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And Dr. Tyndall in this way is a perfect representative of the whole modern positive school 231 Let us compare the molecules of the brain to the six moving billiard-balls 231 The question is, are these movements due to the stroke of one cue or of two 233 The positive school profess to answer this question both ways 234 But this profession is nonsense 236 What they really mean is, 1st. That the connection of consciousness with matter is a mystery; as to that they can give no answer. 2nd. That as to whether consciousness is wholly a material thing or no, they will give no answer 237 But why are they in this state of suspense? 238 Though their system does not in the least require the hypothesis of an immaterial element in consciousness 239 They see that the moral value of life does 239 The same reasons that will warrant their saying it may exist, will constrain them to say it must 240 Physical science, with its proofs, can say nothing in the matter, either as to will, immortality, or God 242 But, on the other hand, it will force us, if we believe in will, to admit the reality of miracles 243 So far as science goes, morality and religion are both on the same footing 243

CHAPTER X.
MORALITY AND NATURAL THEISM.

Supposing science not to be inconsistent with theism, may not theism be inconsistent with morality?	247
It seems to be so; but it is no more so than is morality with itself. Two difficulties common to both:—1st. The existence of evil; 2nd. Man's free will and God's free will	248
James Mill's statement of the case represents the popular anti-religious arguments	249
But his way of putting the case is full of distortion and exaggeration	250
Though certain of the difficulties he pointed out were real	251
And those we cannot explain away; but if we are to believe in our moral being at all, we must one and all accept	252
We can escape from them by none of the rationalistic substitutes for religion	252
A similar difficulty is the freedom of the will	257
This belief is an intellectual impossibility	258
But at the same time a moral necessity	260
It is typical of all the difficulties attendant on an assent to our own moral nature	260
The vaguer difficulties that appeal to the moral imagination we must meet in the same way	261

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