one flesh, the nearness of kin here contemplated, and illustrated by the instances which follow, was to embrace both relationships alike?  I do not know how better to shew that, in the whole connection of this passage, the enactment is of the kind which I have mentioned, than by a quotation from the pamphlet of Mr. Keble, published in 1849.  Though, my lord, you and others have said the same things, you will, I am sure, bear with me whilst I recall the passage as it stands in the words of that revered writer.  After shewing the scope of the law to extend not merely to the Jews by the curse which it entails having been brought upon the very heathen who gave way to such iniquities, he says:—

“Now, what are the customs which were so abominable in the old inhabitants of God’s Holy Land, and caused the land itself to vomit them out? (the customs, I mean, in respect of marriage: for of the other horrors mentioned in this chapter we are not now compelled to speak.)  They are all forbidden in one general principle: ‘None of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness: I am the Lord.’  This being laid down in the 6th verse, the following verses allege so many instances, whereby God’s people might understand what ‘near of kin’ means.  And it is remarkable, that in this enunciation the law makes no distinction between those who are akin by marriage and those who are akin by blood, but mentions them indiscriminately, as if the one sort were precluded from marrying under the same penalties as the other.

“For these are the degrees expressly forbidden, in their order.  First, a natural mother, in v. 7.  Next, a father’s wife, or step-mother, in v. 8: which is the case mentioned in 1 Cor. v. 1.  Next, a sister, v. 9.  Next, a grand-daughter, v. 10.  Next, a half-sister, v. 11.  Next, an aunt by the father’s side, v. 12.  Next, an aunt by the mother’s side, v. 13.  Next, an aunt by marriage with an uncle, v. 14.  Next, a son’s wife, v. 15.  Next, a brother’s wife, v. 16.  Next, a wife’s daughter, mother, or grand-daughter, v. 17.

“Here are thirteen cases in all: six of kindred by blood, and seven of kindred by marriage: and neither by the order in which they follow one another, nor by any difference of expression regarding them, is any hint given, that the one sort of profanation is less heinous in God’s sight than the other.  The world may have come to think there is a difference, because the world will not believe that man and wife are really one flesh.  But the written law of God apparently deals with both alike.” [7]

He then adds:—

“The next remark I have to make on this, which is God’s own table of prohibited marriages, is one which it seems to me that no fair mind can deny.  Indeed, one is half ashamed to enounce it, it is so obvious: yet the reasoning on the other side appears to be mainly based on the denial of it.  It is simply this: that nearness of kin not being affected by sex, what is forbidden to a man is forbidden to a woman in the same degree of kindred or affinity, though it be not set down in words.  For instance, in v. 7, a man is forbidden to marry his mother: then, by the same rule, a woman is forbidden to marry her father, though the prohibition is not expressed.  Surely it would be fearful paltering with God’s law, not to accept and obey such a plain rule as this.  And it is to be observed, that these Canons are all addressed to men only: the woman’s duty and the woman’s sin are left to be inferred in each case: but what should we think of the woman who should therefore account herself left at liberty, so far as the Levitical laws are concerned?

“Now look at v. 16; which, being expressed in such English as we now commonly talk, would run, I suppose, as follows: ‘Thou shalt not marry thy brother’s widow: she is one flesh with thy brother, and is therefore thine own sister.’  Can any other interpretation be put upon it? and if this be the right interpretation, are not marriages with a brother’s widow plainly forbidden among the Canaanitish abominations?” [8]

All this appears to me not only a fair and right explanation, with no unwarrantable deductions or inferences, but one absolutely irrefutable, unless God Himself have marked in some other place a dispensation or exception to be made to it.  I know such dispensation or exception is just what is claimed.  To deal with such allegation is the very object of my addressing you, and I shall shortly come to that part of my subject.  But it may not be amiss here just to call attention to the fact that Dr. M’Caul himself (whom I think I may designate as the most learned and able of the advocates for the change of the law in question) seems to admit that, were there no other Scripture to override the law as thus proclaimed, he should acknowledge the force of this part of the xviii. chapter of Leviticus as conclusive on the unlawfulness of marriage with the deceased wife’s sister; for he says expressly, in his first letter on the subject, addressed to the Rev. W. H. Lyall, “On some points, I think, we agree; as, for instance, that the final appeal in questions relating to marriage must be to the Word of God. . . . I also am convinced that the laws in Leviticus xviii., being a part of the moral law, stand on a totally different footing from circumcision, or the Jewish Sabbaths, or abstinence from meats.  Indeed, I believe that this marriage law was given to the Gentile Churches in the famous decree of the Council of Jerusalem.  On this ground, I believe that the prohibitions of Leviticus xviii. are binding on all Christians.”  That is, he believes, that the general law then given, as being of a moral nature, and intended for all men, was distinctly re-enacted, and re-decreed for the sake of greater perspicuity, by the Christian Church in the Council at Jerusalem.  And he goes on—“I agree, further, with those who interpret ‘woman’ or ‘wife’ in these prohibitions as comprehending widowhood, so that these females are prohibited, not only during the lives of their husbands, but absolutely and forever.”  And he adds—“And, lastly, I admit that from the prohibited marriages enumerated, compared with other parts of the Divine legislation, others not enumerated may be pronounced unlawful.” [9]  Where we may see that, although with a certain reserve, yet the principle of arguing from analogy, and from a case to its converse, in regard to sex, appears to be admitted.  And I think I do not misrepresent the whole tone and sense of the two letters of Dr. M’Caul, when I say that I am convinced, but for the 18th verse of the xviii. chapter, he would himself readily have allowed the full weight of Mr. Keble’s statement, and considered these unions to be absolutely prohibited.

But next as to the exception claimed.  It is true that there is an exception to the working of the law laid down in verse 16, concerning the brother’s wife, by a positive enactment in Deuteronomy (chap. xxv. v. 5–10), where provision is made for a man “raising up seed unto his brother,” by taking to