class="tdleftsc">Conclusion

INTRODUCTORY NOTE ON THE CONSTITUTION

De Tocqueville declared that the English Constitution did not really exist,[1:1] and he said so because in his mind the word "constitution" meant a perfectly definite thing to which nothing in England conformed. An examination of modern governments shows, however, that the thing is by no means so definite as he had supposed.

The term "constitution" is usually applied to an attempt to embody in a single authoritative document, or a small group of documents, the fundamental political institutions of a state. But such an attempt is rarely, if ever, completely successful; and even if the constitution when framed covers all the main principles on which the government is based, it often happens that they become modified in practice, or that other principles arise, so that the constitution no longer corresponds fully with the actual government of the country. In France, for example, the principle that the cabinet can stay in office only so long as it retains the confidence of the popular chamber, the principle, in short, of a ministry responsible in the parliamentary sense, was not mentioned in the charters of 1814 or 1830, and yet it was certainly firmly established in the reign of Louis Philippe; and it is noteworthy that this same principle, on which the whole political system of the English self-governing colonies is based, appears neither in the British North American Act nor in the Australian Federation Act. The first of those statutes, following the English tradition, speaks of the Privy Council for Canada,[1:2] but never of the cabinet or the ministers; while the Australian Act, going a step farther, refers to the Queen's Ministers of State,[1:3] but ignores their responsibility to the parliament.[2:1] Again, in the United States, the provision that the electoral college shall choose the President has become so modified in practice that the electors must vote for the candidate nominated by the party to which they owe their own election. In choosing the President they have become, by the force of custom, as much a mere piece of mechanism as the Crown in England when giving its assent to acts passed by the two Houses of Parliament. Their freedom of choice is as obsolete as the royal veto. So far, therefore, as this meaning of the term is concerned, the constitution of England differs from those of other countries rather in degree than in kind. It differs in the fact that the documents, being many statutes, are very numerous, and the part played by custom is unusually large.

De Tocqueville had more particularly in mind another meaning which is commonly attached to the term "constitution." It is that of an instrument of special sanctity, distinct in character from all other laws; and alterable only by a peculiar process, differing to a greater or less extent from the ordinary forms of legislation. The special sanctity is, of course, a matter of sentiment incapable of exact definition, and it may be said to belong to the British Constitution quite as much as to some others. The peculiar process of amendment, on the other hand,—the separation of the so-called constituent and law-making powers,—upon which Mr. Bryce bases his division of constitutions into rigid and flexible,[2:2] has had a long history and been much discussed; but although the contrast between the two types is highly important, the creation of intermediate forms has made it less exact as a basis of classification. The later constitutions, and the more recent practice, have tended to obscure the distinction. A separation between the constituent and law-making powers does not, in fact, always exist in written constitutions. The Italian Statuto, for instance, which contains no provision for amendment, can be, and in fact has been, altered by the ordinary process of legislation;[3:1] and the same thing was true of the French Charter of 1830.[3:2] The last Spanish constitution omits all provision for amendment, but one may assume that if it lasts long enough to require amendment the changes will be made by ordinary legislative process.

From countries which can change their fundamental constitution by the ordinary process of legislation we pass by almost imperceptible degrees to those where the constitutional and law-making powers are in substantially different hands. Thus the procedure for changing the constitution in Prussia differs from that for the enactment of laws only by the requirement of two readings at an interval of twenty-one days. Here there is a difference legally perceptible between the methods of changing the constitution and other laws; but it may be remarked that a provision in the constitution to the effect that all laws should require two readings at an interval of twenty-one days, would not essentially change the nature of the constitution, and yet in theory it would make that constitution flexible instead of rigid. As it is, the fundamental laws are quite as much under the control of the legislature in Prussia as they are in England.[3:3] This is almost equally true of France; for although the changes in her constitution are made by the National Assembly, composed of the two chambers sitting together, yet the Assembly can meet only after the two chambers have passed a concurrent resolution to that effect; and in fact the chambers are in the habit of determining beforehand by separate votes the amendments which shall be submitted to the Assembly. So that in France, also, the constitution is virtually under the unrestricted control of the legislature.

The separation of constituent and law-making powers has been rendered of much less practical importance in some countries not only by making the process of amending the