قراءة كتاب A Historic Sketch, Lest We Forget Company "E," 26th Ohio Infantry in the War for the Union, 1861-65
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A Historic Sketch, Lest We Forget Company "E," 26th Ohio Infantry in the War for the Union, 1861-65
was great. Finally, the signal came, carefully counted by each, and when the sixth sounded all stepped over our temporary works and moved forward.
The enemy’s artillery promptly opened in full force from the top of the ridge, the shells exploding all around us. A file or two of men fell near the colors. The men began quickening the step—no pale faces now—the excitement of battle was on. You could constantly hear the officers’ command—“Steady men! Go slow!” Time flew by like a dream. The enemy’s line in the lower works at the foot of the ridge became demoralized and they left before we reached them. The reverse side of their works offered us no protection from the artillery and infantry fire from the top, and by a common impulse, without orders, we continued the charge up the side of the ridge. We had the usual double line formation, the 26th Ohio in the front line, the 15th Indiana supporting 150 to 200 paces in the rear. We were to a great extent winded, having made the last three or four hundred yards double quick. We moved up the hills slowly, loading and firing, taking advantage of such protection as was available. The enemy was at this time largely overshooting us and the 15th Indiana, in our rear, was suffering heavily. When half or two-thirds the way up the ridge they came forward to our assistance where they could take part in the shooting. Lieutenant Wm. B. Johnson of company E went down with a shattered leg and ordered his First Sergeant to go on with the company, but to see that he was cared for that night. We reached the enemy’s works and captured them, taking a few prisoners, most of the enemy escaping down the eastern slope of the ridge, which was not so precipitous as the western which we had come up. The road leading from General Bragg’s headquarters, (about three hundred yards south of where our regiment reached the top), going east down the slope, was the only way available for the Confederates’ artillery to make their escape. General Sheridan, quick to seize and hold the advantage, came to the left of his division and ordered Colonel Young, with his 26th Ohio and the 15th Indiana, to hasten northeast down the slope and capture all we could reach or head from the road mentioned. This we did for nearly a mile, gaining two brass guns at one place, four brass and two Parrott guns, several caissons and limbers at another. The troops of Wood’s division to our left advanced but a short distance after reaching the top of the ridge and were recalled. A quarter of a mile or more of gap now existed between our right and the brigade, which was advancing in line along the road mentioned and became heavily engaged. Sheridan sent orders for us to oblique to the right. It was now dark and under Colonel Young’s directions we moved carefully and slowly over ravines, through brush, guided by the sound of battle, striking the enemy’s line on an abrupt knob, which we, without hesitation or any delay, charged, and captured two more pieces of artillery and many wagons. General Sheridan, in his official report of the battle, in speaking of this part of the engagement states: “But a few moments elapsed ere the 26th Ohio and 15th Indiana carried the crest. When the head of the column reached the summit of the hill the moon rose from behind and a medallion view of the column was disclosed as it crossed the moon’s disk and attacked the enemy.”
Our part in the battle was over. That the reader may more fully understand the important part taken by us I will give a few statistics taken from official records: Loss of Sheridan’s 2nd division 4th army corps, 1346, the heaviest in any division of the army. Wood’s 3rd division, 4th army corps, came second, with 1035. Our 2nd brigade, 2nd division, 4th army corps, lost 730. There were three brigades in each division. The next brigade to ours in loss was General Hazen’s 2nd Brigade, 3rd (Wood’s) division, 4th army corps, 522. That magnificent 15th Indiana regiment that was in the second line supporting us, that came so gallantly to our aid and so nobly stayed with us (see official report), went into the battle with 334 officers and men, and of this number its loss was 199 killed and wounded, the heaviest regimental loss in the battle. The three regiments sustaining the greatest loss were all in our brigade. The 26th Ohio numbered present about 150 and lost 36. Company E, 13 engaged, loss 5. All of them had participated with the company at Chickamauga. Thus of the 32 engaged on September 19, seven were left, two of whom were later killed in battle while with the company. James H. Smith was shot, a minnie (1 oz.) ball passing through his leg while we were going up the ridge. He examined the wound and remained with the company, the blood spurting from the top of his shoes at each step until he was ordered to the hospital by Colonel Young after the battle was over. No organization in the battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga carried their banner higher on the roll of fame than did the 26th Ohio.
The following day, November 26, the two divisions, Sheridan’s and Wood’s, of the 4th corps, were ordered to march to relieve General Burnside, besieged at Knoxville. We were expected to live largely from the products of the country (now largely exhausted). We had drawn no clothing since leaving Murfreesboro in June. Our mules and horses were either dead or unfit for service. We were short on clothing and transportation. We left our camp in Chattanooga and saw it no more until January 18, 1864. This was a memorable and a cold winter, with its historic cold New Year’s day. We marched through the day and part of the time gathered corn, shelled it and ran the water mills, of which that country was plentifully supplied. During the night, when we could, we built log-heap fires, and when the ground had become thoroughly warm, we divided the fire, cleaned away the coals and ashes and slept on the warm ground between the two fires. January 1st, while at Blains Crossroads, northeast of Knoxville, the regiment veteranized or re-enlisted and was ordered home on thirty days’ furlough. We marched to Chattanooga, arriving on the 18th, completed our papers and were mustered January 21, starting home by freight soon afterward.
We left Columbus, Ohio, on our return to the front, about March 4th, joining our brigade at Charleston, Tennessee, about March 15th. In April we moved to Cleveland, Tennessee, and from there started on the Atlanta campaign, May 3rd, and came under the fire of the enemy’s guns May 7th, and remained in hearing of their guns and under fire until September 5th—at least over one hundred days under fire. We (our brigade) advanced along the Eastern slope and near the summit of Rocky Face Ridge, supporting Harken’s brigade, moving along the summit, assaulting the main line of works. We came under the direct fire from their main line, but were restrained from assaulting. We held this position until Sherman’s entire army (except part of the cavalry and our 4th corps), had moved south along the west base of the ridge to Snake Creek Gap and through it to near Resaca, when Johnson abandoned his fortified position at Rocky Face and hastily retreated, we following on the direct line of his retreat and on arrival joining at once in the battle of Resaca, driving the enemy’s lines into their fortifications. We built a temporary line of works within 200 yards of theirs, holding this position until they again retreated. The night of May 15, bridges were floated and the Oostanaula River crossed, the 4th corps taking the advance, driving Johnston’s rear guard. On the 17th, our division (Newton now commanding, Sheridan having been ordered to the Eastern department) was in the advance. One brigade deployed. In the evening two brigades were deployed