have now given Umra Khan full warning that, unless he retires from Chitral by the 1st of April, corresponding with the 5th day of Shawal 1312 H., they will use force to compel him to do so. In order to carry out this purpose, they have arranged to assemble on the Peshawur border a force of sufficient strength to overcome all resistance, and to march this force through Umra Khan's territory toward Chitral.

The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the present, and prevent any future, unlawful aggression on Chitral territory; and as soon as this object has been attained, the force will be withdrawn.

The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes; and they will scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards the tribesmen so long as they on their part refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops. Supplies and transports will be paid for, and all persons are at liberty to pursue their ordinary avocations in perfect security.

Orders were also now issued for the mobilisation of the 1st Division of the Field Army under Major-General Sir Robert Low.

While preparations were in progress of this force, news reached the Government of India of the disaster to a detachment of troops under Captain Ross on their way to Chitral, when Captain Ross had himself been killed, his Lieutenant, Jones, been wounded, and fifty-six men killed out of a total of seventy-one; another detachment under Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler was also known to be surrounded; and finally communication with the supporting post of Mastuj was severed. This intelligence materially altered the situation again. It was now known to the Government of India that before they had taken the action described above, Umra Khan and Sher Afzul had actually waged war upon British Indian and Kashmir troops.

The necessity for relieving the little garrison in Chitral was more imminent than had been supposed, while the reason for giving Umra Khan a period of grace within which he might withdraw from Chitral had now disappeared. Colonel Kelly, commanding the 32nd Pioneers, the senior military officer in the Gilgit district, was placed in command of the operations in the Gilgit district. His orders permitted him to make such dispositions and movements as he might think best, provided he undertook no operations which did not offer reasonable prospects of success. It was, however, felt that the relief of Chitral from the side of Gilgit was probably impossible. Gilgit is 220 miles from Chitral, and at this season of the year was cut off from all support from India, by passes 13,000 feet in height, which were now covered deep in snow, and which would not become available for the passage of troops till June. On the other hand, the road from Peshawur to Chitral was less than 200 miles in length, and on it there was only one pass of 10,000 feet which would still have snow upon it. This pass was not altogether impracticable for an army. Orders were therefore issued for the despatch of the Chitral Relief Force under Sir Robert Low, as soon as it could be made ready.

Before describing General Low's advance it is necessary to relate the circumstances under which the detachments under Captain Ross and Lieutenant Edwardes had, as mentioned above, suffered such signal loss.

CHAPTER II
CAPTAIN ROSS AND LIEUTENANT EDWARDES

On the 1st of March, while Mr. Robertson with his escort was in Chitral and active hostilities had not yet commenced, a native officer had started from Mastuj with forty men and sixty boxes of ammunition for Chitral. He had proceeded for a couple of marches and had reached Buni, when he found the road broken and rumours reached him that he was to be attacked. He accordingly wrote to Lieutenant Moberly, the special duty officer with the Kashmir troops in Mastuj, telling him of the state of affairs and asking for instructions. Rumours had by now reached Mastuj that Sher Afzul had entered Chitral territory and that large numbers of the Chitralis had joined him. But he was said to have friendly intentions towards the British and all the local head men reported to Lieutenant Moberly that no organised attack upon a party of troops was at all likely.

Still there was evidently a feeling of unrest abroad, and as a detachment of the 14th Sikhs under Captain Ross and Lieutenant Jones were now at Laspur, two marches on the Gilgit side of Mastuj, on their way up, Lieutenant Moberly wrote to ask Captain Ross to come on into Mastuj in a single march instead of two. This Captain Ross did, and on the evening of the 4th of March he started from Mastuj with fifty men to reinforce the Subadar, who was blocked at Buni. On the same day a detachment of twenty Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant J. S. Fowler, R.E., accompanied by Lieutenant S. M. Edwardes also arrived in Mastuj. The party were on their way to Chitral with engineering stores, and without halting at Mastuj they left on the following morning, March 5th, with the intention of overtaking the Subadar at Buni and with the combined party continuing the march to Chitral.

That evening Captain Ross returned to Mastuj reporting that everything was quiet at Buni, and that Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler were to leave Buni on the 6th for Chitral with the ammunition escort. On the evening of March 6th Lieutenant Moberly received a note from Lieutenant Edwardes dated noon of the same day from Koragh, a small hamlet a few miles below Buni, saying that he heard he was to be attacked near Reshun, the first stage beyond Buni. Upon hearing of this Captain Ross at once moved from Mastuj, and also wrote to the officer commanding at Ghizr, the nearest post on the Gilgit side of the Shandur Pass, asking him to send up as many men as he could possibly spare to reinforce Mastuj. The strength of Captain Ross's party was