not well consider that it is no addition to the Word of God to command things for order and decency provided they are enjoined only as regulations of human authority.  And supposing some persons continue perplexed and under scruples, the Church may, notwithstanding, without sin, insist upon compliance with decent ceremonies; and all this without being guilty of offending our weak brethren, for here the offence is taken, not given.  It is the prejudice and mistake of the scrupulous person that disturbs himself.”  A somewhat more exact discrimination as to causes of offence than the Commissioners seem to have “dreamed of in their philosophy!”  But the Bishops of 1661 continue, “Neither will the case of St. Paul not eating flesh if it offended his weak brother give any support to the objection.  For here, it must be observed, the Apostle speaks of things not commanded by God, or His Church, of matters which had nothing of decency or significancy for religious purposes, and therefore in a case thus unconnected with Divine worship St. Paul was willing to resign his liberty rather than offend his brother.”  Surely a remark not without a very close significance in defence of those who are unwilling to forego what they deem so important to the due celebration of Divine Service, even though some are offended at it.  “But if any man should venture to break a just law or custom of the Church, the Apostle marks him for a contentious person (1 Cor. xi. 16).”  Has this no bearing upon objectors now?  And the Bishops continue, “That these ceremonies have occasioned many divisions, as it is pretended, is no more their fault than the misunderstandings between the nearest relations, accidentally consequent upon the preaching of the Gospel (Luke xii.) can be fairly charged upon the Christian religion.” [13]  Have our present Commissioners duly regarded all this in their hasty conclusion?

To sum up:—these arguments, if not pressed to the full as to sin or fault in those who may not use or carry out a prescribed ceremonial in all circumstances, such as, for instance, long desuetude, may, at the very least, one would think, be of sufficient weight defensively for such as have merely obeyed the Law to prevent hard words being used either by Royal Commissioners, or any others in high places, towards those, I say, whose offence is merely that they have thus obeyed it.  And the fact of a ceremony, significant, though giving offence, being thus prescribed by the Canon, and others of like kind, contended for by the Savoy Episcopalian Divines, though confessed to be things indifferent, gives a special application of the whole to the one argument of the Commissioners concerning the vestments being “regarded by none as essential.”  For let it be well observed that the argument of the Canon is; This ceremony, the sign of the Cross, though derided by Ethnics and Jews, is rejoiced in by the Apostles; it begets a reverend estimation in regard to a Sacrament: even the abuse of a thing doth not take away the lawful use (no, not when the abuse has been by Rome).  The usage is indifferent, non-essential, in itself, and the conclusion is, it is all the more to be retained.  Moreover, being ordered by lawful authority, it ought not to be made light of, or objected to.  In which principles the divines of the Savoy Conference and the last revisers of our Prayer Book agree.  Surely, then, these authorities in all this are as widely divergent from the views and reasoning of the Royal Commissioners as east is from west, or black from white.  And the whole comparison teaches us much as to the value of their one argument, which I have ventured to call a sophism, as to the vestments being “by none regarded as essential.”  Moreover, if Bishop Sanderson’s remark is sound, that “to take away the indifferency of things indifferent is superstition,” it will not be hard to decide between those who reverently use, and those who bitterly denounce, the vestments, which are the superstitious persons in the present controversy.

But let us proceed to another point.  I said, that even when a thing or usage may be in itself not essential, yet the liberty to use it may be highly essential, and this, in spite of its giving grave offence to many.  Take a brief illustration of this.  We all know there was a time when the marriage of the clergy gave grave offence to many.  Suppose at such period a Royal Commission had been appointed to inquire into the importance of the celibacy of the clergy.  Say the Commissioners had reported, “We have examined many witnesses, married and unmarried.  We find considerable difference of opinion.  But we find that by none, even among the married clergy, is the marriage of priests regarded as essential to any priestly act, whilst their marriage gives grave offence to many.  We are therefore of opinion that it is expedient to enforce a greater uniformity of practice by restraining the marriage of priests, and admitting no deviation from what has been a long-established usage in the Church, &c. &c.”  Now no one among us will deny the fact of marriage being unessential to the functions of the priesthood, and yet the liberty to marry may be very essential indeed to the welfare of the Church.  This liberty, for “Bishops, Priests, and Deacons, as for all other Christian men, to marry at their own discretion, as they shall judge the same to serve better to godliness,” was at any rate thought essential enough to be made the subject of one of our Articles.  And surely this may shew something as to the weight to be attached to the one argument of the Commissioners, for the “opinion” which they put out, and the conclusion at which, on this sole basis, they arrive.

There is one point, further, which I should like briefly to touch upon before leaving this matter of essential or non-essential, for it shews how very carelessly or unscrupulously the Commissioners have done their work, and made their Report.  The citation, which in its commencement they give from the Commission appointing them, contains these words: that “it is expedient that a full and impartial enquiry should be made into the matters aforesaid,” viz. ornaments, vestments, and such like, “with the view of explaining or amending the said rubrics, orders, and directions, so as to secure general uniformity of practice in such matters as are essential.” [15]  Now, observe, by their own shewing, by the evidence they adduce, by the one argument they advance, they recommend changes to secure a greater uniformity in things which are not essential!  Their own very statement about these things, their sole ground on which they form their opinion and base their recommendation, is, that in regard to those witnesses whom they have examined, they (the ornaments or vestments) are by none regarded as essential.  They accept and endorse this; and then, in spite of the terms of their commission to enquire how to secure a general uniformity of practice in such things as are essential, the only recommendation which they make is upon that which they proclaim to be unessential, and what is more, upon the very ground of its being unessential!