most persons familiar with the place, that it would be quite impossible to dislodge a body of troops properly posted on the north bank of the river at this ferry, provided a stubborn resistance was made.

It was for the purpose of preventing the crossing of the enemy at this point that the force of Colonel Tyler was ordered to Cross Lanes. By keeping pickets well on the line of the river, to watch any advance of the enemy, the regiment was entirely safe at its camp, from which it was comparatively easy to re-enforce any portion of the line. But for some reason, the commanding officer failed to visit the ferry in person, until the afternoon of the day on which a peremptory order was received to report with his command at Gauley Bridge. Hitherto he had been entirely unable to give correct information, as to the probability of his being able to hold the ferry. He was ordered to abandon the position, because his dispatches were such, that they created an uneasiness in the minds of Generals Rosecrans and Cox, as to the propriety of trusting him to hold so important a position. Here was the fatal mistake. A lesser error had already been made, in withdrawing all the forces from Tyler, other than the Seventh. Had these forces remained, the position would probably not have been abandoned, as all would have felt secure. When the order to withdraw was received, the commanding officer regretted it as much as any one. But the mischief was already done; the order was imperative. On that evening, Monday, the regiment left Cross Lanes at 11 o'clock P.M., and the next day, by noon, was at Twenty Mile Creek, some eight miles from Gauley Bridge.

On the Wednesday morning following, Colonel Tyler reported in person to General Cox. In the mean time, the general having become satisfied that Colonel Tyler could be trusted to hold Cross Lanes, and being confident that the contemplated attack of the enemy on Gauley Bridge had been abandoned, ordered him to return as soon as the troops were rested, expecting him to start back, at least the next morning. But Tyler did not move. On Friday afternoon, General Cox, on learning that he had not moved, was much excited, and said to an officer present—

"He must move; he must move at once; it is all important that Cross Lanes be held, and Floyd be kept on the other side of the river; ride back to camp and tell him from me, to move early in the morning, and with speed, to secure the position."

The order was delivered in nearly the same language as given, but notwithstanding its directness, he did not move till noon on Saturday, and then made a distance of only fourteen miles, over good roads, encamping at the foot of Panther Mountain, after having fallen back from Peter's Creek, on learning of the presence of the enemy.

On arriving in camp, a dispatch was sent to General Cox, representing to him that the enemy were in force in front, and asking instructions. On Sunday morning at about 3 o'clock, a courier arrived with an order from General Cox, substantially as follows: The force in your front cannot be as large as you estimate it. Advance cautiously, feeling your way; if the enemy is too strong, fall back, if not, occupy Cross Lanes at once, as it is of the utmost importance.

About nine o'clock Sunday morning, August 25th, the regiment moved towards Cross Lanes, casting lots as to which company should be left in charge of the baggage. It fell upon Company F, which was temporarily commanded by Lieutenant Kimball. The entire day was occupied in reaching Cross Lanes. It was not until dark of that day that the regiment went into camp.

In the days' advance some slight skirmishing occurred with the enemy's cavalry videttes, but beyond these few horsemen no enemy was encountered, the regiment encamping in apparent security near the church, after having driven away a cavalry picket of the enemy.

Companies were sent out on picket, as follows: Company A, on the road leading to Summerville; Company K, on the road leading to Carnifex Ferry; Company C, on the road leading in the opposite direction, while Company E was sent on a diagonal road leading to a ferry some distance below Carnifex. The balance of the command remained near headquarters, which were established in the church.

Each company on picket was divided into three reliefs, with instructions to be vigilant.

The silence of the enemy, together with his neglect to attack, created the impression that he had withdrawn his forces to the other side of the river, fearing that this small force was but the advance of a well-equipped army. But these theories were destined to fade into sadder realities, as the shadows of night melted into morning.

Nothing occurred during the night to disturb the general repose. A short time before day fires were kindled, and those who were up had pieces of meat on sticks, which they were roasting. Some had obtained green corn during the night, which they were also roasting. Before day had fairly dawned, the command was almost entirely astir. As it became sufficiently light to distinguish objects at a considerable distance, several musket shots were heard in the direction of the river, followed in quick succession by others. It soon became evident that a determined attack was being made on Company K. About this time a column of rebels was seen advancing from the river road, across the fields, towards Company A's position on the Summerville road. Arriving in the vicinity of this road, the column halted, formed in line of battle, at the same time swinging round its right to the Summerville road, driving Company A back to the point where the roads cross. In the mean time Companies B, D, G, H, and I were ordered to the support of Company K; but on arriving at the cross roads, Company K was seen falling back in some confusion, before a superior force, therefore they remained at that point. Meanwhile a heavy fire was opened from a dense wood opposite the church, to resist which Company K, having been joined by Companies A and C, which had advanced to its support on the ferry road, took position on a hill midway between this belt of timber and the crossing of the roads. From this point these companies delivered several effective volleys, which soon drove the rebels from their position. Taking advantage of this partial check of the enemy, Captain Crane ordered a charge, which resulted in piercing the lines, and the capture of a stand of rebel colors. The three companies now escaped, with a loss, however, of Captain Shurtliff, Lieutenant Wilcox, and Lieutenant Cross, taken prisoners, the latter being severely wounded in the arm.

During this time the rebel column from the direction of Summerville had advanced so as to lap over the road opposite the Ferry road, exposing the companies occupying the road in front of the church to an enfilading fire, at the same time being exposed to a severe fire from the front, from a column of infantry and cavalry coming up the Ferry road. These companies were now ordered to rally on a hill near the church. In executing this movement Companies D and H passed through a corn field, exposed to a deadly fire from almost every direction. Soon after reaching this field Captain Dyer, Company D, fell dead, pierced in the heart by a rifle bullet. Lieutenant Weed succeeded him in command. On reaching the hill these companies attempted to rally, but being in an open field, combated by a much superior and partially hidden foe, were compelled to fall back to a piece of woods skirting the road. The balance of the command, other than those who had followed the fortunes of Captain Crane, now joined them, and soon organized for a systematic retreat.

Captain Crane and his followers, after putting some distance between themselves and the enemy, crossed the Gauley road, and hastened to the mountains, where they would be entirely free from the attacks of cavalry, and where they would have a chance, at least, of partially defending themselves against attack from the rebel infantry.

Arriving in the mountains, they took a