of the 22d April, 1815, and the 17th December, 1822, on the Portsmouth petitions, together with the minutes of conference between your Lordship and certain physicians, on the 7th January, 1823. In the judgment on the petition of 1815, it is stated by your Lordship,[A] "I have searched, and caused a most careful search to be made into all the records and procedures on lunacy which are extant. I believe, and I think I may venture to say, that originally commissions of this sort were of two kinds; a commission aiming at, and enquiring whether, the individual had been an idiot ex nativitate, or whether, on the other hand, he was a lunatic.

The question whether he was a lunatic, being a question, admitting in the solution of it, of a decision that imputed to him at one time an extremely sound mind, but at other times, an occurrence of insanity, with reference to which, it was necessary to guard his person and his property by a commission issuing. It seems to have been a very long time before those who had the administration of justice in this department, thought themselves at liberty to issue a commission, when the person was represented as not being idiot ex nativitate, as not being lunatic, but as being of UNSOUND MIND, importing by those words, the notion, that the party was in some such state, as was to be contra-distinguished from idiotcy, and as he was to be contra-distinguished from lunacy, and yet such as made him a proper object of a commission, in the nature of a commission to inquire of idiotcy, or a commission to inquire of lunacy. From the moment that that had been established, down to this moment, it appears to me to have been at the same time established, that whatever may be the degree of weakness or imbecility of the party to manage his own affairs, if the finding of the jury is only that he was of an extreme imbecility of

mind, that he has an inability to manage his own affairs: if they will not proceed to infer from that, in their finding, upon oath, that he is of UNSOUND MIND, they have not established, by the result of the inquiry, a case upon which the Chancellor can make a grant, constituting a committee, either of the person or estate. All the cases decide that mere imbecility will not do; that an inability to manage a man's affairs will not do, unless that inability, and that incapacity to manage his affairs amount to evidence that he is of unsound mind; and he must be found to be so. Now there is a great difference between inability to manage a man's affairs, and imbecility of mind taken as evidence of unsoundness of mind. The case of Charlton Palmer, in which this was very much discussed, was the case of a man stricken in years, and whose mind was the mind of a child;—it was, therefore, in that sense, imbecility, and inability to manage his affairs, which constituted unsoundness of mind."

The introduction of the term unsoundness, to denote a particular state of disordered mind, which is supposed to differ from idiotcy and lunacy, has

been the source of considerable perplexity to medical practitioners; and, in my own opinion, opens an avenue for ignorance and injustice. The application of figurative terms, especially when imposed under a loose analogy, and where they might be supplied by words of direct meaning, always tends to error and confusion.

When medical persons depose that the mind of an individual is unsound, (which character of intellect, if accredited by the jury, would induce them to find the commission,) they ought, at the