no addition to that, because, if you do undertake to add to it or to take from it, you must depart from the jurisprudence of every civilized country,—not only of our own country, not only of England, but of every civilized nation on the continent of Europe. In the jurisprudence of every one of those countries you will find this same distinct, precise, simple rule.

Now, Sir, allow me to say,—I say it with entire respect,—the confusion in this debate has arisen from confounding the rule of law with the evidence under that rule. The rule, I say, is precise, that there must be intent. But how shall the intent be proved? Sometimes in one way, sometimes in another; sometimes by long-continued residence,—by purchase of property,—by the establishment of a home,—by the establishment of a place of business,—by all those circumstances and incidents which show fixity of purpose. All this comes under the head of evidence. It does not touch the rule of law behind.

The Senator from Illinois says there must be an act. Allow me to say that words are sometimes acts, and especially if associated with important events. It is a familiar phrase of law that language enters into what we call the res gestæ; language is welded into the transaction and becomes a part of it. Words then become things; and when were words more things than when the commanding general in Mississippi distinctly declared his purpose to resign his commission in the Army of the United States and accept a nomination as Senator? Here was a declaration constituting part of the res gestæ, and in itself an act.

I am not speaking merely on theory. I have in my hand a case, which I think, when I read it, you will see is applicable: I refer to Metcalf’s Reports, volume three, page 200, the case of Kilburn v. Bennett. In the statement of facts is the following passage:—

The case was carried before the full bench, when the ruling of the judge below was set aside, and the Court observed as follows:—

Now on the authority of this case it seems to me that the declaration of General Ames, accompanied by the acceptance of candidacy as a Senator, is clearly an act. But I do not argue that the Senate is now bound by any technical rule of this kind. It is enough if the Senate is satisfied with regard to his intent on the evidence adduced. No rule of limitation or exclusion can prevail. If the Senate believes that he had at the time the animus manendi, it must act accordingly.

Is the Senate, on the evidence before it,—without the application of any technical rule of evidence, without recognizing his declaration as part of the res gestæ,—is the Senate satisfied that at the time named he intended to reside in Mississippi? This is the whole case. On this question of fact each Senator will judge for himself, on the evidence before him. This evidence I will read in the Report of the Committee, being the language of General Ames in a written statement to them, as follows:—

On which the Committee remark:—

Sir, what more can you ask? On the report of your own Committee you have explicit evidence of the intent of General Ames to reside in Mississippi; and where intent is enough, you need add nothing to it. There is no necessity for any act beyond this declaration, which, as I have already said, is in itself an act, as the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Howard] says, taken in connection with his personal presence on the spot,—and I would add, taken in connection with all the necessary implications from his position, and from his acceptance of the candidacy. This is not a case in a justice’s court, or even in a county court. This is the Senate of the United States; and we are considering the evidence with regard to the declarations of a gentleman already chosen by a State of this Union to take his seat among us. We cannot apply to these declarations any technical rule which possibly might be applied in an inferior tribunal. We are to look at the case in its essence, and, if satisfied of the intent, we cannot go further. The Senate does not sit in chains. It may act according to its conscience on the evidence, without any constraint, except from the rule of law requiring intent.

Much stress has been laid upon the fact that General Ames held a commission in the Army of the United States, and was actually the military commander and provisional governor of Mississippi. What then? Does this affect his position now? Is a soldier or officer in the Army, is the commander of an army, shut out from the same privileges that belong to you, Sir, and to me? Each of us may change his domicile as he pleases, and to-morrow or next week transfer his home to another State of the Union, and nobody can say, No. Has the soldier or the officer fewer rights than you and I have? I think not; and I am sure that both reason and authority sustain my conclusion. I have in my hands a volume of the California Reports,—the twenty-eighth volume. I call attention to the case of The People v. William Holden, and I will not trouble you with anything more than one clause from the marginal note, as follows:—