Army, would not have failed to profit by the least negligence on our part, nor to try for an easy success at any weak point discovered in our lines. But no chance of the kind was given them.

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The system of defence created by the Belgian Army along the front, as briefly described above, served a double purpose.

First, it gave support to the left flank of the Allied forces along the western front, and at this end barred the most southerly roads to Dunkirk and Calais.

Secondly, it preserved unviolated for Belgium the last fragment of her national soil—an object of both political and military importance.

While the first shows with sufficient clearness the importance of the part undertaken by the Belgian Army, the latter explains even more fully the great value which that army sets upon the positions entrusted to its valour. It realises in full the seriousness of its task, for by relieving the Allies of all anxiety concerning the most northerly part of their front, it gives them the necessary freedom of action for dealing the enemy, in selected sectors, those heavy blows which have already repeatedly shaken the might of Germany.

But how the Belgian soldiers' readiness to do their part without flinching stiffened into a firm resolve when they reflected that, in doing it, they were also defending against the enemy's greed the last few square miles of Belgian territory, in which the air they breathed was still free, in which lived their king! What a holy enthusiasm was kindled in their hearts by the prospect of one day leaping from their trenches to drive out the tyrannical and cruel oppressor!

These are the noble feelings whence spring the moral strength and stout-heartedness of our troops—qualities which have enabled them to endure without a murmur severe privations, the cruel separation from all they hold most dear, the long sojourn in their comfortless trenches, amid water and mud and ruins that become more and more depressing—heart-breaking surroundings among which they will have to pass yet a fourth winter, now close at hand.

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To give a better idea of the work imposed on the Belgian Army it will be convenient to summarise what, in the present war, is implied by organising the defences of a sector. The power of modern artillery and explosives, which are able to destroy the most massive fortifications, renders it impossible to rest content with a single position, however strong it may be. Hence the absolute necessity for extending the state of defence to a deep zone and for creating several successive positions. This is the only way of localising a temporary success, such as the enemy may win at any time if he take the necessary steps and be willing to pay a heavy price for it. Moreover, every position must itself consist of a series of defensive lines, a short distance apart, each covered by its own subsidiary defences.

These conditions are all the more difficult to fulfil when the defences are rendered less permanent by the nature of the ground, as is the case on the Belgian front, where one cannot burrow into soil which is practically at sea level. It thus comes about that—to take an example—the organised zone, 10 to 12 kilometres deep, between the two natural defensive lines of the Yser and the Loo canal, is nothing more than an unbroken series of organised lines, placing as many successive obstacles in the path of an assailant who may have succeeded in breaking through at any point.

The positions nearest to the enemy are necessarily continuous; and the lie of each is influenced not merely by the terrain but still more by the arbitrary direction of the contact lines of the two opponents. Each line, therefore, follows a twisting course. More or less straight stretches are succeeded by salients and re-entrant angles which take the most varied forms. The defences embrace farms and other premises and small woods, all converted into points d'appui. Where such are lacking at important points, they must be created artificially.

Communication trenches, allowing movement out of sight of the enemy, connect the various positions, and the successive lines of a position, with one another. Shelters have to be constructed everywhere—they cannot be built too strong, to protect the men as much as possible from bombardment and from the weather during their long spells on guard in the trenches. Special emplacements must be most carefully prepared for machine-guns, bomb-throwers and trench-mortars, which play a part too important to need special comment.

The whole zone is dotted over at various distances from the enemy with batteries, or emplacements for batteries, of all calibres. You will understand that their construction represents a vast amount of hard and exact work, and that only with the greatest difficulty can they be more or less satisfactorily hidden from the enemy's direct or aerial observation in a plain that is practically bare and commanded everywhere by the Clercken heights.

The magnitude of the movements of troops and material, as well as the need for ensuring rapid transfer in all directions, have compelled the creation of all means of communication to alleviate the existing shortage—roads, tracks and railways of standard or narrow gauge. The execution of such work is attended by great difficulty where the soft nature of the soil gives an unreliable foundation. You may imagine also how complicated the task is when foot-bridges, in many cases several hundred yards long, have to be carried right across the floods in full view of the enemy, to give access to the most advanced positions. In conclusion, we may mention among the most important undertakings the vast network of telegraph and telephone wires, with which the whole of the occupied zone has to be covered in order to inter-connect the numberless centres and keep them in touch with the posts close to the enemy lines.

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Topographically, the sector which the Belgian Army has had to organise and defend is certainly one of the worst. This will be denied neither by the British units which this year occupied the Nieuport district nor by the French units linked up with the Belgians near Boesinghe and Steenstraat. Several descriptions have been written of the peculiar appearance presented by this low-lying, perfectly flat, region between the Franco-Belgian frontier, the sea coast and the Yser, and known as the "Veurne-Ambacht." It is a monotonous plain of alluvial soil, which centuries of toil have slowly won from the waters. As far as the eye can see stretch water-meadows, which serve as pasturage for large numbers of cattle. That they may be flooded during the winter and drained again later in the year, these water-meadows are surrounded by irrigation ditches three to four yards wide—"vaarten" or "grachten," as they are called locally.

A glance at the Staff map reveals so great a number of these ditches that the district appears to be nothing more than a huge marsh. As a matter of fact, the country is subdivided into innumerable lots by this inextricable tangle of ditches, and looks like a huge fantastic chess-board. With the approach of winter the "vaarten" become brimful of water; and at any time of the year a short spell of rain makes them overflow and transform the ground into a morass.

During the happy times of peace the only shelter to be found on the plain was that of the villages or hamlets, their houses as a rule grouped round a slated steeple, and of the isolated farms whose red roofs relieved the monotony