Deduction, both our knowledge and injoyment would be very short of what they now are; many considerable pleasures depending almost intirely upon Reason; and there being none of the greatest Enjoyments of Sense which would not lose their best Relish, separated from those concomitant satisfactions which accompany them only as we are rational Creatures. Neither is it our greatest happiness alone which is manifestly provided for in our being indu'd with this Faculty; but our much greater safety, and preservation likewise; since these require a capacity in us of foreseeing distant Events, and directing means to an End, oftentimes through a long train of Actions; which is what we can only do by that in us, whereby the Relations, Dependencies and Consequences of things are discoverable to us.

But as Reason is that which either in kind or degree, differences Men from Brutes; and that there are few, if any, who would lose this distinction, it is by common consent acknowledg'd that Reason is in respect of all others, a preferable indowment. And if Beasts, only inferiour to Men in the advantages of this Faculty, appear hereby intended to be subjected to Men, it cannot be less evident That that part in Men which they have in common with Beasts, was likewise design'd by their Maker to be subjected to their Reason also. From All which, it undeniably follows that we do not act answerably to the Will, or pleasure of God, in making us such Creatures as we are, if we either neglect the Search of those Measures of our Actions prescrib'd to us by the discernable Natures of Things; or, if seeing these, we yet conform not our selves thereunto.

Now for any Creature knowingly to oppose the Will of its Creator, is not only disingenuity in regard of what is owing from it to its Sovereign Benefactor, and Folly in respect of that dependence which it has on him for its Being, as it is commonly represented to us to be; but is also in the Nature of Things (simply consider'd) so repugnant to right Reason, that were such a Creature consistent with it self herein, and could act pursuantly to That Will, it would operate to its own destruction; since its Existence evidently depends upon That of its Maker; whose Will, as reveal'd to us, being but a different consideration of his Attributes, the knowledge whereof is all the Knowledge we have of God, cannot be so much as conceiv'd by us separable from the Being of God; unless the God, which we conceive, be a Fiction of our own Imagination, and not the Creator of All Things; who is an invisible Being only knowable to us in, and by, the exemplifications of his Attributes: The infinite Perfection, and the inseparable Correspondence, and Harmony of which (discernable in the Frame and Government of the Universe) plainly tells us, That the Divine Will cannot be (like ours) successive Determinations without dependance, or connection one upon another; much less inconsistent, contradictory, and mutable; but one steady, uniform, unchangeable result of infinite Wisdom and Benevolence, extending to, and including All his Works. So that Sin, or disobedience to our Maker is manifestly the greatest Nonsense, Folly and contradiction conceivable, with regard purely to the immutable perfection of the Divine Nature; and to the Natural constitution of things, independently upon any positive command of God to us, or his irresistible power over us.

But as without a capacity in The Creature to act contrary to the will of the Creator there could be no defect, or self-excellency in any Created Being; contrariety to the Will of God is therefore permitted in the Universe as a necessary result of Creaturely imperfection, under the greatest endowment that a Created Being is