قراءة كتاب The Outlook: Uncle Sam's Place and Prospects in International Politics

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The Outlook: Uncle Sam's Place and Prospects in International Politics

The Outlook: Uncle Sam's Place and Prospects in International Politics

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دار النشر: Project Gutenberg
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in the Philippines; neither is smallpox, though both diseases have at different times swept through cities and districts in the train of filth and carelessness.

As for the natives, Professor Worcester gives them, on the whole, a fairly good character. The aboriginal tribes, Negritoes, or "little niggers," are, like our own Indians, nearly extinct. The pagan Malays are bold, warlike, treacherous, but they are not numerous, being confined largely to the northern islands, and even the Spaniards were able, by keeping firearms out of their reach, to prevent them from becoming seriously dangerous. The Mohammedan Malays are more formidable. To the fierceness and treachery of their pagan congeners, their faith has added a savage fanaticism which takes the form of special hatred for the Christian. They are fatalists, and hence fearless in battle, and their priests teach them that for every Christian slain they will be rewarded with a new peri in paradise.

There are forty thousand Chinese in the islands, including some coolies, but the greater part are engaged in retail trade, which in some districts they entirely monopolize. Scarcely any village is without its Chinese shop.

The most numerous and important portion of the population is the half-caste element—Malay-Chinese and Malay-Caucasian, generally Spanish. The creole Spaniards affect to despise these "half-cousins," especially the friars, though it is said that the friars are responsible for the existence of most of them. As a matter of fact, however, the half-castes constitute the great "middle classes" of the population, and are far and away the most tractable, intelligent, and in every way promising for the purposes of a civilized government. Not a few of them are intelligent and fairly educated. Aguinaldo himself is said to be a Malay-Chinese. The Spaniards, never violently addicted to labor, allowed these people to do the greater part of such work as shop-tending, bookkeeping, etc., so that, in the opinion of Professor Worcester, they would be available for the minor positions of government, under the direction of American chiefs.

Much will depend on how these half-castes are treated. Senor Nicholas Estévanez, at one time Spanish Minister of War, gives friendly warning to the Americans, not to copy the mistakes of his own countrymen in taking for granted the inferiority of the native Filipinos. This was one stumbling-block to the peacefulness of Spanish rule in the islands, though not, of course, the only one. In a very interesting article in the North American Review, Senor Estévanez tells of the trials and injustices endured by these really patient and peaceful people at the hands of "impure priests and merchants without a conscience." Disraeli said, "Race is the key to history." But race distinctions can be overworked, and if our people enter upon the government of the islands too strongly prepossessed with the idea of their own superiority, they will simply be making unnecessary trouble for themselves.

In one respect at least we shall start with a great advantage over the Spanish. It is not easy to picture American rulers oppressing a subject race on the score of religion. The Spanish, on the other hand, made baptism the test of loyalty from the very start. "They wanted," says Senor Estévanez, "no subjects who would not begin by having water poured on their heads." The natives, on the other hand, were willing to submit in all else, but insisted on retaining their religion. "So, for the sake of a few drops of water, we had three centuries of war."

Such a people is not devoid of sterling qualities. Troy itself stood out for only ten years against the Greeks; Mindanao resisted the Spaniards for three hundred years. If we profit by the example of our predecessors we may accomplish in a few months what they failed to do in all that long period.

The game is well worth the candle. All authentic accounts of the islands agree that they are rich beyond computation in natural resources—forest, mine, and soil. The Spaniards have, even in their slothful, unskilled and clumsy fashion, taken out untold wealth; but they only scratched the field; most of what remains is practically virgin soil. True, there is lack of all civilized methods; railroads must be built and labor is hard to find. But such difficulties have never yet daunted a virile race, and they will not for long deter the Americans.


The difficulties of which I have spoken thus far are material; there are others much deeper in their origin and more apt to give pause to this giant enterprise. I refer now to what might be called the subjective obstacles to success; the qualities inherent in ourselves and in our own government which rise up now to impede the pathway to success.

"Providence protects little children and the United States," is a saying in the diplomatic world, referring to the good luck, as some call it, or the special gift for rising to sudden emergencies, as we ourselves prefer to say, which in many difficult crises has kept us safe from harm or helped us to success. But now, as Speaker Reed said the other day, "we have burst our swaddling-clothes." We have, let us hope, put away childish things and put on the garment of national manhood. As one of the great powers we must no longer rely upon child-luck. The great task before us calls for the strength, soberness and consistency of the adult.

It will not, for example, be consistent with the character of a world power to apply to the government of new colonies the same methods, or lack of method, that has prevailed in the government of our cities and some of our states. We cannot hope for success if we carry the spoils system into the difficult administration of foreign lands and people. Colonial work calls for special fitness in the civil service, for long and careful training. Shall we turn it over to the politicians, who have thus far, with some honorable exceptions, monopolized our diplomatic service. As a rule, our consuls and ministers, and even our ambassadors, have been patriots with "claims upon the administration"—not based upon special education and fitness, but for political service rendered. As a result, many—perhaps even a majority—of our representatives abroad have distinguished themselves and their country by such antics as were explained or forgiven only because the men were Americans, and therefore protected by that "special providence" of which I have spoken. Is it imagined that we can administer colonies after this method? If so, a great and painful surprise is in store for us.

For the present administration it must be said that the President's choice of men for work in the new colonies inspires the hope of better things. In the Philippine Commission, for example, every man has justified his selection by special ability or experience, or both. If this course be followed to the end the nation is relieved at the start of a grave anxiety. Let us hope that it is so.

But with even the best intentions we have difficulties to face that are not due to any fault of our own, but are rather inherent in our institutions, in our form of government. Ours is a democracy, with all the virtues and all the defects of that form of government. It is obvious that such work as is now to be done in the East calls for a strong central executive force. Russia has been able to fortify her position in the East not only because she is rich and powerful, but because her form of government is an autocracy. Germany is, in name at least, a constitutional monarchy, but it is because her government owns and administers the railroads,

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