while the mechanical, soulless elements with their ceaseless actions and reactions in definite order, and according to inviolable law, were held sufficient to account for the phenomena of nature. The keynote was "relation to environment"; a constantly changing environment, changing according to law, called for ceaseless readjustment, and the adaptation to environment was held to be the stimulus to all activity in the natural world.

The later development of biology, and the doctrine of the evolution of species, gradually extended this conception of nature to include man himself.

What he had regarded as his distinctive characteristics were held to be but the product of natural factors, and his life was regarded, too, as under the domain of rigid, inviolable law. There was no room for, and no need of, the conception of free, originative thought. Thought was simply an answer to the demand that the sense world was making, entirely dependent upon the external stimulus, just as any other activity was entirely dependent on an external stimulus. So thought came to be regarded as resulting from mere sense impression, which latter corresponded to the external stimulus. It is obvious that the idea of the freedom of the human soul, and of human personality as previously understood, had to go. Man was simply the result of the interaction of numerous causes—and like the rest of nature, involved no independent spiritual element. Everything that was previously regarded as spiritual was interpreted as a mere adjunct to, or a shadow of, the sense world. Such a conception accounted for the whole of nature and of man, and so became an explanation of the universe, a philosophy.

In such a theory self-preservation becomes the aim of life, the struggle for existence the driving-power, and adaptation to environment the means to the desired end. Hence it comes about that only one standard of value remains, that of usefulness, for that alone can be regarded as valuable which proves to be useful towards the preservation and enjoyment of the natural life. The ideas of the good, the beautiful, and the true, lose the glory of their original meaning, and become comparatively barren conceptions. Hence at a stroke the spiritual world is wiped away, the soul of man is degraded from its high position, the great truths of religion are cast aside as mere illusions.

The naturalistic explanation possesses the apparent advantage of being a very simple one, and hence attracts the human mind with great force in the early stages of mental culture. All the difficulties of the conception of a higher world are absent, for the naturalistic position does not admit of its existence. It gives, too, some purpose to life, even though that purpose is not an ideal one.

Eucken is not reluctant to give the theory all the credit it deserves, and he is prepared to admit that it fulfils to some extent the conditions which he holds a satisfactory solution should fulfil.

He goes, however, immediately to the root of the matter, and finds that the very existence of the theory of naturalism in itself is an eloquent disproof of the theory. The existence of a comprehensive scientific conception involves an activity which is far superior to nature itself, for it can make nature the object of systematic study. An intellect which is nothing more than a mirror of sense impressions can get little beyond such sense impressions, whereas the highly developed scientific conception of nature that obtains to-day is far beyond a mere collection of sense impressions. Nature, indeed, is subdued and mastered by man; why then degrade man to the level of a universe he has mastered? To produce from the phenomena of nature a scientific conception of nature demands the activity of an independent, originative power of thought, which, though it may be conditioned by, and must be related to, sense impressions, is far above mere sense impressions.

Naturalism, in directing attention to the things that are experienced, fails to take proper account of the mind that experiences them; it postulates nature without mind, when only by the mind processes can man become aware of nature, and construct a naturalistic scheme of life. "To a thorough-going naturalism, naturalism itself is logically impossible." Hence the impossibility of the naturalistic theory as an explanation of life.

Then it fails to provide a high ideal for life, and to release man from sordid motives. It gives no place for love, for work for its own sake, for altruistic conduct, or for devotion to the high ideals of life. The aim of life is limited to this world—man has but to aim at the enjoyment and preservation of his own life. The mechanical explanation of life, too, does away with the possibility of human freedom and personality, and it is futile to urge man to greater efforts when success is impossible. It is a theory which does justice merely to a life of pleasure and pain, its psychology has no soul, and its political economy bases the community upon selfishness.

In this way Eucken disproves the claim of naturalism; in doing so he points out that a satisfactory solution must take account of the life of nature in a way which religion and idealism have failed to do.

Of late years Socialism and Individualism have come into prominence as theories of life. Eucken attributes the movements in the first instance to the receding into the background of the idea of an overworld which gave meaning and value to life. When doubt was thrown upon religion and idealism, when confidence in another world was shaken, man lost to an extent his moral support. Where could he turn now for a firm basis to life? He might, of course, turn from the invisible world to the world of sense, to nature. But the first result of this is to make man realise that he is separate from nature, and again he fails to find support. He is an alien in the world of nature, and disbelieves the existence of a higher world. When both are denied him he turns naturally to his fellow-men—here at least he can find community of interest—here at least he is among beings of his own type. Hence he confines his attention to the life of humanity, and in this, the universe of mankind, he hopes to find an explanation of his own life, and a value for it.

The progress of humanity, then, must become the aim of life—all our strength and effort must be focussed upon human nature itself. But an immediate difficulty arises. Where are we to find Man? "Is it in the social community where individual forces are firmly welded together to form a common life, or among individuals as they exist for themselves in all their exhaustless diversity?" If we put the community first, then the social whole must be firmly rooted in itself and be independent of the caprice of its members. The duty of the individual is to subordinate himself to the community—this means socialism. If, on the other hand, the great aim is to develop the individual and to give him the maximum of opportunity to unfold his special characteristics, we arrive at an opposing theory—that of individualism.

In the history of society we find an age of socialistic ideas followed by one of individualistic ideas, and vice versa, and there is much that is valuable in each, in that it tends to modify and disprove the other's extreme position.

The present wave in the direction of socialism arises, to an extent, in reaction from the extremely individualistic position of previous ages. Man is now realising that the social relations of life are of importance as well as the character of his own life. He realises the interdependence of members of a community, and the conception of the State as a whole, a unit, instead of a mere sum of individuals, grows up. The modern industrial development and the organisation of labour have, too, emphasised the fact that the value of the individual depends largely upon his being a part of society. His work must be in co-operation with the