instruction, as well as the food and equipment, was distinctly British.

Five weeks of this work and we took our next step trench-ward. Hiking from Zouafques at 1.30 A.M., May 13th, we entrained a la chevaux at Audruicq. A day's journey via Calais, Boulogne, Etaps, and Doullens brought us to Mondrecourt, in Flanders. Then an almost heartbreaking hike thru Pas to the war-worn village of Couin.

Our assimilation by the British forces became most complete when we found ourselves brigaded with a battalion of the Lancashire Fusileers of the 125th British Brigade. Our position was in reserve of the British lines north of Amiens and southwest of Arras.

Here another five weeks of training gave us the right to work alone. Once again we traded rifles, retrieving our American guns, and on June 6th we started on a three-day march. Thru Gézaincourt, Bernaville, Ailly le-Haut Clocher, to Pont Remy, where we entrained.

Vosges and the Lorraine—June 11th to August 7th

Two days by rail, via Amiens, Versailles, Bar-le-Duc, and Nancy, and we detrained on June 11th at Thaon, in the Vosges. Then an intermittent hike, with stops at Longchamps, Destord, and Menil, passing thru Rambervillers and Baccarat, to Vacqueville, in the Lorraine.

A stirring incident occurred en route when we passed the boys of the old Sixty-Ninth New York Regiment. Brooklyn hailed Brooklyn; Harlem called to Harlem; Bronx met Bronx. It was a breath of home to the already veteran Sixty-Ninth and more than a cheering welcome to us.

We shared Vacqueville with a battalion of the Alabama regiment of the 42d "Rainbow" Division. Advance parties were sent into the lines to acquaint themselves with the position which we were to take over. And in the dead of night, on June 20th-21st, Company B took over that part of the line between Ancerviller and Badonviller designated as P. C. (post commandant) Hameau and P. C. Montreux.

The first and second platoons of our Company held a position in the Grand Bois (Big Woods), a section of forest southeast of Ancerviller. The second and third platoons and Company headquarters occupied the ruined village of St. Maurice. St. Maurice was a part of the line at this point and had been subjected at different times to severe shelling. Only bare skeletons of the buildings remained and any nook or cranny between sections of walls and under a bit of roof was used as shelter. Deserted cellars had been bolstered, reinforced, and barricaded so that they would serve as shell-proof protection in the event of attack.

The First Gas Attack

It was usually Fritz's intention to place a harassing barrage on any section of the line where he knew that a relief was being effected. But he was less watchful than usual when we went in.

U. S. Official Photo "Hotel de Barn"—Showing Barber Shop and Reading and Writing Rooms

The enemy awoke, however, three days later, on the morning of Monday, June 24th, and attacked our regimental outposts. In order to effectively prevent any assistance being rendered by the platoons stationed in St. Maurice, a heavy barrage was laid on the town beginning at 3:30 A.M. During the early part of the shelling the continual use of H. E.'s (high explosive shells), with an occasional gas shell, served to keep the men not only penned in their bomb-proof cellars, but also forced the continued use of gas masks. Gradually the H. E.'s were interspersed with gas shells until a point was reached where far more gas shells than high explosives fell into the town, resulting in a heavy blanket of phosgene, mustard, and lachrymatory gases settling over the position.

The barrage did not lift until 6:00 A.M. and when it did the platoons were forced to take a defensive position to guard against any possible success of the enemy.

During the night before the attack, the men had been digging until a late hour on a system of trench defense. This entailed a lack of sleep which, together with the continued wearing of the gas mask and the exposure endured immediately after the barrage, weakened their resistance to such an extent as to make them easy victims to the poisonous gases.

Seventy-nine men were forced to the hospital by the effects of the combined phosgene and mustard. Among them were our first sergeant, supply and mess sergeants, all but one of our cooks, and both mechanics, which left us decidedly crippled.

The shadow of our losses was deepened when we heard that Cook George Alberts, always popular, had died from gas inhaled while trying to prepare the company breakfast in a gas-filled kitchen. He was our first loss by death.

U. S. Official Photo
Shell-Proof Dugout—A Shelter in St. Maurice

An immediate result of our losses was the extra work shouldered by those who had escaped any of the serious effects. The men left in St. Maurice remained on constant guard until the Company was relieved several days later.

During the short rest period that followed, a reorganization of the Company was accomplished and we again entered the lines in July, taking over P. C.'s Hameau and Montreux, as before.

The Daylight Raid

On Sunday, July 21st, a patrol of fifty-two men from our Company, accompanied by two medical first-aid men, engaged in a raid on the German trenches at two-thirty in the afternoon. The party advanced on the enemy lines in single file, divided in four groups which were respectively commanded by Sergeant Todd, Captain Barrett, Sergeant Bromback and Lieutenant Mohlke.

The intent was to surprise the enemy with a daylight raid and thereby obtain information thru capture and observation. But either thru knowledge or by chance, the Germans had prepared against this maneuver and the surprise was reversed.

Waiting until our patrol was fairly within their lines, and then partially surrounding them, the enemy centered upon our men a deadly fire of rifles, machine guns, and grenades. The raiders fought valiantly in return but were outnumbered four to one. After an hour's fighting, seventeen of our party, including Captain Barrett, lay dead, and sixteen were captured. Of the twenty-one who returned, thirteen were wounded. We were informed by two German prisoners captured a few days later that seventeen Germans had been killed.

The loss sustained in this daylight raid occasioned considerable comment, chiefly because it was generally believed that Captain Barrett had misread his orders,—that the time for action had really read 2:30 A.M. instead of 2:30 P.M. This, however, is quite untrue, inasmuch as all the Company officers, as well as the supply sergeant and company clerk, were conversant with the orders. Captain Barrett's immediate battalion and regimental superiors were present at or near the time of action and possessed full knowledge of the entire plan.

The Baccarat Sector, Showing St. Maurice and the Grand Bois

The defeat was caused solely by the lack of the intended element of surprise. Whether or not the enemy had possession of our plans, and if they had possession, how they obtained it, is something we shall never know.

A telegram was received by the Divisional Commander from