friend; we are protestants; we can die, we can burn, we can do anything but rebel; and this being our first duty, viz., to recognise our rightful sovereign, are we not to do that first? And if popery or slavery follow, we must act as becomes us. This being then orthodox doctrine, is equally a substantial reason why we should be against the Hanover succession.

There may be sundry other reasons given why we should not be for this new establishment of the succession, which, though perhaps they may not seem so cogent in themselves, have yet a due force, as they stand related to other circumstances, which this nation is at present involved in, and therefore are only left to the consideration of the people of these times. No question but every honest Briton is for a peaceable succession; now, if the pretender comes, and is quietly established on the throne, why then you know there is an end of all our fears of the great and formidable power of France; we have no more need to fear an invasion, or the effects of leaving France in a condition by the peace to act against us; and put the pretender upon us; and therefore, peace being of so much consequence to this nation, after so long and so cruel a war, none can think of entering upon a new war for the succession without great regret and horror. Now, it cannot be doubted but the succession of Hanover would necessarily involve us again in a war against France, and that perhaps when we may be in no good case to undertake it, for these reasons:—1. Perhaps some princes and states in the world by that time, seeing the great increase and growth of French power, may think fit to change their sentiments, and rather come over to that interest for want of being supported before, than be willing to embark against France, and so it may not be possible to obtain a new confederacy in the degree and extent of it, which we have seen it in, or in any degree suitable to the power of France; and if so, there may be but small hopes of success in case of a new rupture; and any war had better be let alone than be carried on to loss, which often ends in the overthrow of the party or nation who undertake it, and fails in the carrying it on. 2. France itself, as well by the acquisition of those princes who may have changed sides, as above, as by a time for taking breath after the losses they have received, may be raised to a condition of superior strength, and may be too much an overmatch for us to venture upon; and if he thinks fit to send us the person we call the pretender, and order us to take him for our king, and this when we are in no condition to withstand him, prudence will guide us to accept of him; for all people comply with what they cannot avoid; and if we are not in a condition to keep him out, there wants very little consultation upon the question, whether we shall take him in, or no? Like this is a man, who being condemned to be hanged, and is in irons in the dungeon at Newgate, when he sees no possibility either of pardon from the queen, or escape out of prison, what does he resolve upon next? What! why he resolves to die. What should he resolve on? Everybody submits to what they cannot escape. People! people! if ye cannot resist the French king, ye must submit to a French pretender. There is no more to be said about that. 3. Then some allies, who it might be thought would be able to lend you some help in such a case as this is, may pretend to be disgusted at former usage, and say they were abandoned and forsaken in their occasion by us, and they will not hazard for a nation who disobliged them so much before, and from whom they have not received suitable returns for the debt of the revolution. And if these nations should take things so ill as to refuse their aid and assistance in a case of so much necessity as that of the succession, how shall we be able to maintain that attempt? And, as before, an attempt of that, or any other kind like that, is better unmade than ineffectually made. 4. Others add a yet farther reason of our probable inability in such a case, viz., that the enemies of Britain have so misrepresented things to some of the neighbouring nations, our good friends and allies, as if we Britons had betrayed the protestant interest, and not acted faithfully to our confederacies and alliances, in which our reputation, it is pretended, has suffered so much, as not to merit to be trusted again in like cases, or that it should be safe to depend upon our most solemn engagements. This, though it is invidious and harsh, yet if there may be any truth in it, as we hope there is not, may be added as a very good reason, why, after this war is over, we may be in no good case at all to undertake or to carry on a new war in defence of the new protestant succession, when it may come to be necessary so to do. Since, then, the succession of Hanover will necessarily involve us in a new war against France, and for the reasons above, if they are allowed to be good reasons, we may not be in a condition to carry on that war, is not this a good reason why we should not in our present circumstances be for that succession? Other reasons may be taken from the present occasion the nation may lie under of preserving and securing the best administration of things that ever this nation was under in many ages; and if this be found to be inconsistent with the succession of Hanover, as some feign, it is hoped none will say but we ought to consider what we do; if the succession of Hanover is not consistent with these things, what reason have we to be for the said succession, till that posture of things be arrived when that inconsistency may be removed? And now, people of Britain! be your own judges upon what terms you can think it reasonable to insist any longer upon this succession. I do not contend that it is not a lawful succession, a reasonable succession, an established succession, nay, a sworn succession; but if it be not a practicable succession, and cannot be a peaceable succession; if peace will not bring him in, and war cannot, what must we do? It were much better not to have it at all, than to have it and ruin the kingdom, and ruin those that claim it at the same time.

But yet I have other reasons than these, and more cogent ones; learned men say, some diseases in nature are cured by antipathies, and some by sympathies; that the enemies of nature are the best preservatives of nature; that bodies are brought down by the skill of the physician that they may the better be brought up, made sick to be made well, and carried to the brink of the grave in order to be kept from the grave; for these reasons, and in order to these things, poisons are administered for physic; or amputations in surgery, the flesh is cut that it may heal; an arm laid open that it may close with safety; and these methods of cure are said to be the most certain as well as most necessary in those particular cases, from whence it is become a proverbial saying in physic, desperate diseases must have desperate remedies. Now it is very proper to inquire in this case whether the nation is not in such a state of health at this time, that the coming of the pretender may not be of absolute necessity, by way of cure of such national distempers which now afflict us, and that an effectual cure can be wrought no other way? If upon due inquiry it should appear that we are not fit to receive such a prince as the successor of the house of Hanover is, that we should maltreat and abuse him if he were here, and that there is no way for us to learn the true value of a protestant successor so well as by tasting a little what a popish pretender is, and feeling something of the great advantages that may accrue to us by the superiority of a Jacobite party; if the disease of stupidity has so far seized us that we are to be cured only by poisons and fermentations; if the wound is mortified, and nothing but deep incisions, amputations, and desperate remedies must be used; if it should be necessary thus to teach us the worth of things by the want of them; and there is no other way to bring the nation to its senses; why, what can be then said against the