awakening from this transient period of theory came from a nation not trained to arms, and it is to the American civil war that we owe the revival that took place in the use of the cavalry arm. The raids made by the Confederates under Morgan, Stuart, Forrest, and by the Federals under Sheridan, drew attention to advanced cavalry work, such as scouting, reconnaissance, outpost and dismounted work. As particular examples we may select Morgan's boldest and greatest raid in 1862, when he passed through Kentucky and Indiana, capturing large stores from the enemy. By his rapid and skillful marches the Federal officers were completely bewildered. He was absent from his army 24 days, in which time he traveled 1,000 miles, capturing 17 towns and destroying all the government supplies and arms. In a second raid he forced the Federal army to fall back by taking possession of the railway in its rear which brought it supplies. In October, 1862, Stuart made his greatest raid through Pennsylvania, around the Northern army. He set out with 1,800 cavalry and four pieces of horse artillery, and crossed the Potomac. The telegraph wires were cut in all directions, railways obstructed, and a large number of horses captured, and all the public stores and buildings were destroyed. His position at this time was very critical, 90 miles from his own army. He considered it less dangerous to return by the opposite way to which he came.

Forrest used his cavalry in every possible manner, dismounting in the battle field and employing it as infantry. In October, 1864, during a raid, he impeded the navigation of the Tennessee River, which was filled with Federal gunboats. Choosing a strong position on the bank, he masked his guns and awaited the approach of the enemy's vessels. He captured a gunboat and a transport, and manned them with his own men; but his naval expedition did not last long. Pursued by several gunboats, he had to run his ships on shore, when the troopers gladly mounted their horses again. His object was, however, gained—inspiring alarm throughout the country and occupying a considerable number of the enemy. Later on the Federals copied this system, when the raids of Sheridan, with his 10,000 horsemen, armed with the magazine rifle and revolver, with sword attached to the saddle, brought about the final overthrow of the Southern army.

The next campaign that took place was in 1866, known as the "Seven Weeks' War," when large bodies of cavalry were used by the Austrians and Prussians. This campaign was of such short duration that there was not sufficient time for the experience gained in the use of cavalry to be utilized while the war lasted; but when the war was over, both sides, having bought their experience, set out to reorganize their systems, and the course pursued by the Prussians after this campaign in largely increasing their cavalry was fully justified by the advantages reaped in the war in France in 1870. At the close of the Franco-German war the attention of the whole of Europe was called to the successful use of German cavalry during the campaign, more especially the advanced duties, when at times 60 miles in breadth and 50 in advance of the army was covered by the cavalry.

In England, after the termination of this war, many German military works of great value were translated and published; the battle fields in France were visited and described; every movement of both armies, strategical and tactical, was studied. All this tended to draw our attention to the extended use of the cavalry arm in future campaigns, and the shortcomings of our own system were carefully scrutinized. The movements of our drill book were simplified, the careful training of our men in shooting was more fully recognized, and the teaching of advanced cavalry duties, reconnaissance, outpost and dismounted work, were gone into most thoroughly—in such a manner that I may confidently appeal to those officers who have the best opportunities of forming an opinion, whether our cavalry does not bear comparison now with what is being done in other armies, and in these matters is advancing in a satisfactory manner. While all this good work has been going on (and I would be the last to say one word that might seem to depreciate its value) we may perhaps have permitted the action of cavalry on the field of battle to escape from sufficient notice.

It is for this reason I will ask your permission to bring before you this subject, believing that the opinions of all branches of the service being brought to bear upon it, considerable advantage maybe obtained. It will be my endeavor to show, not by my own arguments, but by quotations from others, that cavalry still has an important part to take on the battle field, and far from its duties ending when armies come in contact, that it is still reserved to them, as has been the case before, to decide, perhaps by only one charge, the issue of a whole campaign. Prince Kraft in his letters on cavalry says: "The battle of Mars-la-Tour, won by the bold employment of cavalry, made possible the blockade of Metz, and afterward the surrender of the whole of Bazaine's army. So it may be said, without exaggeration, that the charge of Bredow's six squadrons on that day was the turning point of the Franco-German campaign."

Colonel Home, in his "Précis of Modern Tactics," says: "The action of cavalry on the actual battle field is by no means a thing of the past. The use of cavalry with skill at the right moment and in the right numbers has always been considered one of the most difficult problems in war. Modern arms have increased this difficulty manifold, but to say the day of cavalry on the field of battle is past is merely another way of saying that the knowledge of how it should be used is wanting." Cavalry is apportioned to an army in two capacities: (1) Divisional cavalry, that is (if possible) a regiment, or as many squadrons as can be spared, attached to each infantry division, acting under the orders of the general of the division. (2) The cavalry division, that is, a large body of cavalry composed of several brigades, an independent body having its own commander. On the march the divisional cavalry covers the head and flanks of its own division: on the field of battle it will be as near as possible to its division, in the most sheltered spot that can be found; in the early part of the battle it would be kept as much in reserve as possible, écheloned in rear of one flank of its own infantry. It would remain there until the artillery and musketry had effected their work, and the enemy's flanks had become thinned and shaken. Then, when his infantry become tired and exhausted, under cover of the smoke, the cavalry may be further advanced.

Prince Kraft says: "At Sedan the divisional cavalry were employed during the battle, charging by single squadrons, patrolling and reconnoitering to obtain information of the enemy and the ground. Every infantry body is accompanied by patrols, however small." An instance of the too early employment of cavalry in a battle occurred at Waterloo, when Napoleon at the commencement launched his cavalry into the fight. The result was that although it far outnumbered the English at first, it became so reduced, depressed, and worn out, that it was unable afterward to offer full resistance to the British squadrons, who were comparatively fresh. Wellington, on the contrary, after his first successes, kept his cavalry, as much as possible, in reserve. The field of battle itself shows the proper situation of cavalry, but the divisional cavalry on the defensive side must always be at hand to fall upon the flanks of the enemy's infantry when in extended order, while that of the attacking side must be equally at hand to prevent the flanks of its own infantry being so attacked.

In discussing the action of divisional cavalry, the most advantageous time for its assisting in the combat must be considered. At what moment, if any, can infantry be attacked by cavalry? When opposed to a force acting on the defensive, divisional cavalry has its operations limited, and probably in the