[6] "Śaṅkara, Bháskara, and other commentators name the Lokáyatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the Sect of Chárváka" (Colebrooke). Lokáyata may be etymologically analysed as "prevalent in the world" (loka and áyata). Laukáyatika occurs in Páṇini's ukthagaṇa.

[7] Kiṇwa is explained as "drug or seed used to produce fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, &c." Colebrooke quotes from Śaṅkara: "The faculty of thought results from a modification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an exhilarating property not found in those substances severally."

[8] Of course Śaṅkara, in his commentary, gives a very different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf. Śabara's Comm. Jaimini Sút., i. i. 5.

[9] I take kaṇa as here equal to the Bengali kunṛ. Cf. Atharva-V., xi. 3, 5. Aśváḥ kaṇá gávas taṇḍulá maśakás tusháḥ.

[10] See Nyáya Sútras, ii. 57.

[11] I.e., personality and fatness, &c.

[12] I read dehe for dehaḥ.

[13] Literally, "must be an attribute of the subject and have invariable concomitance (vyápti)."

[14] For the sandigdha and niśchita upádhi see Siddhánta Muktávali, p. 125. The former is accepted only by one party.

[15] Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (as of smoke by fire).

[16] The attributes of the class are not always found in every member,—thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal; and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some other place.

[17] See Sáhitya Darpaṇa (Ballantyne's trans. p. 16), and Siddhánta-M., p. 80.

[18] The properly logical, as distinguished from the rhetorical, argument.

[19] "Upamána or the knowledge of a similarity is the instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named." Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha.

[20] The upádhi is the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," if we add wet fuel as the condition of the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case of a true vyápti, there is, of course, no upádhi.

[21] 'Αντιστρἑφει (Pr. Anal., ii. 25). We have here our A with distributed predicate.

[22] If we omitted the first clause, and only made the upádhi "that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly accompanied by it," then in the Naiyáyika argument "sound is non-eternal, because it has the nature of sound," "being produced" would serve as a Mímáṃsaka upádhi, to establish the vyabhichára fallacy, as it is reciprocal with "non-eternal;" but the omitted clause