numerically by means of the fixed unity, although that has ceased to have a material representation. In practice the new numerical values will be obtained very easily; from the theoretical point of view they are fixed by means of the formula already given:

v' = v × E'/E

a formula which by the way, shows that if it happened that for anything at any moment and at any place, the elements d, h and o took values such that the term (d' × h')/o' should return to a value equivalent to its initial value (d × h)/o, the value of this same thing would again become identical with its initial value.

This formula shows that the value of things is only relatively to be taken for it varies ceaselessly, shifting to as great a degree as supply and demand itself, just as human desire often does,—it is only mathematically fixed in time and space, we would again repeat for an infinitely short period.

This being so it is evident that it becomes possible to put down in writing all transactions by means of the unity determined on. And if this writing down of transactions can be made under a legal form, that is, can be carried out under conditions which have the effect of conferring on the seller a legal right, corresponding to what the thing is worth to him who acquires it, and here we enter into the conception of «social accountancy», it becomes useless, superfluous and even harmful to make a material use of the thing representing the unity of the value adopted.

It is thus that from the beginning, from the very time barter is abandoned and it is no longer necessary to give a kilogram of wheat to obtain possession of a thing, that at that very moment a writing down would confer on the holder of a thing a right representing a value equivalent to it and permitting him to effect under the same conditions new transactions.

If things can thus take place, it will be seen how absurd it becomes to persist in the custom of representing materially a unity which should be detached from the support which has served to define it at a given moment, and which no longer appears as anything but an abstraction permitting in a homogenous manner the arithmetical representation by figures, of the value of things, relatively and individually. This abstract unity ought to be detached from every material tie.

On the other hand, it becomes evident that money does not in the least constitute the indispensable element for effecting transactions. And if at the distant period to which the introduction of money goes back it had been possible to tell beforehand that transactions could be written down in a simple but legal manner, after having fixed as above indicated the numerical value of things by the use of a unity essentially invariable, an enormous error in principle would have been committed if to the unities admitted as estimates of value had been given, as is actually the case now, a representation of them in gold and silver,—the franc, the mark, the pound sterling.

The usage of money has taken from the unity of value that character of invariability which it ought necessarily to possess.

This unity being associated in point of fact with a real article of merchandise, society has been exposed either to want, or to have too much of the matter thus become the indispensable element of transactions, to suffer in fact monetary contractions and dilations, the results of the traffic which necessarily takes place, results which, for a nation producing the precious metals, like the United States does, may possibly end in disaster.

A confusion must necessarily be brought about between the conventional fixed value attached to pieces of gold and silver money and the actual variable value of the very matter of those pieces. The conventional value of a piece of silver corresponds to the value we have called its initial value, and we have seen it was possible to preserve to that initial value the character of absolute permanency. But how can its invariability be assured if a material support is given to it open to incessant fluctuations of value resulting from all the speculations to which what ever can be bought and sold is submitted?

The very fact of the association of the unity of value with an actual marketable article takes away all stability from the base of our estimates of the value of things. If the price of any commodity,—for example, some article of food or manufacture,—rises in comparison with what it was 50 years or a century ago, it is often asked whether the augmentation is real or only apparent and due to the diminution in the value of the metal which supports the unity: it results clearly from what has been advanced that the variation in the value of metal goes for nothing if, it be well understood that the quantity of money in use is supposed to remain exactly proportioned to the needs of the transactions. But when monetary contractions take place, the implement necessary in transactions is wanting, the value of things in general falls, for those who are engaged in making transactions offer their goods at a reduced price to get the monetary implement without which they cannot effect their operations. It would evidently be the same if this implement instead of being in gold or silver, was in wood or paper; and still the same if it was represented only by comptabilist unities.

Directly it is conceded that man must make transactions then, if an implement is indispensable to that end, be that implement paper or comptabilist unities, he will make sacrifices to procure it and will for this object part with some of his wealth, and therefore the value of things will in a general way fall. While if this implement is in excess, that is if there is monetary dilation, as excess of the implement is of no service to the great bulk of those who transact business, who only want what is necessary to effect their transactions and nothing more, it will be found that the value of things cannot be affected by this as it is in the preceding case.

We would say that if this implement is in paper, or represented by accountancy unities, its excess would do no harm, nor have any effect on the value of things, when in the contrary case as we have just seen, this value would fall. But if it is in gold or silver and instead of being stored up in the iron safes of the banks it circulates amongst those who transact business, these last will seek to get rid of it, not because as in the preceding case it is a mere implement of transaction, but as a valuable metal, and in consequence of withdrawal of this kind the value of things will be raised.

When we say that the value of things in general would rise in a case of monetary dilatation occurring in the way we have put it, and that it would fall in the case of monetary contraction pure and simple, it is because we are allowing that the supposed want or excess of money would make itself generally felt amongst those engaged in transacting business. If it only affected a special class of such persons, if gold or silver were only wanting or only circulated amongst them, it is needless to say that the rise or fall in prices would only affect the commodities in which their special property exactly consisted. We believe it right to attempt to give as logically deduced from the preceding formulas this note of precision in a rather complex question, which, as we think, has not always been rightly looked at, and that, in consequence of the fact that in money, a marketable article of variable value, is associated with a unity which ought to be invariable.

In our epoch of exact science and profound insight into phenomena and things, it is no longer possible to err on the very basis of a question of an interest so general