life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

There is also an implied denial of the proposition that government is the will of the majority, in the proposition that "governments are instituted among men." If the Fathers had meant that government was the will of the majority they would have said, "Men have the right to institute governments for themselves, according to the will of the majority." What they did was simply to state as a fact that "governments are instituted among men," which fact is wholly inconsistent with the hypothesis of a universal right of each and all communities to institute government for themselves.

There is, however, it would seem, clearly implied in the statement that "to secure these rights governments are instituted among men," the statement that governments are universal, that they begin with and continue through human existence,—that government is, as Calvin said, of "not less use among men than bread and water, light and air, and of much more excellent dignity," and therefore the prime necessity of human life,—and that there is a universal right of all men, all communities, all states and all nations, to such government as will secure these rights; for the rights which are to be secured being universal, government, which is the instrumentality for securing them, must also be universal.

Having thus declared governments of a kind suitable to secure the unalienable rights of the individual to be a universal right, and having by implication declared that it is not essential in all cases that governments should be instituted by the people governed, and that therefore there may be cases in which governments may justly be instituted by an external power, the Declaration proceeds to lay down as a universal proposition that all governments,—existing, as they do, solely for the purpose of securing to each and every individual his and their unalienable rights,—do, universally, whether instituted by the consent of the governed or not, "derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." The expression "deriving their just powers from" is generally read as if it were "by," and the expression "the consent of the governed" as if it were "the will of the majority." Both of these readings are so plainly inconsistent with both the text and the context as to be clearly inadmissible. If the words are taken in their usual and proper meaning and read in the light of the context and the surrounding circumstances, it seems at least reasonable to conclude that the expression "deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed," is and was intended to be an epitome of the two fundamental principles of the law of agency, brought over into the English law from the Roman. These principles are: "Obligatio mandati consensu contrahentium consistit," a translation of which is, "The powers of an agent are derived from the consent of the contracting parties," and "Rei turpis nullum mandatum est," a translation of which is "No agent can have unjust powers." If this interpretation be correct, the expression "that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed" means that there is no universal absolute right of communities, states, or nations, to institute their own governments, but that every government, however instituted, is universally the agent of the governed, to secure to every individual, every community, every state, and every nation governed, his and their unalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and to effectuate the equality of all men as the creatures of a common Creator.

On this interpretation a rule is laid down to determine under what circumstances a community, state, or nation has the right to institute its own government. Its rights are to be determined by the principles of agency. Agencies among individuals are of several kinds, express and implied, voluntary and involuntary. There may be co-agencies, in which the performance of one general agency is distributed among several agents. A person of full capacity has the right, according to the common law of persons, to appoint his own agent, unless he is in such just relationship with others that the common interests require that he should adopt as his agent an agent appointed by the others. So communities, states and nations which are of full capacity, have the right, assuming the existence of this common law of nature and of nations, to appoint their own governments, subject to the necessary limitations growing out of their just relationships to other communities, states and nations. Infants, and persons non compos or spendthrift, are subject, by the principles of the common law of persons, to have an involuntary agency created for them by the Chancellor until the disability is removed, if the disability is temporary, or permanently, if the disability is permanent. The same is true by the law of nature and of nations, if the interpretation I have suggested be correct, regarding communities, states and nations, which are in a condition of infancy or anarchy, or are spendthrift. The Chancellor or Justiciar, whether a person, a state, or a nation, must possess the qualities and attributes of a Chancellor and Justiciar, and proceed as a Chancellor and Justiciar. Otherwise the attempt to create an involuntary agency for the suitor is nugatory. The fact that a person who is an infant, or non compos, or spendthrift, has an involuntary agency created for him by the Chancellor, does not destroy, or in any way affect, the juridical personality of such person, or his political equality with other persons; and, by parity of reasoning, the fact that a community which would otherwise be recognized as having free statehood and political personality and equality with other free states, has an involuntary government appointed for it by a Justiciar State, on account of its being in a weak or infantile condition, or on account of its being anarchic or spendthrift, can not destroy or in any way affect its free statehood,—or, what is the same thing, its political personality,—or its equality with other free states.

A further meaning apparently is that the first object of all government is to do justice, and the second object to do the will of the governed. A government which recognizes itself as deriving its just powers from the consent of the governed, is bound to do justice in such manner as will conform to the just public sentiment of the governed. It is in no case bound to execute the will of the governed, much less the will of the majority, unless that will conforms to justice in the particular case. Nor can it do an unjust act and plead in justification the consent of the governed, for the consent of the governed to an unjust act is void by the law of nature and of nations. This principle was often appealed to by the Americans, notably in the final manifesto of 1778, as an answer to the British claim that the Americans were bound by the restrictive Acts of Parliament on account of their acquiescence in them. They said that an attempted consent to an unjust act of government was a nugatory act, an unjust act of government being itself nugatory, and deserving obedience only from motives of policy.

This doctrine that government is the doing of justice according to public sentiment is, of course, utterly opposed to the doctrine that government is the will of the majority. If government is the doing of justice according to public sentiment, government is the expression and application of a spiritually and intellectually educated public sentiment, since the knowledge of what is just comes only after a course of spiritual and intellectual education, and the forms and methods of government should be such as are adapted to such spiritual and intellectual