capable of insanity, their insanity, I presume, must have been of the frantic sort, because in the untutored, intense feelings seem regularly to carry a boisterous expression.”

Mad is therefore not a complex idea, as has been supposed, but a complex term for all the forms and varieties of this disease. Our language has been enriched with other terms expressive of this affection, all of which have a precise meaning. Delirium, which we have borrowed from the latin, merely means, out of the track, de lira, so that a delirious person, one who starts out of the track regularly pursued, becomes compared to the same deviation in the process of ploughing. Crazy, we have borrowed from the French ecrasé, crushed, broken: we still use the same meaning, and say that such a person is crack’d. Insane, deranged, or disarranged,[1] melancholic, out of one’s wits, lunatic, phrenetic, or as we have corrupted it, frantick, require no explanation. Beside one’s self most probably originated from the belief of possession by a devil, or evil spirit.

The importance of investigating the original meaning of words must be evident when it is considered that the law of this country impowers persons of the medical profession to confine and discipline those to whom the term mad or lunatic can fairly be applied. Instead of endeavouring to discover an infallible definition of madness, which I believe will be found impossible, as it is an attempt to comprise, in a few words, the wide range and mutable character of this Proteus disorder: much more advantage would be obtained if the circumstances could be precisely defined under which it is justifiable to deprive a human being of his liberty.

Another impediment to an accurate definition of madness, arises from the various hypotheses, which have been entertained concerning the powers and operations of the human mind: and likewise from the looseness and unsettled state of the terms by which it is to be defined.

Before treating of the intellect in a deranged state, it will perhaps be expected that some system of the human mind, in its perfect and healthy condition, should be laid down. It will be supposed necessary to establish in what sanity of intellect consists, and to mark distinctly some fixed point, the aberrations from which are to constitute disease.

To have a thorough knowledge of the nature, extent, and rectitude of the human faculties, is particularly incumbent on him who undertakes to write of them in their distempered state; and, in a legal point of view, it is most important that the medical practitioner should be enabled to establish the state of the patient’s case, as a departure from that which is reason.

The difficulty of proposing a satisfactory theory of the human mind, must have been felt by every person, who has touched this delicate string since the days of Aristotle, and failure must be expected in him who attempts it: yet the endeavour is laudable, and miscarriage is not linked with disgrace. Every contribution, to illustrate what are the powers of mind we possess; how we are acted upon by external circumstances in the acquisition of knowledge; and concerning the manner in which we use this knowledge for the purposes of life; ought to be candidly received.

Enquiries of this nature have been usually conducted by commenting on the numerous and discordant authorities which have treated on metaphysical subjects; these persons, however they may differ on many points, appear to be pretty generally agreed, that the human mind possesses certain faculties and powers; as imagination, judgment, reason, and memory. They seem to consider these, as so many departments, or offices of the mind, and therefore class men according to the excellence or predominance of these powers. One man, is said to be distinguished by the brilliancy of his imagination; another, by the solidity of his judgment; a third, by the acuteness of his reason; and a fourth, by the promptitude and accuracy of his recollection.

As far as I have observed respecting the human mind, (and I speak with great hesitation and diffidence,) it does not possess, all those powers and faculties with which the pride of man has thought proper to invest it. By our senses, we are enabled to become acquainted with objects, and we are capable of recollecting them in a greater or less degree; the rest, appears to be merely a contrivance of language.

If mind, were actually capable of the operations attributed to it, and possessed of these powers, it would necessarily have been able to create a language expressive of these powers and operations. But the fact is otherwise. The language, which characterizes mind and its operations, has been borrowed from external objects; for mind has no language peculiar to itself. A few instances will sufficiently illustrate this position. After having committed an offence it is natural to say that the mind feels contrition and sorrow.

Contrition is from cum and tero, to rub together, which cannot possibly have any thing to do with the operations of the mind, which is incapable of rubbing its ideas or notions together. Contrition is a figurative expression, and may possibly mean the act of rubbing out the stain of vice, or wearing down by friction the prominences of sin.

If we were to analyze the word Sorrow, which is held to be a mental feeling, we should find it to be transferred from bodily sufferance: for the mind, is incapable of creating a term correctly expressive of its state, and therefore, it became necessary to borrow it from soreness of body.—See Mr. Tooke’s Diversions of Purley, vol. ii. p. 207, where sore, sorry, and sorrow are clearly made out to be the same word.

It is customary to speak of a man, of accurate perceptions, and of another, who has grand and luminous conceptions of human nature. Perception, from per, and capio to take, seize, grasp, through the medium of the organs of sense, being implied. But to take, seize, and grasp are the operations of the hand, and can only, by extreme courtesy, be attributed to mind.

Mr. Dugald Stewart, the most thoughtful and intelligent of modern metaphysicians, has said, “By conception I mean that power of the mind which enables it to form a notion of an absent object of perception, or of a sensation which it has formerly felt.”—Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 8vo. p. 133.

This definition means merely memory; and by perusing attentively the whole chapter the reader will be convinced of it. Conception, from cum and capio, has been applied to mind from the physical sense of embracing, comprehending, or probably from the notion of being impregnated with the subject. It may be remarked, that these three terms, by which conception has been explained, have been all applied to mental operation.

The words reason and reasoning, I believe, in most languages, strictly imply numeration, reckoning, proportion; the Latin ratio, ratiocinor, ratiocinator are sufficient examples. A curious coincidence between the Latin ratio and the Gothic rathjo, together with some pertinent and interesting observations, may be seen in