You are here

قراءة كتاب New York Times Current History; The European War, Vol 2, No. 5, August, 1915

تنويه: تعرض هنا نبذة من اول ١٠ صفحات فقط من الكتاب الالكتروني، لقراءة الكتاب كاملا اضغط على الزر “اشتر الآن"

‏اللغة: English
New York Times Current History; The European War, Vol 2, No. 5, August, 1915

New York Times Current History; The European War, Vol 2, No. 5, August, 1915

تقييمك:
0
No votes yet
المؤلف:
دار النشر: Project Gutenberg
الصفحة رقم: 8

us.

"Finally, not only material, also I might say sentimental, interests play a certain rôle not to be underestimated among the people. Many warm friends of America among us are painfully affected by the fact that actual conditions give the impression that America, even though unintentionally, differentiates between the belligerents.

"Austro-Hungarian statesmen, conscious of the great rôle that America will be called upon to play in the future, would forget their duty if they neglected to do everything in their power to clear away the circumstances that shake the confidence of the bravely fighting armies and the whole population in the justice of America. It is clear that the war would have been ended long ago if America had not supplied our enemies with the means of continuing it.

"The assumption that the Austro-Hungarian note was sent at the wish of the German Government is incorrect. On the contrary, it is a completely spontaneous demonstration, inspired wholly by the Austro-Hungarian considerations. We hope it will be received and judged in America in the same spirit in which it was sent."

MR. WOOLSEY’S OPINION

Theodore S. Woolsey, formerly Professor of International Law at Yale University, in Leslie's Weekly, for July 29, has an article entitled "The Case for the Munitions Trade." In part Professor Woolsey says:

In the midst of widespread industrial depression came a great war. This war intensified the depression. It cut off markets, raised freights, retarded payments, upset the whole commercial world and we suffered with the rest. Then shortly came a demand for certain products and certain manufactures caused by the war itself, varied, considerable, even unexpected. This demand grew until it became an appreciable factor in our industrial life, a welcome source of profit when so many other sources of profit were cut off. It was a good thing; at the same time it was a temporary, unnatural thing, and directly or indirectly it was based upon the desire of some of our friends to kill others of our friends. Accordingly people began to give this trade bad names. They called it unneutral, wrong, inhuman.

For the sake of our pockets we were adding to the sum of human suffering and slaughter, and they urged that, even if legally justified, ethically this trade was a blot upon our character as a humane and civilized people and must be stopped. Where does the truth lie? What can the munitions trade say for itself?

Naturally, it turns for justification first to the usage of other wars, to the recognized rules of international law. As expressed in Article 7, Convention XIII, of the 1907 Conference at The Hague, the law is as follows:

"A neutral power is not bound to prevent the export or transit, for the use of either belligerent, of arms, ammunitions or, in general, of anything which could be of use to an army or fleet."

The next previous article had prohibited a Government from engaging in this trade, so that the distinction between what the State and the individual may do is made perfectly clear, provided both belligerents are treated alike. To permit trade in arms with one belligerent and forbid it with another would be unneutral and illegal.

We permit the munitions trade with both belligerents, it is true, and yet, owing to the chances of war, the right to buy inures to the advantage of one only. Does this stamp our conduct as unneutral? Quite the contrary. To embargo munitions bought by one because the other side does not choose to buy would be the unneutral act. Germany doesn't buy because she cannot transport.

She cannot transport, because she does not care to contest the control of the sea with her enemies. Have we aught to do with that? To supplement her naval inferiority by denying to the Allies the fruits of their superiority would be equivalent to sharing in the war on the German side. Moreover, to assume and base action upon German naval inferiority in advance of any general trial of strength would be not only illegal, but even an insult to Germany. Notice that no complaints of our export of munitions have come from the German Government. To make such complaint would be to plead the baby act. Rather than risk her fleet by contesting the control of the sea, thus gaining her share of munitions imports, Germany has chosen to withdraw it behind fortifications, thus losing the munitions trade. Probably the decision is a sound one, but she must accept the results.

The opposition to the trade seems to come from two classes:

(1) German sympathizers who seek to minimize the advantage which sea power gives the Allies.

(2) Those who are governed by their emotions rather than by reason and respect for law. I would call the attention of both these classes to the usage, especially to the German usage, in other wars.

Professor Gregory, in an interesting article, gives statistics of the large German exports of arms to the British forces in the Boer war after the Boer trade had been cut off. In the Russo-Japanese war Krupp notoriously supplied both sides. In the Balkan war there was said to be competition between Krupp and Creusot in furnishing cannon. No state in the nature of things can satisfy its needs in war completely from its own resources. Every belligerent has bought, every neutral has allowed its citizens to sell, munitions since modern war began. England sympathized with the South in our civil war, yet sold to the North. She did the same in 1870 to France.

If the trade in munitions is to be forbidden, then every state must accumulate its own supply or greatly enlarge its arms manufacturing capacity, both wasteful processes. To say that a moderate trade is lawful which a big trade is not is like the excuse of the lady who thought her baby born out of wedlock did not matter because it was such a little one.

The critics of the munitions trade must note furthermore that in our own country that trade cannot be forbidden without explicit legislation.

At the outset of the Spanish war such legislation was passed, as a war measure, forbidding the export of coal or other war material at the discretion of the President. But by resolution of Congress of March 14, 1912, the 1898 resolution was so amended as to apply to American countries only. The reason for this distinction was, of course, to limit the danger of such exports of arms to our neighbor states, particularly to Mexico, as might endanger our own peace and safety. The general right to trade was left undisturbed.

But let us argue the question on ethical grounds alone. I can see no difference between a peace trade and a war trade from the humanitarian standpoint; between arming a neighbor by our exports in preparation for war and rearming him during war. In both cases we help him to kill. Now, if one regards all war as wrong, aid in waging war by trade in munitions, whether in peace time or war time, should be abhorrent to one's conscience. A Quaker gun is not only a paradox, but a sinful one.

Most of us, however, believe that a defensive war, against aggression threatening the life and liberties of a nation, is just and right. In the present war both parties claim to be fighting in self-defense. We are not their judge; we must take both at their word; what we owe both, ethically, is simply equality of treatment.

We help both alike in waging a just war. To do otherwise is to take part in their war. With the flux and flow of the contest which makes our trade valuable or worthless now to one side, now to the other, both ethically and legally we have nothing to do.


Pages