in express Terms, [Page 98, 2d. Edit.] that America must not be exhausted. Exhaust, therefore, yourselves, my Lords and Gentlemen! as much as you please, or as much as you can; but don’t expect Assistance from America, even in her own Defence, whilst she can get such Knight-Errants as the English to fight her Battles; and whilst she can raise Patriots and Pamphleteers, News-Writers and Republicans, without Number, to yell the American War Hoop, and to denounce BLACK and BITTER Days against those, who should even hesitate to obey her Commands.

But the third Question is, Which Scheme is best calculated to prevent the like Disturbances for the future?

And here I would humbly beg Leave to observe, that if my Scheme had nothing else to recommend it to your Notice, it most infallibly cuts off all the present Causes of Dispute and Contention between the two Countries; so that they never can revive again. Whereas Mr. Burke’s is, at best, but a temporary Cessation from Hostilities; a mere Truce, ’till both Parties can be recruited, and better provided to begin the War again. Nay, his would be found in the Event,—not only to be no Manner of Cure or Palliation of the present Evils, but even greatly to foment them, and also to engender many new ones.

For Example:—Granting, that Peace was made on the very Terms, which Mr. Burke requires:—Granting, that we repealed every Act of Parliament to which the Americans have thought proper to object:—Granting also, that we renounce for ever any Claim of Right to levy Taxes:—And granting, in short, that the American Assemblies became so many distinct Parliaments, supreme within themselves, and independent of all others:—Still, whilst these American Independents are to be protected by the British Flag; whilst they are to enjoy all the Rights and Privileges of natural-born British Subjects, both at Home, and Abroad, and in every Part of the Globe,—Questions will, and must, and ought to arise, on what Terms are these independent Americans to be thus protected? And what Compensation is to be made to the Mother-Country, for communicating to them her most valuable Rights and Privileges? Are they really to enjoy all Posts of Honour and Preferment, and all Places of Trust and Profit, and to be entitled to every Sort of Advantage, [4] Safeguard, and Protection, equally with the Natives of Great-Britain; and yet to make no Recompence or Acknowledgement for all these Favours?—The Answer of every staunch American, and of Mr. Burke their Advocate General, must be as follows, (for on their Principles they can return no other) That each independent American Parliament will be ready to give and to grant to Great Britain, by Way of Recompense or Gratification, the whole Sum of—whatever they shall think proper, and no more[5]. And that in respect to the Regulations of American Commerce, they will consent, that you shall put whatever nominal Restraints you please upon it, provided you will not enforce such Restraints by any Forfeitures or Penalties, which shall imply the most distant Idea of Taxation;—and provided also that, if Offences should be supposed to be committed, they, (the Americans) and no others shall be allowed to be Judges both of the Nature, and of the Degree of each Offence; and that the Cause shall be tried no where else, but in their own American Courts, and by their own American Juries.

Now, my Lords and Gentlemen, suffer me I beseech you, to appeal to your own good Sense and Understandings on this Head.—Ask yourselves this plain Question, Is such a Plan of Reconciliation as Mr. Burke proposes, a likely Method of terminating the present Disputes between the Mother-Country and her Colonies? Nay ask farther;—Hath it so much as a Tendency to cool and moderate them? Or rather doth it not seem much better contrived to enflame, than to extinguish; to kindle new Fires, than to quench old ones?

Besides, when each of these American Assemblies shall be erected into a distinct Parliament, supreme within itself, and independent of the rest,—Is it possible to suppose, that no new Disputes, or new Differences will arise between such co-ordinate States and rival Powers;—neighbouring, jealous, and contending Powers, I say, whose respective Limits are in many Instances as yet undefined, if really definable! And is it at all consistent with any Degree of common Sense, or daily Experience, to suppose that such Combustibles as these will not speedily catch Fire?—Especially, if we take into the Account, the discordant Tempers of the Inhabitants of these respective Provinces, their inbred Hatreds and Antipathies against each other, their different Modes of Life, the Differences of Climate, Religion, Manners, Habits of Thinking, &c. &c.

Now, when Tumults and Disorders shall arise from any of these various Causes,—What is to be done? And to whom, or to what common Head, or general Umpire is the appellant Province to carry her Complaint?—The Parliament of Great-Britain, it seems, must no longer interfere; for that is no longer the supreme Head of the Empire, to which all the Parts used to be subordinate, and professed to be obedient; therefore, being destitute of any authoritative or constitutional Right to compel Submission, all it can do, is to offer its good Services by Way of Mediation; and that is, generally speaking, just nothing at all.

Is then the King (abstracted from the Parliament) to be appealed to in this arduous Affair? And is he alone (in his mere personal Capacity) to command the Peace to be preserved between State and State, or Province and Province.——[6]Is he, I say (abstracted from being a King of Great-Britain) to summon all the Parties before himself and his Privy Council, in order to hear their respective Allegations, and finally to determine, and settle the Differences between them? Be it so: Then if he only is to decide, as in an Affair relating to his own private Patrimony, in which we have no more Concern than we have with Hanover,—it necessarily follows, that he must be invested with sufficient Power (independent of, and without the Consent of Parliament) to enforce these Decisions; for a Decree without a Power to enforce it, and to compel Obedience, is altogether nugatory and vain.

Now, my Lords and Gentlemen, this brings us to the last Point of Comparison between Mr. Burke’s, and my System, viz. Which will least endanger, or rather, which is best adapted to preserve our present happy Constitution?

Mr. Burke’s you see (if consistent with itself) must invest the Prince with an amazing Degree of Power!—Even with such a Degree, as shall be sufficient to controul the refractory States of America, from one