stability of the universe, in the light of the question as to the finite or infinite character of the material universe—Periodicity in Organisms—Criticism of the concepts of Cause and Effect—Criticism of Spencer's definition of Life—The concepts of Heredity and Adaptation—The point of dispute with regard to Variation—Darwin, Haeckel, and Eimer with regard to the inheritance of individual acquirements—Criticisms of Weismann—Habit in the life of the individual—Advantage of the method pursued by Avenarius in the "Kritik der reinen Erfahrung"—Lamarck on the relation of Use and Function—Darwin on Habit and Instinct—Function and Tendency to Function—Relation of organism and environment—Theory of a special vital force—The relation of exercise to strength of Tendency—The concepts of Cause and Effect as applied to organism and environment—Relation of primary tendency to later-evolved function—Form and Function—The mixture of types in sexual propagation—Summary of conclusions 277-306

CHAPTER II

Intelligence and "End"

The question as to the extent to which Reason is diffused in the universe— Darwin and Haeckel on Reason and Instinct—Du Prel on Reason as a fundamental property of all matter—Carneri on the automatism of animals—The dependence of theories on this question on the starting-point assumed in the argument—Difficulties of assigning a limit-line to Reason—Schneider's criteria—Insectivorous plants—Knight, Darwin, etc., on the movements of plants—Race-habits—So-called reflex-action in man—From non-analogy no inference possible—Arbitrary nature of the assumptions involved in the two starting-points of query—Reason = Cause or Effect?—Further criticism of the concepts of Cause and Effect—The bias of the specialist—Attempted definition of the province of reason—Definition of "End"—Unreliability of inference as to the nature of ends in other individuals; in other species—Possible inferences from the analogy of the nervous system—Certain possible limiting assumptions as to the province of knowledge in animal species—The Law of the Variation of Pain and Pleasure in function—The ultimate dilemma—Examinations of Teleological conceptions with respect to the Tendency to Stability—Criticism of Wallace on the Origin of Life, or of Consciousness—Summary of conclusions 307-340

CHAPTER III

The Will

Difficulties of definition—The Will and Consciousness—"Involuntary" action—Will in passivity—The concept of Choice—"Ends" and the Will—The Future and Will—The External and Will—Criticism of Barratt's axioms and propositions—Discussion of the relation of Thought and Feeling to Will—The argument of the Physiologist—The argument of the Evolutionist—The argument from social statistics—The argument from Psychiatry, Criminology, etc.—The argument from the psychological principles on which Evolutional Ethics is founded—Definition of Natural Law and Necessity—The positive factors of Evolution—The positive and active character of the organism as the result of evolution—The equivalence of Conditions and Results—The positive character of the organism as a part of Nature—The sense of Freedom as the sense of Activity—The theory of the Will as determined by Motives—As determined by Feeling—As determined by the desirability of the end or object—The argument of Concomitance and that of Sequence as used by both Materialist and Spiritualist—The endeavor to prove (1) the causal character of physiological process; (2) the causal character of Consciousness—Inconsistencies of these attempts 341-359

CHAPTER IV

The Mutual Relations of Thought, Feeling, and Will in Evolution

Hume on Reason and Passion—The constant connection of Thought with Feeling, and with Feeling as pleasure or pain—The question as to whether Thought or Feeling is primary—Application of answer to previous considerations on the diffusion of Consciousness in Nature—The relation of the concepts of the Pleasurable and Painful to the concept of "End"—Will as a constant accompaniment of Consciousness—Absurdities to which the division of Consciousness into distinct faculties leads—Law of the growth of functional tendency and of pleasure in function—The New as a disturber of equilibrium—The pleasure involved in the overcoming of obstacles—The equilibrium of function as Health—Connection of the pleasure of food-taking with Health—Criticism of Rolph's principle of the Insatiability of Life—Further criticism of Rolph on the Darwinian theory of Growth—The coördinate progress of physiological adaptation with the advancement of knowledge, and with the variation of Feeling and Will—The pleasure of the strongest motive as relative, not absolute—The character of the End in view—The pleasure of anticipation and the pleasure of the event—Criticism of Sidgwick on Hedonism—Criticism of Rolph's theory of Want as universal motive—Suicide—Rest—The diminution of pain with lapse of time as adaptation—Pleasure in pain as pleasure in function—The relation of Health to Happiness—The theory of the absolute Freedom of Feeling—The concepts of Cause and Effect as applied to the evolution of Thought, Feeling, and Will—Application of conclusions to the Teleological Argument 360-382

CHAPTER V

Egoism and Altruism in Evolution

Prototypes in other animal species of what we term Egoism and Altruism in man; care for the young on the part of the parent-animal; mutual aid between the sexes; animal societies—Experiments of Lubbock showing the irregularity and caprice of action altruistic in form, among the ants—Benno Scheitz on maternal care among lower species—Answers to the argument of automatism—Dependence of a theory of moral Evolution on the definition of Egoism and Altruism—The significance of the terms progressive—The possibility of differences in the form of the evolution of Altruism, in different species—The possibility of the combination of different forms in the evolution of a single species—Discussion of the question of the first beginning of action prompted by altruistic motive—The argument of the illogical nature of a supposed development of Altruism from Egoism—The question as to whether Health, the Preservation of Species, or Pleasure, is the actual final end of action—The question of Heredity in relation to that of the moral evolution—Stephen's views—Arguments from Ribot, Dugdale's "Jukes," etc. 383-422

CHAPTER VI

Conscience

The gradual character of the