blunder. With regard to the batteries which were even now being sent out, many of them were manned by reservists and by garrison artillerymen, who had had no experience in the handling of modern field-guns.”

Proceeding to the question of lack of cavalry, he argued:

“With regard to cavalry as with regard to artillery, the first force was well supplied, but the forces of Lord Methuen and General Buller were very deficient in that respect. In that connection the First Lord had made an attack on the critics of the War Office. He said they had not seen, or if they had seen had not insisted on, a novel fact in the present war, namely, that for the first time in the history of the world they had seen an army composed entirely of mounted infantry. The right hon. gentleman had only to read Sir William Butler’s ‘Life of General Colley,’ where he would find very marked attention drawn to that matter. As to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, of which the right hon. gentleman was a member, though he himself had been spoken of as the author of that body, he must admit that it had failed. It was instituted after a correspondence in which he himself, his hon. friend (Mr. Arnold Foster), and Mr. Spenser Wilkinson took part, and it was not new to the present Government. It was instituted in the time of Lord Rosebery’s Government as a Committee of the Cabinet, but it had been proclaimed to the world in the time of the present Government. It had failed on account of the slackness of those who attended the deliberations of the Committee. It had not been worked as the authors of the proposal thought it might have been worked in the interests of the Empire. The Committee ought to have foreseen these difficulties with respect to mounted men; they were foreseen by military men. Though political differences occurred between Sir A. Milner and Sir W. Butler, Sir A. Milner consulted General Butler on the military aspect of the situation, and General Butler’s opinions were known to the Government, or should have been. They were known to Sir A. Milner at any rate and were not concealed by him when he was in this country a year ago. According to his (Sir C. Dilke’s) information, which reached him immediately after the statement had been made to Sir A. Milner, General Sir W. Butler declared that 60,000 men would be required in Cape Colony and 25,000 men in Natal. Leaving that, however, what was the attitude of the Cabinet with regard to the need for cavalry? They telegraphed to the Colonies to refuse mounted men. They gave their reasons in the telegram of October 3: ‘In view of the numbers already available, infantry most and cavalry least serviceable.’ On December 16 they telegraphed to the Colonies, ‘Mounted men preferred.’ After all the loss of life that had taken place, and the months of checks and reverses, they had discovered what competent soldiers had discovered before the war, and must have told them, that mounted men were essential for a campaign of this kind.”

In reply, the Under-Secretary of State for War made the first telling and apposite statement which had been furnished for the Government during the course of the proceedings. His exposition was straightforwardness itself. Though merely the mouthpiece of the Government, Mr. Wyndham gave utterance to definite statements which created a very favourable impression throughout the country, and served at once to wipe away the taste of foregone pronouncements. He said:

“Every one to his dying day would look back with regret on the great many disasters which had followed, but no one could ever know what would have happened if the other course had been adopted. It was very easy to conceive that if Sir G. White had not stayed at Ladysmith and Sir R. Buller had not gone to his relief disaster might have been developed in another line, and that there might have been that universal rising of the Cape Dutch which, thank Heaven, had not occurred. When it was stated that Lord Methuen had not sufficient cavalry and artillery with him, it must be remembered that Lord Methuen was hurried off to the Orange River, and, as a matter of fact, he arrived on the frontier in fewer days than the German army reached the French frontier, and he had not with him the cavalry, which had been diverted for the relief of Ladysmith and other purposes. On the morrow after Nicholson’s Nek three more battalions were sent from home, though none had been asked for, and Lord Landsowne offered a sixth division. In reply, he was told that preparation was desirable, but that there was no immediate need for its despatch. The situation was again changed by the reverses at Stormberg and Magersfontein and the check at Colenso. Thereupon the sixth division was ordered to embark without any communication from South Africa, and at the same time the seventh division was ordered to be mobilised. On December 15, the day after his check at Colenso, Sir R. Buller asked for the seventh division, the mobilisation of which had already been ordered, and for 8000 mounted irregulars from this country. Lord Landsowne replied that the seventh division would embark on January 4, which it did. Next day the first step was taken in connection with the raising of the Imperial Yeomanry, and volunteers were invited to come forward in order to fill the places left vacant by the raising from each battalion of one company of mounted infantry. The patriotism of the Militia was also appealed to, and fourteen battalions were now serving in South Africa, while others were on the way. A great military authority once said, ‘When a battalion is asked for, send a brigade.’ That had been the course pursued by Lord Landsowne.”

In regard to the number of our guns, Mr. Wyndham continued his argument in the following terms:—

“As the right hon. baronet had pressed for information with regard to the number of guns which had been despatched to South Africa, it would not be out of place to tell the House that we had sent and were sending 36 siege train heavy guns; there were already there 38 mobile naval guns, and in addition to these there were 36 5-inch howitzers carrying a heavy shell charged with 50 lbs. of lyddite, in all 110 guns, some of them with a range of 10,000 yards, and all capable of throwing heavy shells. Besides these there were 54 horse-artillery guns and 234 field-artillery guns, in all, counting the howitzers, 324 guns capable of accompanying troops in the field. Including the two mountain batteries, there were altogether 410 guns in South Africa, without reckoning the guns that were going out with the Volunteers and the Colonials, which would bring the number up to 452.”