implying that it rotated along with the rotations of that axis. Aristotle thus construes ἴλλεσθαι, in that particular proposition of the Timæus, as implying rotation. But he plainly did not construe ἴλλεσθαι as naturally and constantly either denoting or implying rotation. This is proved by his language in the second passage, where he reproduces the very same doctrine with a view to discuss and confute it, and without special reference to the Platonic Timæus. Here we find that he is not satisfied to express the doctrine by the single word ἴλλεσθαι. He subjoins another verb — ἴλλεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι: thus bringing into explicit enunciation the fact of rotatory movement, which, while ἴλλεσθαι stood alone, was only known by implication and inference from the circumstances of the particular case. If he had supposed ἴλλεσθαι by itself to signify revolving the addition of κινεῖσθαι would have been useless, unmeaning, and even impertinent. Aristotle, as Boeckh remarks, is not given to multiply words unnecessarily.

It thus appears, when we examine the passages of Aristotle, that he understood ἴλλεσθαι quite in conformity with Buttmann’s explanation. Rotatory movement forms no part of the meaning of the word; yet it may accidentally, in a particular case, be implied as an adjunct of the meaning, by virtue of the special circumstances of that case. Aristotle describes the doctrine as held by some persons. He doubtless has in view various Platonists of his time, who adopted and defended what had been originally advanced by Plato in the Timæus.

M. Boeckh, in a discussion of some length (Untersuch. p. 76-84), maintains the opinion that the reading in the first passage of Aristotle is incorrect; that the two words ἴλλεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι ought to stand in the first as they do in the second, — as he thinks that they stood in the copy of Simplikius: that Aristotle only made reference to Plato with a view to the peculiar word ἴλλεσθαι, and not to the general doctrine of the rotation of the earth: that he comments upon this doctrine as held by others, but not by Plato — who (according to Boeckh) was known by everyone not to hold it. M. Boeckh gives this only as a conjecture, and I cannot regard his arguments in support of it as convincing. But even if he had convinced me that ἴλλεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι were the true reading in the first passage, as well as in the second, I should merely say that Aristotle had not thought himself precluded by the reference to the Timæus from bringing out into explicit enunciation what the Platonists whom he had in view knew to be implied and intended by the passage. This indeed is a loose mode of citation, which I shall not ascribe to Aristotle without good evidence. In the present case such evidence appears to me wanting.4