already come to pass, are fixed and certain.

3. The subject and predicate of a proposition may be fixed and certain consequentially,—and so the existence of the things affirmed may be “consequentially necessary.” “Things which are perfectly connected with the things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a necessity of consequence.” This is logical necessity.

“And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are necessary only in this last way,”—that is, “by a connexion with something that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already is or has been. This is the necessity which especially belongs to controversies about acts of the will.” (p. 30.)

Philosophical necessity is general and particular. 1. “The existence of a thing may be said to be necessary with a general necessity, when all things considered there is a foundation for the certainty of its existence.” This is unconditional necessity in the strictest sense.

2. Particular necessity refers to “things that happen to particular persons, in the existence of which, no will of theirs has any concern, at least at that time; which, whether they are necessary or not with regard to things in general, yet are necessary to them, and with regard to any volition of theirs at that time, as they prevent all acts of the will about the affair.” (p. 31.) This particular necessity is absolute to the individual, because his will has nothing to do with it—whether it be absolute or not in the general sense, does not affect his case.

“What has been said to show the meaning of terms necessary and necessity, may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms impossible and impossibility. For there is no difference, but only the latter are negative and the former positive.” (ibid.)

Inability and Unable.

“It has been observed that these terms in their original and common use, have relation to will and endeavour, as supposable in the case.” That is have relation to the connexion of volition with effects. “But as these terms are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers on controversies about free will, they are used in a quite different and far more extensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will or endeavour for the bringing of the thing to pass is or can be supposed:” e. g. The connexion between volitions and their causes or motives.

Contingent and Contingency.

“Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connexion with its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we have no means of foreseeing. But the word, contingent, is abundantly used in a very different sense; not for that, whose connexion with the series of things we cannot discern so as to foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has any fixed connexion.” (p. 31. 32.)

Contingency and chance Edwards uses as equivalent terms. In common use, contingency and chance are relative to our knowledge—implying that we discern no cause. In another use,—the use of a certain philosophical school,—he affirms that contingency is used to express absolutely no cause; or, that some events are represented as existing without any cause or ground of their existence. This will be examined in its proper place. I am now only stating Edwards’s opinions, not discussing them.

Sec. IV. Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessary and Inability.

We now return to the question:—Is the connexion between motive and volition necessary?

The term necessary, in its common or vulgar use, does not relate to this question, for in that use as we have seen, it refers to the connexion between volition considered as a cause, and its effects. In this question, we are considering volition as an effect in relation to its cause or the motive. If the connexion then of motive and volition be necessary, it must be necessary in the philosophical or metaphysical sense of the term. Now this philosophical necessity Edwards does hold to characterize the connexion of motive and volition. This section opens with the following distinction of philosophical necessity: “That necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible connexion of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is distinguished into moral and natural necessity.” He then appropriates moral philosophical necessity to express the nature of the connexion between motive and volition: “And sometimes by moral necessity is meant that necessity of connexion and consequence which arises from moral causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connexion which there is in many cases between these, and such certain volitions and actions. And it is in this sense that I use the phrase moral necessity in the following discourse.” (p. 32.) Natural philosophical necessity as distinguished from this, he employs to characterize the connexion between natural causes and phenomena of our being, as the connexion of external objects with our various sensations, and the connexion between truth and our assent or belief. (p. 33.)

In employing the term moral, however, he does not intend to intimate that it affects at all the absoluteness of the necessity which it distinguishes; on the contrary, he affirms that “moral necessity may be as absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause. It must be allowed that there may be such a thing as a sure and perfect connexion between moral causes and effects; so this only (i. e. the sure and perfect connexion,) is what I call by the name of moral necessity.” (p. 33.)

Nor does he intend “that when a moral habit or motive is so strong that the act of the will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the nature of things!” But these terms, moral and natural, are convenient to express a difference which really exists; a difference, however, which “does not lie so much in the nature of the connexion as in the two terms connected.” Indeed, he soon after admits “that choice in many cases arises from nature, as truly as other events.” His sentiment is plainly this choice lies in the great system and chain of nature as truly as any other phenomenon, arising from its antecedent and having its consequents or effects: but we have appropriated nature to express the chain of causes and effects, which lie without us, and which are most obvious to us; and choice being, “as it were, a new principle of motion and action,” lying within us, and often interrupting or altering the external course of nature, seems to demand a peculiar designation. (p. 34.)

Edwards closes his remarks on moral necessity by justifying his reduction of motive and volition under philosophical necessity. “It must be observed, that in what has been explained, as signified by the name of moral necessity, the word necessity is not used according to the original design and meaning of the word; for, as was observed before, such terms, necessary, impossible, irresistible, &c. in common speech, and their most proper sense, are always relative, having reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavour, that is insufficient. But no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavour,