this to pass, and afterwards they will not need to take away his Prerogative of making War: He must do that at his own peril, and be sent to fight his Enemies with his hands bound behind him. But what if he thinks not their Party fit to be intrusted, least they should employ it against his Person? why then, as he told you they will give him nothing. Now whose will be the fault in common reason, if the Allyances be not supported, and Tangier not relieved? If they will give him nothing, before they bring him to a necessity of taking it upon their terms, asmuch as in them lyes they dissolve the Government: and the Interest of the Nation abroad must be left in the Suds, till they have destroy'd the Monarchy at home. But since God, and the Laws have put the disposing of the Treasury into his Majesties hands, it may satisfie any reasonable Englishman, that the same Laws have provided for the mispending of the Treasury, by calling the publick Officers into question for it before the Parliament. For God be thanked we have a House of Commons, who will be sure, never to forgoe the least tittle of their Priviledges, and not be so meal-mouth'd as the States of France, of whom neither Monsieur Sully, nor any of his Successors, have never had any cause of apprehension. But since the wisdom of our Ancestors have thought this Provision sufficient for our security, What has his present Majesty deserv'd from his Subjects, that he should be made a Minor at no less than fifty years of age? or that his House of Commons should Fetter him beyond any of his Predecessors? where the Interest goes, you will say, there goes the power. But the most ingenious of your Authors, I mean Plato Redivivus, broaches no such principle as that you should force this Prerogative from the King, by undue courses. The best use which can be made of all, is rather to support the Monarchy, than to have it fall upon your Heads. If indeed there were any reasonable fear of an Arbitrary Government, the adverse Party had somewhat to alledge in their defence of not supplying it; but it is not only evident, that the Kings temper is wholly averse from any such Design, but also demonstrable, that if all his Council, were such as this man most falsely suggests them to be, yet the notion of an absolute power in the Prince is wholly impracticable, not only in this Age, but for ought any wise man can foresee, at any time hereafter. 'Tis plain, that the King has reduc'd himself already to live more like a private Gentleman than a Prince; and since he can content himself in that condition, 'tis as plain, that the supplies which he demands are only for the service of the publick, and not for his own maintenance. Monsieur de Sully might give what Council he thought convenient for Henry the Fourth, who was then designing that Arbitrary power, which his Successors have since compass'd, to the ruine of the Subjects liberty in France; but I appeal to the Consciences of those men, who are most averse to the present Government, if they think our King would put his Peace and Quiet at this time of day, upon so desperate an issue. What the necessities, which they are driving him into, may make him part with on the other hand, I know not. But how can they answer it to our Posterity, that for private Picques, self Interest, and causeless jealousies, they would destroy the foundation of so excellent a Government, which is the admiration and envy of all Europe?

The rest of my Authors Paragraph, is only laying more load upon the Ministers, and telling us, that if a sum of Money sufficient for those ends were given, while they were Managers of Affairs, it would be only to set them free from any apprehensions of account to any future Parliament. But this Argument having only the imaginary fear of an Arbitrary power for its foundation, is already answer'd, he adds in the close of it, That the Prince has a cheap bargain, who gives Paper-Laws in exchange of Money and Power. Bargains, he tells us, there have always been, and always will be, betwixt Prince and People, because it is in the Constitution of our Goverment, and the chief dependance of our Kings is in the love and liberality of their People.

Our present King, I acknowledge has often found it so; though no thanks I suppose to this Gentleman and his Party. But though he cry down Paper and Parchment at this Rate, they are the best Evidence he can have for his Estate, and his friends the Lawyers will advise him to speak with less contempt of those Commodities. If Laws avail the Subject nothing, our Ancestors have made many a bad Bargain for us. Yet I can instance to him one Paper, namely, that of the Habeas Corpus bill; for which the House of Commons would have been content to have given a Million of good English money, and which they had Gratis from his Majesty. 'Tis true, they boast they got it by a Trick; but if the Clerk of the Parliament had been bidden to forget it, their Trick of telling Noses might have fail'd them. Therefore let us do right on all sides: The Nation is oblig'd both to the House of Commons for asking it, and more especially to his Majesty, for granting it so freely.

But what can we think of his next Axiome, that it was never known that Laws signified any thing to a People, who had not the sole guard of their own Prince, Government and Laws?

Here all our Fore-fathers are Arraign'd at once for trusting the Executive power of the Laws in their Princes hands. And yet you see the Government has made a shift to shuffle on for so many hundred years together, under this miserable oppression; and no man so wise in so many ages to find out, that Magna Charta was to no purpose, while there was a King. I confess in Countreys, where the Monarck governs absolutely, and the Law is either his Will, or depending on it, this noble maxim might take place; But since we are neither Turks, Russians, nor Frenchmen, to affirm that in our Countrey, in a Monarchy of so temperate and wholsom a Constitution, Laws are of no validity, because they are not in the disposition of the People, plainly infers that no Government but that of a Common-wealth can preserve our Liberties and Priviledges: for though the Title of a Prince be allow'd to continue, yet if the People must have the sole guard and Government of him and of the Laws, 'tis but facing an whole hand of Trumps, with an insignificant King of another sute. And which is worst of all, if this be true, there can be no Rebellion, for then the People is the supream power. And if the Representatives of the Commons shall Jarr with the other two Estates, and with the King, it would be no Rebellion to adhere to them in that War: to which I know that every Republican who reads this, must of necessity Answer, No more it would not. Then farewell the Good Act of Parliament, which makes it Treason to Levy Arms against the present King, upon any pretences whatsoever. For if this be a Right of Nature, and consequently never to be Resign'd, there never has been, nor ever can be any pact betwixt King and People, and Mr. Hobbs would tell us, That we are still in a state of War.

The next thing our Author would establish, is, That there is nothing in Nature or in Story so ridiculous, as the management of the Ministers, in the Examination of the Popish Plot. Which being prov'd by Coleman's and others Letters, and by both Houses by declaring the King's Life to be in danger, &c. Yet they have persuaded the King to believe nothing of this danger; but to apprehend the Plot to be extreamly improv'd, if not wholly contriv'd by the Presbyterians. And to think it more his concernment to have an end of all; then to have it search'd to the bottom: and that this was the true reason, why four Parliaments, during the Examination of the Plot have been dissolv'd:

Reasonable People will conclude, that his Majesty and his Ministers have