the animals that were slain being "harmless," but for rendering the spirit of man meet to partake of the future life. Abel was himself in his death the first witness (martus) to this truth, and by the same means many chosen servants of God have been "purified and made white" (Dan. xii. 10). The offering of Cain was also proper for food, but as consisting of "fruits of the ground," it was not, like Abel's, susceptible of any meaning relative to the covenant. Grace was given to Abel to select an offering which, as being significant of the covenant, was accepted by God; but the same grace was not given to Cain. "The Lord had respect to Abel and to his offering: but to Cain and to his offering He had not respect."

The narrative goes on to say that because the Lord had not the same respect to Cain's offering as to Abel's, Cain was "very wroth, and his countenance fell," and that on this account he was rebuked. It should be noticed that the terms of the rebuke have no reference to the choice of offering, but to "doing well," implying that Cain's conduct was not "righteous" like that of Abel. To quiet his troubled spirit, he is told that it is God's pleasure that he should stand towards his brother in the relation of protector and ruler. Cain repudiated this relation {23} and slew his brother, acting thus as the unrighteous world, of whom he may be regarded as the representative, have always acted towards God's elect, whom Abel typified. These remarks will afterwards be seen to bear on the general argument.

The distinction which God made between the offerings of Cain and Abel, and His express approval of Abel's offering, might serve to make known, at the time and in succeeding generations, the purport of the promise made originally to Adam, and the ordained conditions of its fulfilment. In fact, the special acceptance by God of Abel's offering may be looked upon as the primary institution of sacrifice. The researches of men of learning have abundantly shown that the sacrificing of animals was a very ancient and wide-spread religious practice, but have left altogether unexplained how it originated, and whence arose the custom of ratifying a covenant between man and man by killing animals; for what reason also the slaying of innocuous and helpless victims came to be the principal act of religious worship among the Jews, and why it was thought among the Gentiles that such sacrifices pleased the gods. These questions do not appear to admit of answers apart from information derived from Scripture. The answers will, I think, be found to be given by what, in reliance on such aid, has been already said, and by what remains to be said, {24} respecting the covenant of immortality. It is quite possible that, as has happened with respect to other practices, that of sacrificing animals was continued long after its original signification ceased to be understood. This may be affirmed of the ratifying of covenants by killing victims (which no sane person nowadays would think of doing), and generally of the sacrifices offered by Gentile nations in honour of their gods, which eventually became mere matters of custom, without any distinct appreciation of their intrinsic meaning. In such cases all clue from tradition or history fails, and the explanation of the sources of the practices can be looked for only in the records of Scripture.

It might, however, be questioned whether Abel himself, in making his offering, understood that it had the symbolic meanings ascribed to it above. The answer to this inquiry, given on the authority of what is said in Heb. xi. 4, would seem to be that he did so understand it, inasmuch as it is stated that he brought an acceptable offering by faith, and, according to Heb. xi. 1, faith may be defined to be an intelligent belief and hopeful expectation of the covenanted life. Also, as bearing on this question, it may be mentioned that in passages of Scripture where Abel is subsequently spoken of (as Matt. xxiii. 85, Heb. xi. 4, 1 John iii. 12), his righteousness is specially referred to. Now, since to do righteousness {25} is to do what is pleasing to God, and, as we are told in Heb. xi. 6, "without faith it is impossible to please God," it follows that Abel's righteousness was the consequence of his faith. In fact, according to St. Paul's teaching, faith and righteousness are by law related to each other as antecedent and consequent (Rom. iii. 27, 28). Consequently we may here draw an inference which forms an essential part of the general argument for immortality. For since we have admitted, as a necessary and self-evident principle, that righteousness is the foundation of immortality, and Scripture presents to us in Abel an instance of the attainment of righteousness by faith, it follows that faith is a means of partaking of immortality. This doctrine will be farther treated of in the sequel; but in the mean time it will be well to explain that I consider "righteousness" to consist in obedience by word and deed to the "royal law" according to which, in a perfect social state, every one would do to others as he would that they should do to him. This relation between man and man should, I think, rather be called righteousness than morality, because the latter word is derived from mores (manners), and does not etymologically denote "rectitude," whereas the Greek word for righteousness (dikaiosunê) refers to the deciding of what is morally right by a judge, and the office of a judge, as respects social relations, is the {26} highest that men are appointed to discharge towards their fellow men. It should also be noticed that the "faith" I am speaking of does not consist in believing what is not understood, which seems to be a psychological contradiction, but in believing in consequence of understanding. "By faith we understand that the worlds [or ages (tous aiônas)] were framed by the word of God" (Heb. xi. 3). In short, the faith spoken of in Scripture is the basis of all intellectual, as well as of all moral excellence, and is inclusive of what is usually called "talents," or "gifts."

The same covenant, under different typical circumstances, was renewed, first with Noah (Gen. ix. 8-17), and afterwards with Abraham (Gen. xvii. 1-8). The faith of Noah was exhibited not only in building an ark in obedience to God's command, but also in sacrificing clean animals on coming out of the ark. These sacrifices, being offered immediately after the world had been destroyed by the baptism of the Flood, were peculiarly significant of an understanding and acceptance of the covenant of a life to come. After the mention made in the Epistle to the Hebrews of the faith and obedience of which Noah gave evidence by building the ark, it is said of him that "he thereby became heir [inheritor] of the righteousness which is according to faith" (Heb. xi. 7). Such righteousness, we have already argued, entitles the possessor of it to immortality.

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So also Abraham, when God promised that the land of Canaan should be given to his seed, "builded an altar to the Lord" (Gen. xii. 7, 8), for the purpose, it may be presumed, of sacrificial worship, testifying thus not only belief of the fulfilment of the particular promise, but faith also in the covenanted future life. That Abraham's faith, while he sojourned in Canaan, was directed towards the experience of the world to come, is plainly declared in Heb. xi. 10, where it is asserted that "he looked for a city having foundations, whose builder and maker is God." It was in consequence of such faith that the gift of righteousness was reckoned to him as a favour, and "he was called the friend of God" (James ii. 28). Now, the above-mentioned renewal of the covenant was made with Abraham, not solely in respect to his being father of the Hebrew nation, but in respect also to his being typically father of all that believe of