would mean the extinction of whatever Christian element is there, and would shut the doors to the preaching of the gospel, which your Majesty and your ancestors have procured with so great glory and so many expenses. [That relief of Nueva España and Piru should be prepared] also, for if the relief [from España] should suffer an equal disaster with the last, and that country could not be succored, it would all be lost.

I petition your Majesty to order that this matter be considered, as a matter of so great importance; and that your president of the Indias call a conference of those most experienced in the Indias, so that they may discuss what measures can be taken most fitting for the relief of that country, and as speedily as possible, where he [i.e., Los Rios] will also declare the measures that occur to him.

[Endorsed: “To the president of the Indias. Examined, in the meeting of April 7, 620.”]

Treatise on the navigation of Filipinas, reduced to four chapters

Sire:

Your Majesty orders me to declare my opinion in regard to the navigation from España to the Philipinas and Malucas Islands, from them to España, the mutual navigation between those island groups; and the seasons suitable for such navigation. In obedience to your royal order, I declare, Sire, that the propositions cover four principal points, each of which I shall explain in order. [The original document contains a marginal abstract of each of the four points that follow; but these abstracts are here omitted.]

First point. This point contains in brief the substance of all the others. In explaining it, I declare that the navigations from these kingdoms to those islands are so worthy of consideration, and so important, that no others in the world at this time are equal to them. For the drugs, fragrant gums, spices, precious stones, and silks that the Dutch enemy and their allies bring thence—obtained partly by pillaging, and partly by trading in their forts and factories which they own throughout that archipelago—amount, as they do at present, to five millions [of pesos] annually. It has been stated how paramount is this undertaking to any others that can today be attempted; for besides the spiritual injury inflicted by those heretical pirates among all that multitude [of heathen peoples] (which I think the universal Master has delivered to your Majesty so that you may cultivate it and cleanse it for His celestial granaries), it is quite certain—since the enemy are collecting annually so large a mass of wealth; and since the sinews of war consist in that, both for attack and defense—that they are acquiring and will continue to acquire those riches daily, with greater forces. And, as they continue to increase in strength, their ambitious designs will also extend further. In the same degree as the enemy grows stronger, it is certain that our forces will continue to decrease—and so much that, if relief does not arrive there in time, the day will come in which not one of your Majesty’s vessels can be placed on the sea, because of the many that the enemy will have there. Inasmuch as there is no one in the world today who can oppose the enemy except your Majesty, they hate our interests with all their strength, and will attempt to destroy and ruin them by all possible methods.

The method of preventing all those most considerable troubles is the one that your Majesty is attempting, by despatching the eight vessels that you are sending under color of reënforcements—and would that it had been with a fleet of sixteen vessels, each one of which would carry three hundred sailors and soldiers and be very well armed with artillery. For with that the rest [of the enemy’s forces] would be driven away, and that crowd of thieves, who are becoming arrogant and enriching themselves—so much to the cost of our holy religion, of your Majesty’s reputation and prestige, and of your most loyal vassals, by disturbing your Majesty’s most holy designs—would be forced from those seas and even from these. For it is very certain that if that [trade] be taken away, the enemy would have no resources with which they could preserve themselves; while if your Majesty has all that profit—as beyond doubt, God helping (for whose honor it is being done), you will have it, by encouraging your royal forces and by enforcing your holy purposes—all the heads of that many-headed serpent of the enemy will be destroyed.

Inasmuch as it is proper for us who, like myself, are zealous for your royal service, let us hasten on that service, by as many roads as God makes known to us. I declare, Sire, that in order to encourage those most loyal though most afflicted vassals whom your Majesty has now in Manila, it is advisable for the present reënforcement to be sent; and that its route be by the shortest path and the one of least risk—namely, by way of the Cape of Buena Esperança; not only is the weather more favorable in that route, but it passes through less longitude.

I mention the weather, for from this time on the weather is favorable, as was determined in a general council of experienced pilots of all nations that was held at Manila by Governor Don Juan de Silva. [I mention] also the longitude, because the time taken to go by the above route is known—namely (to one who follows his course without making fruitless stops) seven months; which, counted from the first of December, places the arrival there at the end of June.

Some one may object to all this by saying that the intention is to import this relief into Manila, so that all that region may not be lost; and that, if it shall go by that route [i.e., of the Cape], it runs the risk of meeting the enemy and of being lost, and incidentally that all that region [of Filipinas] will remain in its present danger, and even greater, because of your Majesty’s resources being wasted, and the necessity of getting together a new relief expedition—but [such objector would say], if this relief be sent by another route all those troubles will be obviated and the purpose attained. I answer that objection by saying: First, that eight vessels are not so weak a force that they should fear those of the enemy who, on their homeward trip—inasmuch as they do not fear along that route any encounter that will harm them—come laden with their goods, in great security, and carelessly; and they have at best only two or three galleons, while our eight galleys, ready and prepared for fighting, not only have nothing to fear, but can from the start expect the victory, in case they meet the enemy. Second, for this reason, if once our galleons cause the enemy loss in the chief thing that takes the latter there, namely, trade, they will have to diminish their forces, and will lose credit with their backers. Hence I infer that not only should this route and [possible] encounter not be avoided, but that express orders be given to the commander of this relief expedition to follow the routes taken by the enemy and to reconnoiter their chief factory of Batan, which is not fortified. For if God permits him to find and destroy that place, many and very important results will follow: First, that immediately word will be passed to all those nations—who love changes and cry “long live” to the conqueror—and they will lose the little affection that they have for the enemy at present; while they will incline toward and join us, turning against our enemy, as they have promised. Second, that our soldiers, flushed with the beginnings of victory, will be worth after that for other victories just twice as much; nor will they be