قراءة كتاب A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Volume 1 (of 3)

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A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Volume 1 (of 3)

A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Volume 1 (of 3)

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دار النشر: Project Gutenberg
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begins; and therefore adoptive relatives are among the kindred. Where the potestas ends, kinship ends; so that a son emancipated by his father loses all rights of agnation. And here we have the reason why the descendants of females are outside the limits of archaic kinship." Indeed "it is obvious that the organization of primitive societies would have been confounded, if men had called themselves relatives of their mother's relatives."[17] The basis of the patriarchal family is the patria potestas, but in its "normal shape" it has not been and could not be "generally a durable institution."[18] Yet its former universality may be inferred from certain derivative institutions, such as the perpetual tutelage of women, the guardianship of minors, the relation of master and slave, and especially from agnation which is found "almost everywhere" and is "as it were a mould" retaining the imprint of the paternal powers after they have ceased to exist.[19] Applying this test chiefly, Maine finds evidence of the existence of the potestas among the Hebrews as well as all the peoples of the Aryan stock; and he believes that it would be hard to say "of what races of men it is not allowable to lay down that the society in which they are united was originally organized on the patriarchal model."[20]

The patriarchal family as thus constituted is the "type of an archaic society in all the modifications which it was capable of assuming." From it as in concentric circles have been successively evolved all the higher forms of political organization. Everywhere, as at Rome, "the aggregation of families forms the gens or house. The aggregation of houses makes the tribe. The aggregation of tribes constitutes the commonwealth."[21] The state is therefore the result of the expansion of its primordial cell;[22] and the genealogical organization of society precedes and overlaps the territorial. All these groups, lower and higher, regard themselves as united by the bond of kinship. But, as a matter of fact, the kinship is often assumed; and the heterogeneity of blood is explained as the result of the fiction of adoption by which relationship is artificially extended and strangers are admitted to the sacra. Without this fiction, says Maine, "I do not see how any one of the primitive groups, whatever were their nature, could have absorbed another, or on what terms any two of them could have combined, except those of absolute superiority on one side and absolute subjection on the other." Society could hardly have escaped from its "swaddling clothes."[23] Furthermore, a strong motive for the artificial extension of the family is derived from the worship of ancestors. The earnest desire of the ancients for male issue to perpetuate the family rites has tended to foster adoption, and it probably accounts for the levirate and other similar expedients to provide an heir.[24]

II. CRITICISM OF THE THEORY BY SPENCER AND McLENNAN

The patriarchal family of the Ancient Law, whose leading features have now been presented, reappears with slight modification in the later writings of Sir Henry Maine.[25] It has been widely accepted. Yet it was inevitable that a theory which on its face appears to neglect many of the most remarkable facts everywhere observable in the social life of primitive men[26] should arouse most serious doubt. Nor will it do, with Starcke,[27] to excuse the author on the ground that his conclusions are intended to be true only for the domain of the law-books, of comparative jurisprudence; for obviously his language will not bear that construction.

Herbert Spencer was the first writer to subject Maine's hypothesis to a luminous criticism.[28] First he points out that Maine has not been entirely guiltless of "the lofty contempt" entertained by civilized peoples for their barbarous neighbors, which he himself censures as a serious error. For he "has practically disregarded the great mass of the uncivilized" peoples, and "ignored the vast array of facts they present at variance with his theory." Nor, in favor of a primitive patriarchal state, is it safe to assume that "the implicit obedience of rude men to their parents is doubtless a primary fact." For, "though among lower races, sons, while young, may be subordinate, from lack of ability to resist; yet that they remain subordinate when they become men cannot be assumed as a uniform, and therefore as a primary, fact." This objection is sustained by reference to many savage and barbarous tribes among which parents exercise little or no control over the children. Again, it is by no means established that "the history of political ideas begins, in fact, with the assumption that kinship in blood is the sole possible ground of community in political functions." On the contrary, "political co-operation arises from the conflicts of social groups with one another;"[29] and though it may be facilitated by a feeling of common descent, examples of political combination may be produced in which relationship is not considered. Furthermore, it is hard to conceive how so advanced a conception of government as is implied by the patria potestas could exist in the "infancy of society;" nor has it yet been proved that in the primitive state the individual is entirely lost in the family group, which holds all property in common. Instances of "personal monopoly" of property among low races are not wanting. Finally the assumption that in

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