movement and surrendered to the inevitable.

Our captors politely accepted our pistols and swords, I being obliged to give up the sword of Lieutenant William Putnam of the 20th Regiment, a young Harvard student, from whom I had taken it as he lay mortally wounded on the battle field. This sword, which I had in mistaken kindness taken, was accidentally discovered in Philadelphia some years since, and it being marked with the name, was returned to his mother, who received it almost as a message from Heaven.

We were taken on foot to the Headquarters of the General in Command of their forces in the Town of Leesburg, Virginia, where were gathered other prisoners. By this time night had succeeded day. We were nearly exhausted, and were not cheered by the thought that we were prisoners of war about to begin our captivity.

At this date there was no Cartel of Exchange. Our imagination recalled prisons of all sorts, among them Dartmoor, about which we had heard in our childhood. The future seemed dim, but when the General in command offered to restore us to our friends upon our agreement not to serve again against the Confederacy, no one was found willing to accept the offer. Indeed we were somewhat abusive in chiding him for offering such terms to gentlemen, and suggested that he was hardly worthy of the appellation. His patience was exhausted by the conversation that followed and we were hurriedly started towards Richmond, without waiting for rations.

We passed through the Battlefield of Bull Run, and halting there were shown into a stone structure which had been the target for many cannon balls from both sides during the battle. Here was given about midnight a meal, the first for 24 hours, which we managed to slightly cook by making fires upon the floor with laths wrenched from the ceiling. Somewhat refreshed we took passage in open freight cars for Richmond and Libby Prison.

Our march was over and we began, as prisoners of war, the long, weary months in Libby Prison.

I have termed the affair of Ball's Bluff an Episode. It certainly formed no part of a movement by other troops. It was only casually directed by General McClellan, and only informally by General Stone. The results astonished both of these gentlemen.

The action arose from a misunderstanding caused by a quartermaster's excited imagination. The details of transportation were not thought out beforehand by anyone, nor time given to their perfection.

General McCall, who had a force not far off, which was not called into action, expresses himself as "unable to account for Stone's movement,"—thought it injudicious. It proved afterwards that Stone had not the means to cross the river. He could not have crossed in the face of the "enemy."

General Lander says, "Stone was tripped up by circumstances. If we had orders to cross that stream, we would have had them a week beforehand."

General McClellan says to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, who (judged by the questions which they put), seemed to consider themselves educated soldiers, competent to give orders in actual battle,—"Telegraphed Stone after Baker fell. Intrench yourselves on the Virginia side and await reinforcements if necessary. Telegraphed Banks to support him with three brigades. On the 22nd inst. I went personally to the scene of operation (probably to Edward's Ferry), and after ascertaining that the enemy were strengthening themselves at Leesburg, and that the means of crossing or recrossing were very insufficient, I withdrew our forces to the Virginia side."

General Meade in his published letters, (he then commanded a Brigade in McCall's Division), writes October 24th, "Regarding Ball's Bluff, as far as I can gather, the whole affair was a bungle from beginning to end. The worst part of the business is that at the very time our people were contending against such odds, the advance of McCall's division was only 10 miles off and had we been ordered forward instead of back, we could have captured the whole of them."

Such