to be taken from his counter and read by Mr. King, that he did it with reluctance, and that he was warned of the danger of bringing such writings so far South? Is it unreasonable to suppose that he was deterred by the warning? Taking then the whole evidence together, although it proved great indiscretion in the traverser, and great guilt had he propagated his writings—and that he would have deserved the most condign punishment had he had the temerity to have published them—yet, if I am to take the whole of the testimony in the case, I should be compelled to say, that in withholding the other pamphlets from the view of others, or of any other, he was influenced by the counsel he had received, and was afraid to publish them; and that, under the circumstances in which he permitted the first pamphlet to be taken from his counter and published, if such permission be a publication, that he then was aware of the danger he was in, and that under such circumstances the having in his possession other pamphlets of a similar character, (if the publication by permitting the pamphlets charged in the first count to be taken from his counter and read by Mr. King, be not taking the contents of the pamphlet into view of itself a malicious publication), it cannot be made so by having other pamphlets of similar tendency in his possession, which he did not publish nor attempt to publish.

It was contended, among the reasons assigned by the Attorney for the United States for the admission of those pamphlets in evidence to the jury, that

some three or four of them were endorsed with the words "read this and circulate," in the handwriting of the traverser, and this was evidence of malice in the publication of the pamphlet charged in the first count, and of which evidence of the publication has been offered to the jury. But this pamphlet last spoken of had also the same words written on it: whatever evidence of malice may be inferred from these words, is furnished by the said pamphlet itself, and therefore it is not necessary to resort to other sources for such evidence. It is true that a multiplication of the same inscriptions on other pamphlets may, and do, manifest greater zeal, and more intense interest in the subject matter of the writings, and indicate an intention on the part of the writer of such inscriptions to publish them. The malice which the law denounces is in the publication, not in the writing or composition: a man may express his thoughts or opinions in writing with impunity, and is as innocent in the eye of the law (provided he keeps such writings or compositions locked up from the public eye) as if they were locked up in his own mind. Is not an indication or manifestation of an intention to publish certain writings or printed compositions, and the withholding the execution of such intention as strong evidence of change of purpose from fear of the consequences or for other reasons, as of malice in the publication of one of them in the way, and under the circumstances, in which the one charged to have been published in the first count was published? It is very clear, it seems to me, that if there were no other evidence of any other publication of any of the pamphlets in question, than the inscription on the corner "read this and circulate," that the indictment could not be sustained, because such inscriptions, if the pamphlets are never shown to any other person, is in the eye of the law harmless. If, then, we are asked to admit such inscriptions or pamphlets never shown to, or seen by any other person within this District, because there is evidence that one such pamphlet was permitted to be seen and partly read by another, must we not look at the evidence which proves such exhibition of such pamphlets, and connect that with such inscriptions on other pamphlets not published, to see how far such inscriptions go to fortify and strengthen the evidence of malice as to the published pamphlets? In other words, to see what legal inferences of additional evidence such inscriptions afford? If this were a case of ordinary importance, I should say without much hesitation, that they afford no such inferences. It is for the jury to draw inferences of guilt or malice from circumstances; they are fully competent to do so in the present case from the evidence now before them; but it is often and almost always a nice point for a court to instruct a jury from what circumstances or facts inferences of guilt or malice may be drawn. It is saying, Gentlemen of the jury, such and such a circumstance, if proved to your satisfaction, is evidence from which you may and ought to find against the traverser. It satisfies our minds and ought to satisfy yours. But juries ought and will judge for themselves in criminal cases; and I have always thought it a delicate matter in criminal cases, to give such instructions to juries. Here we are not asked to give an instruction; but we are asked to permit evidence to go the jury, which, if allowed, carries with it the opinion of the court that such evidence affords inference of malice. I must see such inference pretty clear myself, before I give my sanction to the jury to draw such inference themselves. It is true the law denounces any published writing having

a tendency to produce a breach of peace, or insurrection, or to jeopardize the general rights of property, whether the intent of the writer was wicked or innocent, as libellous. The writing itself being of a libellous character, is of itself evidence of malice in the publication, and it would be no excuse for the publisher to say, I meant no harm, I thought I was doing good. In the eye of the law he is as guilty as if this intention was really wicked. This is called implied malice, in the absence of any other proof of malice than what is offered by the internal evidence of the writing itself. Now the object of the motion to lay before the jury other libellous papers, can be for no other purpose than to prove express malice; for the published libel charged in the first count, if it contain libellous matter, and was published, is of itself, sufficient proof of implied malice, and if it be not libellous, no other libellous writing can be introduced to make it so. Then, if it be libellous itself, it implies malice; and if other similar writings be introduced to prove malice, what does it amount to but proving the implied malice of one libel by the implied malice of other libels? Or, if it be said that some evidence of express malice has been laid before the jury, can you make this evidence more strong or clear by evidence of implied malice, contained in other similar writings not published? Upon the whole, I do not distinctly see, under all the circumstances of this case, how the unpublished writings can be admitted to prove the implied malice to be gathered from them if they had been published, the implied malice in the libel charged and allowed to have been published, or how such evidence of implied malice in them, can be brought to prove express malice in the publication of the charged libel in the first count. I am against the motion.

Mr. Key, for the United States, then offered to prove the publication by the defendant of the libels stated in the first, second, and third counts, by proving the following facts, viz: that a large collection of libels, and among them several copies of those charged in those counts, with the words "read and circulate" in his handwriting, were found upon the traverser—that he undertook to account for their being in his possession, and gave untrue and contradictory accounts—that he acknowledged that he had brought here those then shown to him, being the same now in court, and that they comprehended all he brought here, except about a dozen; and that prior to the traverser's arrest sundry similar publications had been privately sent to various persons in this District by some unknown person or persons in this District.

After arguments which