Pressed for Food.

Back in the Valley—Threatening Early on His Retreat from Washington —Battle of Snicker's Ferry—Marched to Winchester—Battle of Kearnstown—Our Retreat via. Martinsburg and Sharpsburg to Halltown—An Incident—R. W. Mahan's Prison Trials—A Large Army Concentrates at Halltown—The Wild-goose Chase Into Maryland.

Sheridan in Command—The Move up the Valley—The Twelfth Charges Rebel Skirmishers—Sheridan Retreats to Halltown—Early Demonstrates Against Him—Early Withdraws—Sheridan Moves to Charlestown—The Fight at Berryville—Grant's Visit to Sheridan—The Battle of the Opeguon —Anecdote of Sheridan—Battle of Fisher's Hill—Pursuit of the Enemy up the Valley—Destruction by Sheridan—He Falls Back to Strasburg—Battle of Tom's Brook—Our Brigade Starts for Martinsburg —Mosby Attacks an Ambulance Guard—The Twelfth Starts for the Front—Early Shells Thoburn's Camp—The Battle of Cedar Creek—The Twelfth on the Way to the Front—Sheridan on His Ride—Col. Thoburn Killed—Capt. Phil Bier Killed—The Twelfth Marches to Cedar Creek—Thence to Newtown.

The Army Moves Back to Kearnstown—Early Follows Far as Middletown —Sheridan's Cavalry Drives the Rebel Cavalry—Early Returns to New Market—Anecdotes—The Twelfth Moves to Stephenson's Depot—Salutes for Gen. Thomas's Victories—The Twelfth Sent to the Army of the James—Put into the Twenty-fourth Corps—The Opposing Pickets—Lieut. Col. Northcott's Resignation—The Sinking of Rebel Gun Boats—Rebel Deserters—The Peace Commission—Grant Reviews Our Corps—Gen. Turner Commands the Division—It Moves to Aid Sheridan—Asst. Surg. Neil's Lecture.

Part of Our Army Crosses the James—The Second Division at Hatcher's Run—The Capture of Fort Gregg—The Enemy Evacuates Richmond and Petersburg—The Pursuit—The March to Cut off Lee's Retreat—An Incident—The Second Division and One Other Were the Infantry Forces Cutting off the Retreat—The Surrender—Both Armies Cheer—Lieut. McCord—The Col. and Citizen McLean Talk—An Incident—Marched to Lynchburg and Back—Thence to Richmond—Some of the Boys Presented with Medals—Mustered Out—Sent Home—Memorial—Conclusion.

  CHAPTER I.

(1) The great War of the Rebellion had gone on for more than a year, and had assumed proportions of a grand scale, dwarfing any other ever fought on this continent, so far as there is any history; in fact, making all other wars on this side of the ocean appear, by comparison, to be Lilliputian in character; and so far as the magnitude of its theater or geographical extent was concerned, the greatest war in the history of the world.

(2) Previous to our great war it had been supposed that modern times had only one man surely—possibly others—capable of efficiently handling a hundred thousand men—Napoleon Bonaparte. But this mighty conflict was developing more than one man fully able to command that number of men in action; and at least one man capable of having a general supervision over fully a million of men in the field. We were exhibiting to the world new methods of warfare both on land and sea, and showing it that we had the most effective and intelligent soldiers in the world.

(3) Several hundred thousand men had been called into the field, armed and equipped. Men and money had been lavishly expended. There was a willingness on the part of the loyal people to spend the last dollar and furnish the last man, if they could see any evidence of progress on the part of our arms, or have any assurance of final success in the suppression of the Rebellion.

(4) The war on the part of the Government, however, had been begun with an entirely inadequate idea of the magnitude of the undertaking. It is well known that one1 high in the councils of the nation had predicted before hostilities actually began that there would be peace in sixty days, and even the good President seemed to think that all the threatening aspect of affairs would pass away if a little time were allowed for the passions of the people to cool. There seemed to be a want of comprehension on the part of the loyal people generally, and not less so on the part of those holding the reins of government, of the terrible earnestness and deadly determination of those who had taken up arms to disrupt the Government.

(5) Hence the first call for troops to cope with what was to prove to be the most determined and formidable rebellion recorded in history, was for only seventy-five thousand men, and what was worse, for only the short terms of three months, as though the suppression of the Rebellion was comparatively a trivial affair.

(6) There was some reason, however, aside from the supposed sufficiency of the first call for troops, for not calling out a greater force, namely, the lack of arms and other munitions of war; but this excuse could not be offered for the deplorable blunder, which all now can see, of making the term of the first enlistment only three months, many regiments' time expiring when they were sorely needed.

(7) In the outset of hostilities and actual conflict of arms, there was a remarkable lack of earnestness and the customary severity, which is generally supposed to characterize grim-visaged war, shown by some of our generals in the field. In some instances the first prisoners were merely sworn to not take up arms again against the Government and then let go—"a process," says Greeley in his American Conflict, "about as imposing and significant, in their view, as the taking of a glass of cider." This treatment of prisoners soon became a by-word and jeering jest among the soldiers. It is related that during the Three Months' service, when a comrade had captured a snake and was holding it up by the tail, a fellow soldier called out to him to swear him and let him go.

(8) There was great tenderness, too, in the beginning of the war, shown by professed friends of the Union, for the people of those States which assumed to be out of the Union; and for the people of the States which were nominally within the Union, yet whose loyalty was of an exceedingly questionable kind, as was manifested by their objecting to the soldiers of our country marching under our common flag, setting foot upon their soil. It was alleged by these professed friends that, by treating the Rebels with severity, the people of the seceded States would be so exasperated thereby that all hope of restoring the Union would be forever destroyed. Just as though they were not already inflamed to the highest pitch, and enraged to the last degree, when a timid, halting policy of being afraid of hurting them, was only bringing the Government into disrespect, encouraging the enemy, and making more Rebels every day; and when a decided, vigorous course toward the traitors was needed to sharply