development will assuredly not be arrested by lack of soil. The 35 to 37 millions of acres already reclaimed, and at present under culture, represent at the most a tenth of the total area of cultivable land, which is estimated roughly at 375 millions of acres, of which at least 125 millions are perfectly adapted to the culture of cereals. The four Provinces of Buenos Ayres, Santa Fé, Córdoba, Entre Rios, and the Territory of Pampa Central alone contain some 32¹⁄₂ millions of land under the plough, while there remains about 170 millions of acres of land which is just as fertile, and which without manuring or preparation would yield a splendid crop from the first year of tilth.

This transformation into an agricultural country has already borne fruit. The figures relating to external commerce, compared with the world’s statistics of cereal production, show the present position of the Argentine among the great exporting nations.

It is the Argentine which to-day, after the United States, occupies the second rank in the matter of cereal exports; and this is a significant event in the economic history of the nations, to which the attention of Europe should be directed. At the present moment the Argentine, with her 4 million tons of corn available for exportation, is not as yet mistress of the grain markets, but she represents, to those countries whose production is insufficient, a notable reserve, which has become indispensable since the United States, Canada, and Russia seem to have reached their limit of exportation.

The year 1907-8 was for the Argentine, thanks to the results of a good harvest, a period of exceptional prosperity. The average yield of wheat was 18·7 cwt. per hectare—14 bushels per acre—and in the Province of Buenos Ayres it amounted to over a ton per hectare—or 15 bushels per

acre—although the average was only 11 per acre in 1906-1907, and 13 in 1905-1906.

As for the prices, they ruled higher than any the country had so far known, even during its most prosperous periods. Wheat had been selling at 6 or 7 piastres the 100 kilos—that is, approximately, at 3s. to 3s. 6d. per bushel—and at that price agriculture still yielded a fair profit. In 1908, as a result of the bad harvests in several European countries, the sales rose to 6s.; at which price the profits on the cost of production amounted to 25% or 30%.

After this cursory glance at the present situation in the Argentine, we must also express our views of the future. Optimism is certainly permissible in the case of a country which has advanced so far in so short a time, and where prosperity is founded on a diversity of products which can never be affected by a universal crisis.

However, one well might wonder whether the Argentine might not, in the Biblical phrase, know lean years following the fat; whether she is not destined to suffer the onset of plagues, such as drought and the locust, which latter is to her, as to Egypt in the time of the Israelites, a veritable scourge. Certainly here we have one of the great risks to which the country is exposed: a country wherein all depends upon the harvest, the earth being the principal source of wealth, and the mother of all industry. Yet this danger, so real a few years ago, is greatly lessened to-day by the fact of the distribution of cultivated lands and pastures over a far greater area. A bad harvest could not compromise both agriculture and stock-raising over a stretch of more than 15° of latitude.

Yet the country is subject to a very real danger, but one of another kind. From the very exuberance of development may arise a crisis of growth; for her prosperity depends not only on plentiful harvests; it may be influenced by other factors on which it is far more difficult to pronounce.

The country must continue to require considerable sums of capital for her agricultural necessities, for her stock-raising, for commerce, and for industries; and it may be asked whether the European markets, from which, in great measure, her capital derives, can continue to afford her an ever-increasing

amount of assistance which will keep pace with her development in all directions.

The Argentine is not so far self-sufficing. The soil is, to be sure, a source of immense national wealth, but this wealth is not in the form of a reserve to be drawn on; it is, as a rule, converted into real estate directly it is produced; unless, indeed, it goes abroad. For a farmer who makes a profit, say, of £8000 or £10,000, will immediately employ his capital to acquire another holding or to start a different kind of culture, instead of clearing off the debts which already burden his property. He is contented with his position as a borrower; for if money, even on mortgage, costs him 8 to 9 per cent., he can, on the other hand, obtain a far higher interest by sinking it in the purchase of land.

From all this it results that in the Argentine rural and even urban property is largely hypothecated. It must be understood that this capital is well guaranteed, as its security rests not upon pure speculations but on the yield of the property, which is far in excess of the charges; however, since the general tendency is not towards redemption, one may wonder if, sooner or later, there may not be a lack of equilibrium between the impulse given to the country and its financial needs. The crisis which arose in the wool market in 1908, the drop in the prices of quebracho timber, and the restricted outlet for cattle on the hoof, and even for refrigerated meat,—all these partial misfortunes are salutary warnings, and we must not lose sight of them, nor allow ourselves to be hypnotised by the high prices of wheat, maize, or flax, or the heavy yield of the lucerne pastures.

For our part, in considering the future of the Republic no less than its present interests, we hope to see it enter upon a period of consolidation, rather than continue indefinitely the discussion of further progress. Before entering upon another stage of development the country must, for a while, mark time, in order to gain leisure to assume its own liabilities, rather than continue incessantly to absorb new capital.

But there is still a cloud in the serene skies of the Republic; a cloud that might be the precursor of a truly national catastrophe, if the measures necessary to avert it

were not taken in time. The peril arises neither from the economic situation, which is excellent, denoting an ever-increasing vitality, nor the relations of the Republic with the neighbouring nations, which are conceived in a spirit of peace and concord. Although a short-sighted diplomacy has attempted to envelop the relations between the Argentine and Brazil in an atmosphere of jealous distrust, there is no fundamental cause which might trouble the friendly relations of these two countries, which formerly fought side by side on the field of battle for the redemption of a sister nation. They have no conflicting economic interests which might divide them, and are destined to afford a great example of progress and of civilisation to the other States of South America.

The peril to which we refer is of a totally different character: it is caused exclusively by the exaggerated expenditure of the public administrations, and the dangerous paths of armed peace upon which the country has entered; thus implanting, in young and free America, a ruinous system, which is ruining the nations of the Old World, burdens them with insufferable taxes, and diverts from production and labour too large a proportion of citizens. In order to face imaginary dangers, Congress and the Government have lately decreed that a sum of £40,000,000 shall be expended upon armaments.

As for home politics, they form a domain which we do not desire to enter, and on which the world of affairs bestows