class="sub1">Uniqueness of acts; possibilities of operation; necessity of play and art; rebelliousness.

PART THREE

THE PLACE OF INTELLIGENCE IN CONDUCT

• Section I: Habit and Intelligence 172
• Habits and intellect; mind, habit and impulse.
• Section II: The Psychology of Thinking 181
• The trinity of intellect; conscience and its alleged separate subject-matter.
• Section III: The Nature of Deliberation 189
• Deliberation as imaginative rehearsal; preference and choice; strife of reason and passion; nature of reason.
• Section IV: Deliberation and Calculation 199
• Error in utilitarian theory; place of the pleasant; hedonistic calculus; deliberation and prediction.
• Section V: The Uniqueness of Good 210
• Fallacy of a single good; applied to utilitarianism; profit and personality; means and ends.
• Section VI: The Nature of Aims 223
• Theory of final ends; aims as directive means; ends as justifying means; meaning well as an aim; wishes and aims.
• Section VII: The Nature of Principles 238
• Desire for certainty; morals and probabilities; importance of generalizations.
• Section VIII: Desire and Intelligence 248
• Object and consequence of desire; desire and quiescence; self-deception in desire; desire needs intelligence; nature of idealism; living in the ideal.
• Section IX: The Present and Future 265
• Subordination of activity to result; control of future; production and consummation; idealism and distant goals.

PART FOUR

CONCLUSION

• Section I: The Good of Activity 278
• Better and worse; morality a process; evolution and progress; optimism; Epicureanism; making others happy.
• Section II: Morals are Human 295
• Humane morals; natural law and morals; place of science.
• Section III: What is Freedom? 303
• Elements in freedom; capacity in action; novel possibilities; force of desire.
• Section IV: Morality Is Social 314
• Conscience and responsibility; social pressure and opportunity; exaggeration of blame; importance of social psychology; category of right; the community as religious symbol.

INTRODUCTION

"Give a dog a bad name and hang him." Human nature has been the dog of professional moralists, and consequences accord with the proverb. Man's nature has been regarded with suspicion, with fear, with sour looks, sometimes with enthusiasm for its possibilities but only when these were placed in contrast with its actualities. It has appeared to be so evilly disposed that the business of morality was to prune and curb it; it would be thought better of if it could be replaced by something else. It has been supposed that morality would be quite superfluous were it not for the inherent weakness, bordering on depravity, of human nature. Some writers with a more genial conception have attributed the current blackening to theologians who have thought to honor the divine by disparaging the human. Theologians have doubtless taken a gloomier view of man than have pagans and secularists. But this explanation doesn't take us far. For after all these theologians are themselves human, and they would have been without influence if the human audience had not somehow responded to them.

Morality is largely concerned with controlling human nature. When we are attempting to control anything we are acutely aware of what resists us. So moralists were led, perhaps, to think of human nature as evil because of its reluctance to yield to control, its rebelliousness under the yoke. But this explanation only raises another question. Why did morality set up rules so foreign to human nature? The ends it insisted upon, the regulations it imposed, were after all outgrowths of human nature. Why then was human nature so averse to them? Moreover rules can be obeyed and ideals realized only as they appeal to something in human nature and awaken in it an active response. Moral principles that exalt themselves by degrading human nature are in effect committing suicide. Or else they involve human nature in unending civil war, and treat it as a hopeless mess of contradictory forces.

We are forced therefore to consider the nature and origin of that control of human nature with which morals has been occupied. And the fact which is forced upon us when we raise this question is the existence of classes. Control has been vested in an oligarchy. Indifference to regulation has grown in the gap which separates the ruled from the rulers. Parents, priests, chiefs, social censors have supplied aims, aims which were foreign to those upon whom they were imposed, to the young, laymen, ordinary folk; a few have given and administered