class="center">INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE AND SOCIAL EXPERIENCE AS SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS INSIGHT

I. The definition of the religious problem, as given in the former lecture, simplifies our undertaking in certain respects, but seems to complicate it in others. Review of the situation. Outlook for further study 37 II. Outline of the undertaking of the present lecture 41 III. The motives that lead to religion are natural and human. Reasons why the objects of religious insight are nevertheless conceived as superhuman, and, as, for our individual experience, mysterious 44 IV. Can these objects be defined as realities or as "values" that our social experience sufficiently brings to our knowledge? Social experience as a source of religious insight. Its scope and importance 54 V. The inadequacy of social experience as a source of religious insight. Objections urged by tradition, by recent individualism, and by William James 58 VI. The social consciousness as an indispensable factor in religion. The consciousness of guilt as a sense of loneliness. Love as a glimpse of something saving and divine. The mystical aspect of our social consciousness. Despite this mystical aspect of all our better social life, our literal social relations are never sufficient to meet the religious need. The resulting outlook toward still further sources of enlightenment 65 {xi}

I. Current objections to the Reason as a source of insight. Intuition vs. Reason. Reason vs. Experience. Usual view of the reason as "abstract" and as "analytic" in its procedure 80 II. But, in common usage, the words "reason" and "reasonable" often refer to something which does not wholly depend upon "abstract thinking" and mere "analysis." The "rule of reason." The concrete use of the reason. Reason as a survey of the connections of experience, as synthetic, and as involving broader intuitions. The alternative: "Either inarticulate intuition or else barren abstract reasoning," is falsely stated. The antithesis: "Either experience or else reason," also involves failure to see how both may be combined. Abstract thinking as a means to an end. This end is the attainment of a new and broader intuition. Relation between "becoming as a little child" and "putting away childish things" 84 III. Examples of the synthetic use of the reason. The fecundity of deductive reasoning. Novelties discovered by the purely deductive sciences. Reason and insight in their general relations 93 IV. The reason and the "religious paradox." The "paradox" as not peculiar to religion. Common sense as an appeal to standards which are in some sense superhuman. No human individual personally experiences or verifies what "human experience," in its conceived character as an integral whole, is supposed to confirm. The concepts of truth and error are dependent upon the concept of an appeal to an insight which no human individual ever possesses. This latter concept cannot be limited to the mere world of "common sense," but must be universalised. The whole real world as the object of an all-seeing comprehension of facts as they are. Otherwise our opinions about the world cannot even be false. Resulting synthetic insight of the reason. The world as the object present to the divine wisdom 102 {xii}

I. Historical relations of philosophical idealism. General bearing of this doctrine upon the religious interest, and upon the history of religion 120 II. Objections to our doctrine of the reason as having no value for life, and as failing to help toward solving the problem of salvation 129 III. First answer to these objections. Reports of religious experience that show some relations of our doctrine to the problem in question 131 IV. Relations of knowledge and will in general. Statement of the position of Pragmatism. Resulting objections to our whole doctrine of the reason. Truth as tested through "workings." Absolute truth as indefinable. Pragmatism as taught by James has defined its own forms and tests of religious insight. These forms and tests of insight are asserted to be superior to our own. Religious insight as saving, but as also empirical, in James's sense of that term, and as never absolute 135 {xiii} V. Answer to pragmatism. Our agreement with some of its principal positions. Our intelligence as the counsellor of our actions. The point where we are at issue with pragmatism. Reason and will, their general relations. Vindication of the position taken in the former lecture 144 VI. The problem as to the absoluteness of truth. The close relations of knowledge and action do not throw doubt upon, but rather emphasise this absoluteness. For all action is expressed in individual and absolutely irrevocable deeds. These deeds, if the practical issues of life are sharply defined, remain irrevocably on the "score of life" as "hits" or "misses." This irrevocable character of our deeds insures the fact that the "counsels" or "ideas" of the intellect, which guide our individual deeds, are as absolutely "hits" or "misses" as are the