but I seemed to have more when I got through the lines, other stragglers having rushed through the opening we made or rode round the flanks.  We galloped off on our way back, pursued by some of the Cossacks, firing at us, until we came to a square of infantry on rising ground with muskets and fixed bayonets pointing at us.  They yelled something in Russian, I suppose calling us to surrender.  When they saw that we was not going to surrender, they fired a volley point blank at us and at the shortest range.  This was fearfully destructive, and only a few of my little squad were left.  Weightman and Marshall together with others of the 17th were captured here, one with 13 wounds and the other with 9, and were prisoners for a year.  We found the guns again re-manned and in position again across the valley, and after we had charged through them from the rear they opened fire on us again, as well as the infantry.

There were no more of the enemy in front and I told the men to separate.  James Cope, 17th Lancers, and George McGregor, 4th Light Dragoons, opened out each side of myself, and we made the best of our way back up the valley.  Cope and I reported together to the regiment which had assembled, numbered off, and been complimented by Lord Cardigan before we got there.  We were the last squad to return, and the only squad that rallied through the guns.

The engagement may be summed up thus: There were five groups which charged into the guns.  The first two were 17th Lancers, one group commanded by Colonel Mayow, chief of Lord Cardigan’s staff, the other by Troop Sergeant Major O’Hara.  The third group was the 11th Hussars under Colonel Douglas.  The fourth group were 4th Light Dragoons, commanded by Lord Paget.  The fifth group, 8th Hussars, Colonel Shewell and the last regiment to enter the batteries.  These five groups charged the masses of Russian Cavalry that were supporting the artillery, time and time again, driving them some hundred yards down the valley.  This seems almost incredible, but it must be recalled that we had no idea of the colossal blunder of which we were victims.  Our natural thought of course was that we would be immediately followed and supported by the Heavy Brigade and Infantry, both of which were stationed close in our rear.  The French Cavalry we know had moved and I thought they were there with us until I had ridden nearly into a body of Russians, taking them for the French.  Of course, the Russians shared our impression that this was the beginning of a general attack, which accounts for their temporary confusion and partial retreat.

While these five groups were going on fighting as best they could, scattering the Russian Cavalry, the General ordered out the Jeropkine Lancers—fresh troops who had not been engaged in the attack on the Heavy Brigade two hours before.  These Lancers took their position between the guns across the valley, apparently cutting off the retreat of all the Light Brigade by forming across their rear.

The officers commanding the different groups now realised that they were unsupported and in great danger.  There was a hasty effort to join forces to make the best of their way back.  Lord Paget, happening to be near the 11th Hussars, ordered Colonel Douglas to join his command.  He refused at first, but seeing himself cut off did so, and a wordy controversy as to who was technically in command takes up many pages in Paget’s book.  Probably, at the time, neither gave thought to anything but getting out of the trap.  Colonel Mayow and Sergeant-Major O’Hara joined with the 8th Hussars, making two groups fighting and charging the Russian Lancers.  Some squads of the Light Brigade had not time to wheel about, but just time to go three’s about, and charge with rear rank in front to prevent the Russian Cavalry from charging their flanks.  Not all the Brigade had fallen into these larger groups which first cut their way out.  After the remnants of these groups had escaped the Jeropkine Lancers, six squadrons strong were formed in line to prevent the stragglers from escaping.

The Brigade of Hussars seeing the Lancers marching down the valley and only a few scattered enemy, halted, wheeled about, and marched up the valley.  It was just at this time and between these two bodies that I rallied my little squad.

It is a singular thing that every authority on the Charge of the Light Brigade gives a different number of killed and wounded, but they substantially agree as to the number 198 which reported mounted after the engagement.

Lord Cardigan gives 195.  James Cope, 17th Lancers, McGregor, 4th Light Dragoons, and myself reported after the roll was called.

I am only certain of the figures for my own regiment.  The 17th Lancers went into the engagement 145 and came out 45 mounted.  Every officer of my squadron was killed or wounded.  We lost 13 prisoners, only one of them unwounded, and he was dismounted, his horse having been killed.  Of these only 3 lived to return to the English ranks, two of them from my squad—Weightman and Marshall.  Weightman, who is still living as a retired officer, had thirteen wounds, and Marshall nine wounds.

THE CAUSE OF THE CHARGE.

The phrase “Someone had blundered” is familiar to every one, but the condition of affairs which precipitated the blunder are not known and have never been stated in history.

After the Heavy Brigade made their glorious charge, the Light Brigade was placed in the North valley by order of Lord Raglan, Lords Lucan and Cardigan being absent congratulating the Heavy Brigade officers.  Both Commanders-in-chief and Staffs had assembled at the top of Sebastopol Heights and were watching the Russian Army.  They decided to force a general engagement and recapture the guns and heights the Turks had lost.  The Russian General could see the allied armies—the French massing on the heights of Sebastopol and the British Infantry and Artillery marching down both valleys.  The Russians, recognising the uselessness of trying to take Balaclava, ordered their army on the Causeway Heights to retreat and abandon the captured guns.  Lord Raglan sent General Airey, Quarter-master General, to give Lord Lucan instructions to which he paid no attention.  The third order was, “The Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights; they will be supported by Infantry which has been ordered to advance on two fronts.”  Now the trouble commenced.  Lord Lucan could see that Lord Raglan intended the whole cavalry to advance in one body, but he could not give the word of command for his two brigades to move together, not knowing the drill in vogue.  Again, how could he ask the cavalry to advance with the Artillery without ammunition?  How far could he advance against the Russian Artillery?  It would be simple slaughter to charge.  Lord Lucan had invaded the Crimea without any supply for his cannon.  He admits that he did not leave the forts till he had used all his ammunition, and that was before daylight.  He was then only one mile from Balaclava Harbour, the only place for supply, and he could have sent his ammunition wagons for it.  His artillery being only six-pounders—the smallest in the Crimea—it was impossible to draw or borrow it.  So the humbug went on, and instead of him informing Lord Raglan he had no supply of ammunition in the Crimea—which was his first duty to his Queen and country—he prepared the Heavy Brigade to support infantry at the top of the South valley,