condensation, or expansion, or motion, for there would be no empty space left to move to. Observation teaches us that this is not the case; therefore an infinitely extended, indivisible, immaterial substance is absurd in the highest degree, and opposed to all true philosophy.

2. The immaterialist teaches that the godhead consists of three persons of one substance, and that each of these persons can be everywhere present. Now in order to be everywhere present, each of these persons must be infinitely extended, or else each must be susceptible of occupying two or more places at the same time. If a substance be infinitely extended it ceases to be a person; for to all persons there are limits of extension called figure; but that which is not limited can have no figure, and therefore cannot be a person. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that a person should be included in a finite extent. Now that which is limited within one finite extent, cannot be included within some other extent at the same time; therefore it is utterly impossible for a person to be in two or more places at the same time, hence immaterialism is totally absurd and unphilosophical.

3. The immaterialist teaches that the substance of the Deity is not only omnipresent and indivisible, but that all other substances are contained in his substance and perform all their motions in it without any mutual action or resistance. The profound and illustrious Newton, in the Scholium at the end of the "Principia," has fallen into this error; he says, "God is one and the same God always and everywhere. He is omnipresent, not by means of his virtue alone, but also by his substance, for virtue cannot subsist without substance. In him all things are contained, and move, but without mutual passions God is not acted upon by motions of the bodies; and they suffer no resistance from the omnipresence of God." Here we have an omnipresent substance, which is said by immaterialists to be so compact as to be indivisible, with worlds moving in it without suffering any resistance: this is the climax of absurdity. All masses of substance with which we are acquainted, are susceptible of division, yet even in these, bodies cannot move without being resisted; how much more impossible it would be for worlds to exist and move in an indivisible substance without resistance, yet this is the absurdity of the immaterial hypothesis. There is nothing too ridiculous or too unphilosophical to be incorporated in an immaterial substance when its existence has been once assumed.

The reflecting mind turns away from such fooleries with the utmost disgust, and feels to pity those men who have degraded the great and all-wise Creator and Governor of the universe by applying to him such impossible, unheard of, and contradictory qualities. The heathen, in their wildest imaginations never fancied up a god that could begin to compare with the absurd qualities ascribed to the immaterialists' god.

II.—AN IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE CANNOT EXIST.

1. We shall first endeavour to show what is absolutely essential to the existence of all substance. It will be generally admitted that space is essential to existence. Space, being boundless, all substances must exist in space. Space is not the property of substance, but the place of its existence. Infinite space has no qualities or properties of any description excepting divisibility. Some eminent philosophers have supposed extension to be a property of space, but such a supposition is absurd. Extension is space itself, and not a property of space. As well might we say that azote is a property of nitrogen, whereas they are only two different names given to the same substance, as to say that extension is a property of space. Infinite space is divisible, but otherwise it cannot possibly be described, for it has no other properties or qualities by which to describe it. It has no boundaries—no figure—no other conceivable properties of any description. It has a variety of names such as space, extension, volume, magnitude, distance, &c., all of which are synonymous terms.

2. Duration is also essential to the existence of substance. There can be no such thing as existence without duration. Duration, like infinite space, is divisible, but otherwise it has no properties or qualities of any description. Like space we can call it by different names, as duration, time, period, &c; but to give it any other kind of description would be absolutely impossible. Infinite space can only be distinguished from duration by certain imaginary qualities, which can be assigned to finite portions of it, but which cannot be assigned to duration. We can conceive of cubical, prismatical and spherical portions of space, but we cannot conceive of portions of duration under any kind of shape. Both space and duration are entirely powerless, being immovable, yet both are susceptible of division to infinity. To assist us in our future remarks we shall give the following definitions:—

Definition 1.—SPACE is magnitude, susceptible of division.

Definition 2.—A POINT is the negative of space, or the zero at which a magnitude begins or terminates; it is not susceptible of division.

Definition 3.—DURATION is not magnitude, but time susceptible of division.

Definition 4.—AN INSTANT is the negative of duration, or the zero at which duration begins or terminates; it is not susceptible of division.

Definition 5.—MATTER is something that occupies space between any two instants, and is susceptible of division and of being removed from one portion of space to another.

Definition 6.—NOTHING is the negative of space, of duration, and of matter; it is the zero of all existence.

3. Modern immaterialists freely admit, as we have already shown, that "a disembodied spirit" is NOWHERE. "We must no longer allow ourselves to imagine," says the immaterialist, "that it is or can be, in any place." (Taylor's Physical Theory of another Life. Chapter II.) But that which does not occupy any place or space, has no magnitude, and is not susceptible of division; therefore it must be an unextended point or nothing—(see definitions 2 and 6,) the negative of both space and matter, that is, the negative of all existence. Immateriality is a representative of nothing: immaterial substance is only another name for no substance; therefore such a substance does not, and cannot exist.

4. Having shown that an immaterial substance can have no existence, because it has no relation to space, we shall next show that it can have no existence, because it has no relation to duration. Isaac Taylor says, "that which is wholly abstracted from matter, and in speaking of which we deny that it has any property in common therewith, can in itself be subjected to none of its CONDITIONS." One of the conditions absolutely essential to the existence of matter is duration or time. (See definition 5.) That which is not subjected to the condition of duration, must be subjected to the condition of an instant, which is the negative of duration; but nothing is also the negative of duration and of substance; (see definition 4 and 6;) therefore that which has no duration is nothing, and cannot be a substance; hence an immaterial substance cannot exist.

There are many truths which may be called FIRST TRUTHS, or self-evident truths, which cannot be demonstrated, because there are no truths of a simpler nature that can be adduced to establish them. Such truths are the foundation of all reasoning. They must be admitted without demonstration, because they are self-evident. That space and duration are essential conditions to the existence of all substance, may be denominated a self-evident truth; if so, it is useless to undertake to prove it. And in this case, the foregoing need not be considered as a demonstration, but merely