(Sept. 27-Oct. 5, 1918) 21, 170
  Battle of Flanders (Sept. 28-Oct. 14, 1918) 21
  Second Battle of Le Cateau (Oct. 6-12, 1918) 21, 66, 96
  Battle of the Selle (Oct. 17-25, 1918) 21
  ——— Sambre (Nov. 1-11, 1918) 21, 65, 67
  Armistice Day (Nov. 11, 1918) 65, 169

Mesopotamia

  Battle of Ramadie (Sept. 27-29, 1917) 64
  ——— Bagdadieh (March 26, 1918) 64-65

North Russia

Archangel Province (Aug.-Sept. 1918) 66-67

{xix}

PUBLICATIONS CITED IN THE LECTURES

"Field Service Regulations," Parts I. and II.

"Infantry Training," Parts I. and II.

CLERY, Major-General Sir C. F., K.C.B.:
  "Minor Tactics."

CREASY, Sir Edward:
  "Fifteen Decisive Battles at the World."

FOCH, Maréchal Ferdinand:
  "Principles of War."

FRENCH OF YPRES, Field-Marshal Earl, K.P.:
  "1914."

GRANT, General Ulysses S., United States Army:
  "Memoirs."

HAIG OF BEMERSYDE, Field-Marshal Earl, K.T.:
  "Sir D. Haig's Dispatches."

HAKING, Lieut.-General Sir R. C. B., G.B.E.:
  "Staff Bides, etc."

HAMLEY, General Sir E. B., K.C.B.:
  "Operations of War."

HENDERSON, Colonel G. F. R., C.B.:
  "Stonewall Jackson."
  "The Science of War."

NAPIER, Sir William Francis Patrick, K.C.B.;
  "History of the Peninsular War."

"OLE LUK-OIE." See SWINTON.

SWINTON, Major-General E. D., C.B.:
  "The Green Curve."

TAYLOR, General R., Confederate States Army:
  "Destruction and Reconstruction."

{1}

LECTURES ON LAND WARFARE

THE ART OF WARFARE

"The Art of War, like every other art, possesses its theory, its principles; otherwise, it would not be an art."—MARSHAL FOCH.

The Art of War, like any other art, is based upon certain fixed principles, and there is no short cut which hurries the student to his goal. The long and laborious line of study is the only safe way, and there are many pitfalls to be avoided on the road. One of these pitfalls is dug by those who maintain, whenever a new war breaks out, that all previous warlike knowledge must be thrown on the scrap-heap and attention paid only to the problems of the hour. Another is the alluring trap that Warfare is "merely a matter of common sense"; and a third is the oft-expressed idea that knowledge is required of the General, and that compliance with orders is sufficient for the Subaltern Officer.

KNOWLEDGE OF PRINCIPLES ESSENTIAL.—With regard to the first of these difficulties, the opinions of recognised authorities on the Art of Warfare may be consulted. "The cardinal principles on which the art of war is based are few and unchangeable, resembling in this the code of morality; but their application varies with the theatre of the war, the genius and temper of the people engaged, and the kind of arms employed" (General R. Taylor, C.S. Army). "Although the manifold inventions of modern times have given to warfare {2} a wider scope and fresh materials, it remains obedient to the same laws as in the past; but it applies these laws with means more numerous, more powerful, and more delicate" (Marshal Foch). "This war has given us no new principles; but different mechanical appliances—and in particular the rapid improvement and multiplication of aeroplanes, the use of immense numbers of machine guns and Lewis guns, the employment of vast quantities of barbed wire as effective obstacles, the enormous expansion of artillery, and the provision of great masses of motor transport—have introduced new problems of considerable complexity concerning the effective co-operation of the different arms and services. Much thought has had to be bestowed upon determining how new devices could be combined in the best manner with the machinery already working" (Marshal Haig).

The laws of war are not in themselves difficult to understand, but their successful application on the field of battle requires that they should be carefully studied and considered in all their aspects. "The mind can only be trained to this by close study of campaigns, and by the solution of definite problems on maps and on the ground" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). "A lifelong experience of military study and thought has taught me that the principle of the tactical employment of troops must be instinctive. I know that in putting the Science of War into practice it is necessary that its main tenets should form, so to speak, part of one's flesh and blood. In war there is little time to think, and the right thing to do must come like a flash—it must present itself to the mind as perfectly obvious" (Marshal French). The same idea is expressed by the Generalissimo of the largest victorious force that was ever controlled by one mind. "Generally speaking, grave situations partially obscure even a bright intellect. It is therefore with a fully equipped mind that one ought to start in order to make war or even to understand {3} war. No study is possible on the battlefield; one does there simply what one can in order to apply what one knows. In order to do even a little one has to know a great deal, and to know it well. . . . The right solution imposes itself; namely, the application, according to circumstances, of fixed principles. . . . Incapacity and ignorance cannot be called extenuating circumstances, for knowledge is within the reach of all" (Marshal Foch); and in the words of Napoleon's own maxim: "The only way to learn the art of war is to read and re-read the campaigns of the great captains."

THE "COMMON-SENSE" FALLACY.—The fallacy that warfare is "merely a matter of common sense" has been exposed by Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, in his contrast of the conduct of the American Civil War of 1861-1865, when it was controlled by President Lincoln and his Cabinet in Washington, and when it was handed over without reserve to a professional soldier in the field (General Grant). Few mortals have possessed "common sense" in greater abundance than Abraham Lincoln, and yet he permitted interference with his generals' plans, which were frequently brought to nought by such interference, and but for a like hindrance of the Confederate generals by Jefferson Davis this well-intentioned "common sense" would have been even more disastrous. "Men who, aware of their ignorance, would probably have shrunk from assuming charge of a squad of infantry in action had no hesitation whatever in attempting to direct a mighty army" (Henderson, "Stonewall Jackson").

In June, 1863, the Confederate Armies were scattered from Strasburg (in the Valley) to Fredericksburg (in Spottsylvania); General Hooker, commanding the Army of the Potomac in the field, begged to be allowed to attack Lee's Corps in detail. Success was certain, but permission was refused. The one and only idea of the Federal Government was to keep the Army of the Potomac between Lee and the Federal Capital.

{4}

THE "HIGHER RANKS" FALLACY.—The same writer has also protested vehemently against the idea that the practice of strategy in the field is confined to the higher ranks.