The Belgian Front

AND

ITS NOTABLE FEATURES

BY
CAPTAIN WILLY BRETON

OF THE BELGIAN ARMY

Translated from the French

LONDON:
CHATTO & WINDUS
MCMXVIII

The illustrations are from photographs
taken by the Photographic Service
of the Belgian Army
Command

THE BELGIAN FRONT

AND ITS NOTABLE FEATURES.

The Belgian Army's Activities since the Battle of the Yser.

Everyone knows how severely the Belgian Army was tested in the initial stages of the campaign. Caught unawares by the war while in the midst of re-organisation, it had to struggle alone, for long weeks on end, against forces greatly superior in both numbers and equipment, suddenly hurled against it in accordance with a deliberate and carefully planned scheme of attack.

Yet the Belgian Army bravely faced the enemy, grimly determined to fulfil its duty to the last, and at once aroused enthusiasm by its heroic resistance at Liège, from August 8 onwards, to the onset of several army corps. On the 12th the troops emerged victoriously from the bloody engagements at Haelen; and not till the 18th, and then only to escape being overwhelmed by the ever-rising flood of invasion, did the Belgian Army abandon its positions at La Gette and fall back on Antwerp, the national stronghold in which would be concentrated the whole of the country's powers of opposition. Its retreat was covered by rearguards which fought fiercely, especially at Hautem Ste. Marguerite. Namur, threatened since August 19th, fell to the enemy on the 23rd, after several of its forts had been destroyed by a terrific bombardment and the complete investment of the position made further resistance impossible. By a desperate effort, some 12,000 men of the 4th Division escaped the assailant's grip and succeeded in reaching France in the first instance, and Antwerp subsequently.

The army, left to its own devices in the great fortress which it still hoped to make impregnable, continued the stubborn fight against its implacable foe, though it had suffered cruel losses and the Germans had initiated a reign of terror in the invaded provinces. It did everything possible to assist the Allies against the common enemy; first, by a sortie, made while the battle of the Somme was in progress; and then by a second vigorous and timely attack which coincided with the immortal victory of the Marne. For four days (September 9-13, 1914) the Belgian troops hurled themselves on the strong German positions facing Antwerp, drove back the masking forces in them, and prevented three whole divisions from going to the support of von Kluck's hard-pressed army. The part played by the Belgian Army in the battles of the Marne was, although an indirect one, very important and effective—as the Germans themselves have admitted.[A]

While engaged in continually harassing the enemy and also putting the fortress into a proper condition for defence, the Belgian Army was preparing, in the closing days of September, for a fresh and vigorous offensive to be directed chiefly against the left wing of the German containing forces, when it was confronted by a pressing danger which completely altered the aspect of affairs.

The Germans, having massed before Antwerp all the huge resources at their disposal, decided to attack the Belgian Army as it lay by breaching the defences of the fortress. On September 29th the first shells from the mammoth guns fell on the forts of Waelhem and Wavre-Sainte-Catherine, doing fearful damage, and from that moment the fate of Antwerp was sealed. The Belgian commander saw this clearly; and one of the things most greatly to his credit will always be that in these tragically momentous hours he was able to keep a stout heart and make the manly decision to abandon a position which he could not hold, in order to save his fighting army and continue the struggle elsewhere without respite or signs of weakening.

To cover the operations of evacuating from Antwerp all supplies that could be moved, and to ensure the army's retreat towards the coast, the Belgian troops, though exhausted and half-dead with fatigue, fought steadily for eight days under a fire of unprecedented violence.

The order for a general retreat was not given till the night of October 6-7, by which time the limit of resistance had been reached. Only one narrow avenue still lay open—between the Scheldt on the one side and the Dutch frontier and the sea on the other. Protected at first by a flanking guard (a cavalry division and two infantry divisions) and later by a rear-guard of two cavalry divisions, the field army managed by a miracle to reach the Yser, without leaving anything behind in the hands of the enemy during that epic retreat in which the exhausted troops had to cover more than 100 kilometres of congested roads.

The Yser line had not been designedly selected. But at the moment it happened to be the nearest line on which the Belgian Army could link up with the Allied forces now gradually advancing northwards along what has been termed "the sea-board route." Prodigies of valour and endurance were still needed to make the continuous front a fact and to shatter the enemy's efforts in the great battle of Flanders.

It is not my intention to recapitulate here the ensuing changes of fortune. The first act of the drama was, as everybody knows, the desperate fight which the "Belgian Army of ragamuffins"—now reduced to 80,000 men, with but 48,000 rifles and 350 guns—put up on the Yser during the last two weeks of October, against 150,000 Germans—mostly fresh troops—employing at least 500 guns of all calibres. Except for a reinforcement of 6,000 French marines, it was at first unsupported, yet it maintained an heroic resistance for eight days, fired by the passionate appeal and the example of its king. After October 23rd it had the help of the first detachments from the French division under Grossetti, and kept up the fight for another week with almost superhuman energy.

On the 31st the Germans were driven from Ramscapelle, and obliged to give ground before the inundation, whose dark, stealthy waters slowly but surely invaded the low-lying plain between the river and the Nieuport-Dixmude railway.

The battle of the Yser was then practically over. It had ended in victory, and the direct road to Dunkirk and Calais was barred to the enemy. He had suffered huge losses; but those of the Belgian Army also had been heavy enough—they were placed at 11,000 killed and missing and 9,000 wounded, a total of some 25,000 men, including those put out of action by sickness and exhaustion. The cadres had been so depleted that some regiments had only about ten officers left. Material was in a sad condition; half of the guns, rifles and machine-guns were useless, at least for the time being, and reserves of ammunition had given out.

The men looked hardly human in their ragged clothing. There were terrible gaps in their ranks. The infantry—to mention only the arm which had the hardest fighting to do—was reduced to 32,000 rifles. Yet, in spite of its weakness and its destitution—all the more pitiable now that winter was approaching—this army set about mounting guard over the last fragment of Belgian soil which its valour