their errors, were two outrages upon religion in France, which caused perpetual grief to the Holy Father. The formal promises of Napoleon, coupled with the advantage of the Pope's presence in Paris, gave good grounds to hope that these two evils could be remedied if the Emperor's invitation were accepted. It was not thought prudent, however, to accept the invitation in the dark, as it were, nor did the Emperor's verbal promises to the Legate, nor Cardinal Fesch's vague generalities on the good of religion, inspire confidence enough. Before the Pope would give his final consent, he determined to reduce to something tangible and obligatory these vague indefinite promises of the French government. Cardinal Fesch advised that the Pope should exact, as a condition of his consent, the restitution of the three Legations which France had torn from the States of the Church. But the pure soul of Pius VII. revolted against the idea of admitting any thought of temporal advantages; not only did he reject the Cardinal's well-meant suggestion, but positively forbade him ever again to make mention of it. He refused to give his consent unless the French government would promise to withdraw the organic laws, and to abandon those of the constitutional bishops who should refuse to make a public and sincere retractation. It took four or five months of negotiation to extort these promises from Napoleon. During that period Consalvi had daily conferences with Cardinal Fesch, whose warm temper frequently led to lively debates. At length M. de Talleyrand addressed an official note to the Cardinal Legate, in which it was expressly declared that as to the organic laws the Emperor would treat directly with the Holy Father, whose representations should be attended to in such a way as to give his Holiness the most complete satisfaction. The Emperor was ready to do even more than the Pope had asked; and it was insinuated that he would be happy to listen with favour to any requests the Pope should make concerning his temporal interests. Touching the intruded bishops, M. de Talleyrand made large promises, but their tenor was so vague that the Holy Father did not remain satisfied until he held in his hand a written promise that the constitutional bishops should make their retractation in the Pope's hands in the form prescribed by him, and that any who might refuse to do so should be forced to resign their sees. This point having been arranged, it was thought that the due regard for the majesty of the pontifical dignity demanded some other precautions. The Holy Father felt that he ought not to expose his high office to insult or irreverence, and this consideration urged him to request some information as to the manner in which he was to be received at Paris by the Emperor. In his reply to the inquiries made on this point Talleyrand employed these remarkable words: "Between Pius the Seventh's journey to France, his reception there, his treatment, and the results which are to spring from it, and Pius the Sixth's journey to Vienna, there shall be as much difference as there is between Napoleon I. and Joseph II.". Another precaution judged necessary by Consalvi regarded the coronation itself. The later notes of Cardinal Fesch were remarkable for a strange variety of expressions. Instead of the word coronation (incoronazione), employed in the original invitation presented by the Cardinal Legate in the Emperor's name, the Cardinal Fesch had commenced to use the word consecration (consecrazione). Consalvi at once demanded the reason of this change, and Cardinal Fesch replied: "Beyond all doubt, the Pope is to crown the Emperor, but I believe there is to be a double coronation, one in the Church by the Pope, the other in the Champ de Mars by the Senate". The Pope at once sent a despatch to the Legate at Paris commanding him to signify to the Emperor that the Holy Father could not allow his Majesty to be crowned by other hands after he had been crowned by the Pope; that a second coronation would be an insult to the dignity of the Head of the Church; and that, consequently, if it were intended that the Emperor should be twice crowned, the Holy Father would not go to Paris at all. Talleyrand replied in an official note that the Emperor set too high a value on his coronation by the Pope to wish to receive a second diadem from the hands of others.

The choice of those who were to form the suite of the Pontiff next came under discussion. The French government was anxious that the Pope should take with him twelve cardinals and a corresponding number of prelates and of Roman nobles. The Holy Father resolved to bring only four cardinals and four bishops, besides the prelates attached to his immediate service, such as his maggiordomo and his maestro di camera. The two Roman princes who commanded the noble guard were to follow him. However, in deference to Cardinal Fesch's requests, he added to this little court the two cardinal deacons, Braschi and de Bayane. The other four cardinals were Antonelli, de Pietro, Borgia, and Caselli.

To conduct these negotiations to a happy issue was a task of immense difficulty. The Cardinal writes that while they were proceeding he had to bear what was almost intolerable, and what only his zeal for the interests of the Holy See could have made him brook. At length the decisive yes was spoken, at first confidentially, because no formal invitation was to be delivered until such time as all arrangements were completed. The French government at once announced the Pope's intended visit, in order that the publicity thus given to his promise might make any change of purpose impossible or very difficult. Having thus made himself sure of the presence of the Roman Pontiff at his coronation, Napoleon all at once changed his tone, and made the Pope feel how little respect be really had for the Head of the Church. Indeed, it was Cardinal Consalvi's deliberate opinion—and after events show that he was correct in his judgment—that the French government was fully determined never to carry out the promises which the Pope's minister had extorted from it. The formal invitation was couched in language that fell far short of the ancient formula used on similar occasions, and which the government had promised to employ. Then, instead of deputing ecclesiastics or great dignitaries to present the Emperor's letter to Pius VII., Napoleon sent through Brigadier-General Caffarelli a note so mean in every respect that the Holy Father was inclined to refuse to accept it. But as he had undertaken the journey for the good of the Church, he resolved to bear with calmness and patience whatever slights might be put upon him. He soon found abundant occasions for the exercise of these virtues. In the first place, he was forced to set out on his journey with a precipitate speed that was equally unbecoming his dignity and injurious to his health. He left Rome on 2nd November, 1802, in order to arrive at Paris on the 27th or 28th; and during this long journey he was allowed to rest only twice—once at Florence for a day or two, and again a day at Turin—a few hours of repose being with difficulty permitted him at other places on the road. Besides, he was not even consulted about the day to be fixed for the ceremony, although common politeness should have suggested this mark of deference. "I will say nothing", says Consalvi, "of all the Pope had to suffer from the disrespect shown him in the capital; I will not speak of the manner in which Napoleon made his first appearance before his Holiness at Fontainebleau, in the midst of a pack of fifty hounds, as if going to or returning from the chase; I will not tell how the Pope was made to enter Paris by night and in silence, in order that no eye might see the Emperor at the Pontiff's left, for being in his own carriage he was forced to yield the right to his guest. I will be silent as to how and why, on the