just before the war, started on the new departure (or rather returned to the old system) of granting a concession to a private enterprise which was to take over a portion of the existing state railway, build an extension with the aid of state subsidies, and then work on its own account both sections as one undertaking under private management.

I may add, as a fact within my own knowledge, that shortly before the outbreak of the war the Belgian Government was studying the question of returning its state railways to private enterprise and management.

Mr. Acworth relates a resolution unanimously passed by the French Senate a few years after the State had taken over certain lines, beginning: "The deplorable situation of the State system, the insecurity and irregularity of its workings." He gives figures demonstrating the invariably greater efficiency, economy and superiority of service of private management as compared to State management in countries where these two systems are in operation side by side. He treats of the effect of the conflicting interests, sectional and otherwise, which necessarily come into play under government control when the question arises where new lines are to be built and what extensions to be made of existing lines.

He asks: "Can it be expected that they (these questions) will be decided rightly by a minister responsible to a democratic legislature, each member of which, naturally and rightly, makes the best case he can for his own constituents, while he is quite ignorant, even if not careless, of the interests, not only of his neighbor's constituency, but of the public at large?" And he replied: "The answer is written large in railway history.... The facts show that Parliamentary interference has meant running the railways, not for the benefit of the people at large, but to satisfy local and sectional or even personal interests." He maintains that in a country governed on the Prussian principles railroad operation and planning may be conducted by the Government with a fair degree of success, as an executive function, but in democratic countries, he points out that in normal times "it is the legislative branch of the government which not only decides policy but dictates always in main outline, often down to the detail of a particular appointment or a special rate, how the policy shall be carried out."

For corroboration of this latter statement we need only turn to the array of statutes in our own States, which not only fix certain railroad rates by legislative enactment, but deal with such details as the repair of equipment, the minimum movement of freight cars, the kind of headlights to be used on locomotives, the safety appliances to be installed, etc.—and all this in the face of the fact that these States have Public Service Commissions whose function it is to supervise and regulate the railroads.

The reason why the system of state railways in Germany was largely free from most, though by no means all, of the unfavorable features and results produced by government ownership and operation elsewhere, is inherent in the habits and conditions created in that country by generations of autocratic and bureaucratic government. But Mr. Acworth points out very acutely that while German manufacturers, merchants, financiers, physicians, scientists, etc., "have taught the world a good deal in the twenty years preceding the war, German railway men have taught the world nothing." And he asks: "Why is this?" His answer is: "Because they were state officials, and, as such, bureaucrats and routiniers, and without incentive to invent and progress themselves or to encourage or welcome or even accept inventions and progress.

It is the private railways of England and France, and particularly of America, which have led the world in improvements and new ideas, whilst it would be difficult to mention a single reform or invention for which the world is indebted to the state railways of Germany."

The question of the disposition to be made of the railroads after the war is one of the most important and far-reaching of the post-bellum questions which will confront us. It will be one of the great test questions, the answer to which will determine whither we are bound.

V

And, it seems to me, one of the duties of business men is to inform themselves accurately and carefully on this subject, so as to be ready to take their due and legitimate part in shaping public opinion, and indeed to start on that task now, before public opinion, one-sidedly informed and fed of set purpose with adroitly colored statements of half truths, crystallizes into definite judgment.

My concern is not for the stock and bond holders. They will, I have no doubt, be properly and fairly taken care of in case the Government were definitely to acquire the railroads. Indeed, it may well be, that from the standpoint of their selfish interests, a reasonable guarantee or other fixed compensation by the Government would be preferable to the financial risks and uncertainties under private railroad operation in the new and untried era which we shall enter after the war. I know, indeed, that not a few large holders of railroad securities take this view and therefore have this preference.

Nor do I speak as one who believes that the railroad situation can be restored just as it was before the war. The function, responsibility and obligation of the railroads as a whole are primarily to serve the interests and economic requirements of the nation. The disjointed operation of the railroads, each one considering merely its own system (and being under the law practically prevented from doing otherwise) will, I am sure, not be permitted again.

The relinquishment of certain features of our existing legislation, the addition of others, a more clearly defined and purposeful relationship of the nation to the railroads, involving amongst other things possibly some financial interest of the Government in the results of railroad operations, are certain to come from our experiences under Government operation and from a fresh study of the subject, in case the railroads, as I hope, are returned to private management.

Personally I believe that in its underlying principle, the system gradually evolved in America but never as yet given a fair chance for adequate translation into practical execution, is an almost ideal one. If preserves for the country, in the conduct of its railroads, the inestimable advantage of private initiative, efficiency, resourcefulness and financial responsibility, while at the same time through governmental regulation and supervision it emphasizes the semi-public character and duties of railroads, protects the community's rights and just claims and guards against those evils and excesses of unrestrained individualism which experience has indicated.

It is, I am profoundly convinced, a far better system than government ownership of railroads, which, wherever tested, has proved its inferiority except, to an extent, in the Germany on which the Prussian Junker planted his heel and of which he made a scourge and a horrible example to the world; and the very reasons which have made state railways measurably successful in that Germany are the reasons which would make government ownership and operation in America a menace to our free institutions, a detriment to our racial characteristics and a grave economic disservice.