fortifications would have successfully resisted Stuart's cavalry, with all the field artillery he could have brought against them.

On Saturday, the 13th of June, the enemy was encountered early in the day within a short distance of Winchester; but no enemy appeared in the direction of the Strasburg road until the afternoon. Our forces held both roads, but they gradually withdrew, skirmishing, during the day, as the enemy steadily approached the town. At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon, a prisoner was captured, who professed to belong to Hay's Louisiana brigade, of Ewell's rebel corps. From this prisoner was derived the information that both Ewell and Longstreet, with their entire forces, fifty thousand strong, were in the immediate vicinity of Winchester. This report was soon fully confirmed by a deserter, who shortly afterward entered our lines; and now, for the first time, it was rendered certain that the command at Winchester was in the immediate presence of an overwhelming force, probably the advance of Lee's entire army.

At this time the 3d brigade, under Colonel McReynolds, was on the march from Berryville to Winchester, in pursuance of the signal, which had been given early in the morning. The direct road from Berryville to Winchester was only ten miles; but the appearance of the enemy at Berryville prevented Colonel McReynolds from taking that route. He accordingly pursued the Harper's Ferry road for a short distance, then turning to the left by a circuitous road through Summit Point to Winchester. His rear guard was attacked by the enemy's cavalry before leaving Berryville, and also again with greater violence at the Opequan Creek, between Summit Point and the Martinsburg road. The enemy was handsomely repulsed in both instances, but particularly in the latter, when the cavalry, under Major A. W. Adams, and the artillery, commanded by Captain Alexander, were both brought into action. After a march of thirty miles, the 3d brigade reached the forts at Winchester about ten o'clock at night.

After it became known what force was in front of Winchester, early in the night of Saturday, under cover of the darkness, the men were withdrawn from the Front Royal and Strasburg roads, and posted in the southern part of the town, with orders to retire to the forts at two o'clock in the morning.

It was now apparent that a very large force of the enemy had approached Winchester, and virtually surrounded it. The Berryville road, the direct route to Harper's Ferry, was held by them. An attack had been made on our forces at Bunker Hill, on the Martinsburg road, during the day (Saturday), and some time in the evening the telegraphic line, which communicated by that road, was severed. Thus Winchester seemed to be entirely isolated and cut off from all its communications. Without any warning whatever, the whole rebel army had eluded the Army of the Potomac, and had poured over the mountains like an avalanche into the Shenandoah Valley. General Milroy did not, for a moment, suppose that this movement could have taken place without the timely knowledge of the authorities at Washington, and he very naturally supposed he had been left unadvised and without orders, because of some movement of the Army of the Potomac, which would soon relieve him from his perilous position.

General Schenck was in expectation of early advice in case of any movement of Lee's army into the valley. In his testimony he produced several telegrams to General Halleck inquiring for information on this subject; but down to Sunday, the 14th, it seems there was no knowledge of Lee's movements in possession of the commander-in-chief of the army. On Friday the 12th, General Schenck had telegraphed General Milroy in these words: 'You will make all the required preparations for withdrawing, but hold your position in the mean time. Be ready for movement, but await further orders.' The additional orders had not been received. The telegraph had been in operation during the greater part of Saturday, while the enemy was gathering around the post; and when, that night, the real situation became known, the most obvious conclusion arising from the circumstances was, that General Schenck had ordered the place to be held until further orders, for some important reason connected with the wider plans of the General-in-chief of the army. The cutting of the telegraphic wire was the only circumstance which cast any doubt upon this view. But in consultation with some of his officers on Saturday night, the commanding general, with their concurrence, adopted the conclusion that his orders prohibited him from leaving Winchester at that time, even if he could have done so with safety, which was more than doubtful. He resolved, therefore, to await the events of Sunday, when the enemy would probably have massed his forces; and if relief should not come during the day, it would then be more easy to determine in what manner and by what route it would be possible to escape. This conclusion was undoubtedly the wisest that could have been adopted. The most critical military judgment will hardly succeed in finding any ground of complaint against this decision in that serious emergency.

So passed the night of Saturday. On Sunday morning the contest was renewed, and kept up with great energy during the whole day, chiefly within the suburbs of the town of Winchester. In the afternoon a sudden and unexpected attack was made upon an unfinished earthwork on Flint Ridge, which, as it commanded the Pughtown and Romney roads, was occupied by Battery L of the 5th regular artillery, supported by the 110th and part of the 116th Ohio volunteer infantry, all under command of Colonel Keifer, of the former regiment. A reconnaissance had been previously ordered in that direction, and had been made or pretended to be made by part of the 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry, the officer in charge of the party reporting that there was no enemy on either of those roads or between the two for a considerable distance from Winchester. Within two hours after this report was made, an overwhelming force appeared in that very quarter. The enemy opened on the position with not less than twenty guns, and precipitated upon it a column of at least ten thousand men. After a gallant but ineffectual resistance, Colonel Keifer was enabled to make good his retreat, under cover of the guns from the main fort, which commanded the position. The guns of Battery L were most effectively served in this affair, and executed great slaughter in the ranks of the enemy; but the horses having been nearly all killed, they were necessarily spiked and abandoned.

Our forces, pressed by the enemy on all sides, were now concentrated within the fortifications, and the rifle pits immediately in front of them; and the contest was continued with artillery on both sides until darkness compelled its cessation. In his report of this affair, General Milroy, with characteristic ardor at this juncture, says: 'To my regret, the enemy made no effort to take my position by assault.' It was probably about this time that the rebel General Ewell is reported with his glass to have descried General Milroy in the lookout, which had been constructed some distance up the flagstaff of the main fort, and to have exclaimed, 'There's that d—d old Milroy, who would stop and fight, if the d—l himself was after him.'

With the exception of the loss of Battery L, which was wholly attributable to the imperfect reconnaissance or the false report of Captain Morgan, who commanded the reconnoitring party, the advantage in the fighting, both on Saturday and Sunday, had all been with our forces; and there can be little doubt that the enemy would have suffered severely in any attempt to take the forts by assault.

But it was now apparent that the only alternatives were an evacuation or a surrender. A council of war was ordered by the commanding general, and the three brigade commanders, Brigadier-General Elliott, 1st